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Promoting the development and dissemination of economic and 
political information has clearly become a common legal solution to a 
variety of public policy problems and market breakdowns. Applying 
the perspective of two important legal approaches, law and economics 
and civic virtue, 1 many scholars have demonstrated the theoretical 
and practical values of increased information in enhancing both public 
and private decisionrnaking. 2 
The approach of law and economics can be traced back to early 
scholarship on private commercial and corporate markets. This litera­
ture envisioned a state of "perfect information" and zero transaction 
1. l use the term civic virtue, though this school can also be identit1ed more generally as civic 
republicanism. 
2. See infra notes 20-66 and accompanying text. 
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costs as the ideal environment for facilit2ting "pareto-superior" ex­
changes and moving toward the economic ideal, "pareto optir11ality."3 
In order to improve imperfect markets, therefore, the early lavi-and­
economics literature often suggested thftt the government should step 
in, through either the adoption of legal rules requiring disclosure of 
information by private parties, the direct production of information by 
public sources, the creation of property rights in information, or some 
combination thereof.4 Similarly, in response to analogous concerns in 
the governmental sphere, law-and-economics scholars (especially 
many who are writing in the public choice tradition)5 have found that 
the public has a disincentive to gather political information due to seri­
ous free-rider problems. 6 The solution offered recently by some of 
these scholars, like many of their private law predecessors, has been to 
adopt a variety of legal doctrines that either increase the availability of 
information to the general public or improve the ability of private incii­
viduals and diffuse groups to collect such information. 7  
From a quite different perspective (though in some respects pursu­
ing oddly parallel goals), recent writings in the civic virtue tradition 
have applauded attempts to stimulate rational dialogue by expanding 
the amount of information available to the public and to actors in 
3. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. I, 8 (1960) (noting that with zero 
transaction costs, efficient distribution of resources is achievable regardless of how courts set the 
initial entitlement). Unfortunately, because information ordinarily has many of the qualities of a 
public good (namely, it is freely available to the pubiic without possibility of exclusion of free 
riders and without increasing costs to producers) the private market frequently faiis to stimulate 
adequate levels of information. See Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of lnformationally 
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REv. 393 (1980). 
4. As a consequence, the private free-riding tendency not to produce information couid be 
minimized. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
The assumption that economic agents prefer to have better information if they can acquire it 
without cost is implicit in models determining efficient information structures and even in 
models of optimal search: In these models, the costs of information acquisition and trans­
mission and the costs of search are the only factors that limit the quest for more 
information. 
L. PHILLIPS, THE ECONOl\IICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 12 (1988). 
5. Publi c choice is "the application of economic (models] to poli t ic &] decisionmaking.·· fo;<, 
The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision f,faking: Antitrust as a Window. 61 
N.Y.U. L REv. 554. 560 n.l7 (1986). 
6. Moreover, this incentive supposedly affects groups differently: ;he rise of so-called special 
interest groups in a variety of legislative and administrative contexts is '�aid to be Ltrgely the 
result of asymmetry in information acquisition between more diifu-;e groups and more concen­
trated groups. Na;·rowly focustd, more concentrated groups. acco;·ciing to this analysis, have an 
information/trans�tction-cost advantage in pursuing their political interests because they suffer 
from few er and less-pronounced collective action problen;s. See inf"u notes 28-32 and accompa­
nying text. 
7. Toward this end, legal and other mechanisms would be <!dopt"d that case dis::losure of 
informarion into the public domain. Suci1 rnechani�ms include strict enforcement of the first 
amendment, ex pansive disclosure requiren1ents, and '"lib.-:r;::tl"' techniques of statutory constnJc­
tion and judicial rcvie"-v. Sqe infi·a notes 33-48 and acc(hnpanying I��t. 
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Congress and administrative agencies. This literature envisions delib­
eration on ethical norms as being enhanced by the abiiity of diverse 
groups to present their views in the political sphere, 3 thereby increas­
ing the variety of perspectives.9 
Despite these persuasive arguments, there are times when we 
might well prefer to be less informed. For example, many people 
would prefer not to know a major piece of personal information, the 
specific date of their own death. 10 This article explores the ramifica­
tions of this powerful insight in the arena of public decisionmaking by 
detailing the advantages which can flow from the structure of some 
political institutions that limit political information. 
In developing this argument, I will rely principally on the litera­
ture on political parties and party identification, suggesting that both 
the value and vi.ability of parties depend on their ability to li:mit certain 
types of information and to channel information to centralized polit­
ical institutions. In this sense, the present analysis is a sequel to a 
prior article, in which I relied on the literature on political parties to 
highlight some of the benefits of political centralization and the poten­
tial costs of certain decentralizing reforms advanced in the civic virtue 
literature.11 Here, I argue that if one focuses on questions of mass 
S. In particular, checks and balances, decentralized units of decisionmaking, and propor­
rional representation have been offered as beneficial techniques for "proliferating pcims of ac­
cess" to governmental deliberations, expanding the number and types of groups that are able to 
in;roduce their particular perspective into the public debate. See infra notes 60-65 and accompa­
n ying text. 
9. Of course, in comparison to the classic law-and-economics perspective , civic virtue advo­
cates emph11size the value of information in terms of improving the ethical decisionmaking of 
public and private decisionmakers. As set forth below, rational dialogue is supposed to "ma�<e us 
rhin!-: from :he point of view of everyone" by elucidating differing viewpoints, persper:tiv,�s, and 
bac!cgrounds, forcing us to appr·ociatc our differences and to feel empathy and resp,::ct for those 
who do not share our background and v iewpoint. Under this framework, information is not 
simply a utilitarian exchange of price or similar information about goods and serv i ces; it encom­
oass�s the examination from different perspectives of the normative value of different life styles. 
From this intel!ectual free exchange and dia logue, which trac ks many traditional liberal defenses 
of the first amendment, an agreement on social ends and an appreciation of private autonomy is 
>upposed to be furthered. Thus, while law-and-economics scholars emphasi ze the ·,raluc of infor­
mation in improving ti1e instrumental ability of private actors to achieve or funher their own 
preexisting goals, civic virtue scholars see the exchange of viewpoints as helping to shape those 
very goals. 
10. See. e.g . .  Fitts & Fitts, Ethical Swndards of the Medical Profession, 297 ANi-;ALS 17, 25 
(1955). In a quite different area. the law of evidence, courts routinely exclude information from 
admi•;sion on the grounds that its prejudicial effect ··substantially outweighs"" its probative va!u�. 
Se� FED. R. EvlD. �-03. 1\Jeedlt":s:� ro sny. the list of inforrntliion society n1ight prefer individuals 
;10� to �,:nr.I',V i:� t>xtensive. S;:::, e.g. c·. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERT't' i\�IJ FREErJO:"i OF 3PE.�CH 21 
(]989) (�;urnrn�J.i-izing nurr.erous e:..:arnples). 
11. See Fitts, The Vices o_f Virtue: A Political Parry Perspeclirt! on Civic Virtue .!!.(ej'ornz_..,. oj'thc! 
Legisfarive Process. !36 U. P.-\. L. Rev. 1567 ( 1988) [hereinafter Fitts, Vices of Virtue]; sec also 
Fitts. Leak Bejim: Yuu Lmp: Some Coution(//y Notes on Civic Repubficonisrn, n Y.;LE L.J. 1651. 
(1938). V/hll.� :_he political party zpprcash has not been explored by civic virtur: c:nd la\v-and·· 
::(:ry;-:ornir.:s sc�!ola;s, f)O!itic�.J ?C.tties appear ro enjoy the strong sur:port Gf "a_ lar[.:� rna.jority r:f 
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political organization and group dialogue, channeling information to 
central political institutions, rather than simply permitting its diffusion 
among the public, can be seen as a valuable tool in several different 
ways. In particular, limiting information can sometimes narrow and 
rationalize political choice, promote greater popular accountability 
(especially among the poor), stimulate group dialogue, and forge polit­
ical agreements.12 Based on these observations, I will sketch four sep­
arate explanations (what I will crudely call models) of how less 
information can be beneficial. 
The first model suggests that more limited information can im­
prove the rationality of decisionmaking itself . :J:n recent years, social 
psychologists have begun to examine the complex process through 
which decisionmakers evaluate new information and make decisions 
about appropriate action. This still- evolving and somewhat contro­
versial literature suggests that the use of certain simplifying devices, 
heuristic shortcuts which in effect exclude information and narrow 
choices, can improve decisionmaking. 1 3 As outlined below, party 
identification, and party influence more generally, have served this role 
for the public, especially the poor, by ignoring certain types of political 
information and emphasizing others. 
The second model suggests that less information sometimes can 
further traditional utilitarian goals by helping to overcome various 
collective action problems. As numerous economisis and political 
scientists have noted, many collective action problems (in other words, 
many problems of group government organizations) stem from situa­
tions in which individuals' or groups' pursuit of their narrow self-in-
maimtream political scientists" concerned with government organization, see L. SABATO, THE 
PARTY's JUST BEGUN: SHAPING POLITICAL PARTIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 2 (1988), and 
offer an important contrast to t he usual law-and-economics and civic virtue perspectives. As a 
strong advocate of political parties, E.E. Schattschneider, once wrote, "modern democri!cy i:; 
unthinkable save in terms of the parties. As a m atter of fact, the condition of the parties is the 
best possible evidence of the nature of any regime." E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERN­
!VIENT i {1942). Wh ilt political parties probably enjoyed their greatest academic support in tl1e 
1940s and 1 950s, there has been renewed scholarly interest of late, in part for the reasons sug­
:sested in this article. 
12. It should be noted that group dialogue in the political context often occurs in fundamen­
tally different vvetys frcm dialogue in the adjudicatory context. 
As deveiop.::d below. pnn of the argument is based on the potent ial advantages of more ccc!1-
(falized information :;yc,tems. In this sense. limiting i nformat ion means limiting (or failing to 
��ubsidize) inforn1ation in one cont��xt n.s coinpared to another. At the sam t!  time, I a1:;o suggest 
that alons certain Jirnensions dispersed information In:..ty have negative effects on an �bsol�te 
level. reg�Hdless of \Vhether resources used to develop information nre transferred to a more 
centralized information structure. 
13. Analogous obs-;:rvations have been m�'de in social science theory, philosophy. iiternry 
theory, tind private lav,.. l i terature. See j;zj.'ra EOtes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
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terest rnakes most or aU parties worse off. 14 Government dominated 
by special interest groups is thought to create an important example of 
!:his difficulty. Although the traditionallaw··<J.n.d-,eccmom_ics solution is 
to expand t.h� ability of diffuse groups to acq1..'ci.re informo.ti.on, these 
problems also can be reduced by decreasing the ability of narrower 
interest groups and individual politicians to develop information inde­
pendently. Is Social and political structures that downplay certain in­
formation, especially strong political parties and party identification, 
have often helped overcome the influence of narrower constituencies 
in this way. 
The third model suggests that less information can make it easier 
to reach political agreements and to overcome stalemates because ac­
tors with less information may avoid politically contentious issues. 
While confronting problems normally improves the political process, 
in some contexts less information can serve to remove intractable con­
troversies from the political agenda.I6 For example, many budget 
problems and political party divisions appear to have resulted from 
our inability at times to prioritize among issues and to balance con­
frontation with avoidance in this way. 
Finally, as a normative, ethical matter, vagueness about a group's 
14. See genem/iy R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COL­
LECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
i 5. The prob!em and solution can thu� be conceptualized as a prisoners' dilemma, the classic 
game-theory predicamei1t in which t-..vo cohorts in crime are individually offered a reduced sen­
tence if they squeai on their compatriot. Although they will both be better off if they both 
stonewall their interrogators, the private incentive is to squeal, disadvantaging both. While the 
usual method for avoiding this perverse incentive is to reach a prior agreement not to accept the 
interrogator's offer (thereby allowing private and group incentives to converge), the alternative 
:;ocial-intervention technique hypothesized here is not to ailow the interrogator's offer to be com­
municated in the first place, that is, to keep bmh the prisoners ignorant of what appears to be 
cheir immediate self-interest. thereby furthering their joint long-term interests. In this way, igno­
rance would promote both efficiency and cooperative goals. Needless to say, this approach 
would be valuable primarily where high transaction costs and strategic behavior preclude the 
parties reaching a prior enforceable agreement. the normal law-and-economics/public choice so­
iution to this problem. 
An analogous issue can arise in the antitrust context, wh�re market actors likely to enter into 
a price-fixing conspiracy are r:ostricted in communicating information about certain market activ­
ity. See, e.g.. Unit·::d St:Hes v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (i969); Am.::rican Column & Lum­
�Jer Co. v. United St:lt,�s. 257 U.S. 377 (1921). See generally R. HARDIN, supra note 14, at 13 1. 
16. Examining such proble:ns can cause political divisions that, in retrospect, almost every­
·Jne would agree :;hould have been uvoidr::d . As an example of this view. Rawls has suggested 
th:ll the willingness to <lcccpt certain issues as beyond public purview is a precondition to the 
··,tability of many !ilxral states. See Rawls, Jus/ice as Fairness: PoliEicul No! l�rfelaphysical, 14 
F'HIL. & PuB. AiT 223, 251 (1985). Information limitations can serve an analogous function by 
-:lownplaying certain issues. Cf P. O!I.DESHOOK. GAME THEOP.Y AND POLITICAL THEORY 58 
( 1986) (increases in number of participants increases the probability of a voting cycle). To some 
:legree, this may be viewed J:; <! phi!osophicai or ideologie<1l prisan<:rs· dilemma, and thus, a 
·;ariant of the second model. ln this 1:2.se, however, the prisoners' dilemma is ordinarily viewed 
::-.s overcoming ideological stalemate, n:ti1e; :h;m avr;iding the inefficiency of interest group 
3overnrnent. 
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or an individual's place within the political system can serve to create 
a real-world veil of ignorance - a state of imper:fect information about 
our own or other groups' place in society that can reduce self-interest 
in social decisionmaking processes. In this way, vagueness about the 
political position of different groups can promote public acceptance of 
and desire for resource distribution, help stimulate a rational dialogue, 
and even further a political consensus. 17 Indeed, the existence of a 
greater historical consensus on separation-of-powers issues at various 
points in our history, I suggest below, can be understood in terms of 
this analysis and the viability of a strong two -party system. 18 Con­
versely, the recent proliferation of separation-of-powers confrontations 
can be seen as partly resulting from the breakdown of this process and 
from the effect of doctrinal changes supported in some of the civic 
virtue and law-and-economics literatures. 
My purpose in explicating these circumstances is not to suggest 
that less information is presumptively a good thing. Except for the 
resource cost of acquiring the information, dialogue and exchange of 
information ordinarily improve deliberative as vvell as utilitarian 
processes . 19 There are clear advantages to open discussion, and dan­
gers in information limitation, such as political tyranny, that need not 
be elaborated here. Needless to say, my goal is not to challenge widely 
held beliefs about the first amendment or the value of free intellectual 
exchange in our society. 
Rather, I have two objectives. First, based largely (but not exclu­
sively) on the political party literature, I propose to develop these four 
models, or ideal types, demonstrating how the organization of  political 
institutions can be beneficial (in terms of social goals with which many 
vvould agree) by downplaying various types of public information. In 
this sense, my purpose is academic : to explicate and understand sev­
eral analyses of various types of information that are different from the 
17. Significantly, this limitat ion on information improves decisionmaking in a different way 
than civic virtue theory envisions.  Civic virtue writers conceive of the decisionmaking capabili­
t i es of political actors as being improved by discussion - even confrontation - w i t h  opposing 
viewpoin ts and perspectives. In other words, our ability to u ndertake eth ical deliberation is im­
proved by increasing our world of i n formation. To this extent, c iv ic virtue seems to view polit­
ical actors as more inheren t ly  vir t uous and empathetic - a resource that  can be tapped and 
motivated t h rough disc ussion with other participants.  I n  the c i rcums tances noted here, h ow•.:ver, 
it may be that our capacit ie;; for del iberation over social ends are i m proved by l i mi t i n g  our i n for­
mational world - by vei l i n g  the re8.l world applications of our dec is ions . See infra n o tes 173-77 
and accompanying text.  
1 3 . See infra notes 1 99-205 and �ccompanying text . 
1 9 . Nothing said here denies that t he insights of civic virtue and law and economics offer 
po·werful critiques of iegal inst i t u t ions and useful avenues for reform . I ndeed. as suggested be­
low, many of my observations are quite  comp;nibie with  classical economic theory as i t  would 
l ikely b;: appl ied to t h e  analvsis of party-based political  structures. 
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normal law-and-economics or ci•;ic virtue insights about public insti­
tutions. Although the United States has never had strong parties as 
compared to countries such as Great Britain, historically its parties 
have performed these functions to some extent and perhaps would 
have to a greater degree had they been stronger or structured differ­
ently. Thus, quite apart from the factual issue of how significant these 
effects are in a particular context, they represent alternative ap­
proaches that need to be weighed in policy analysis. 
My second objective is more practical : to use these analyses to 
understand and, in part, defend several government reforms that di­
verge from some current legal trends. These reforms are limited de­
partures from the usual civic virtue and law-and- economics 
approaches and from the general presumption in favor of information 
proliferation. They include changed rules on campaign contributions 
to individual politicians; reduced access to administrative agencies and 
Congress; and centralization devices such as party identification and 
party conventions. These changes would reduce support for dispersed 
sources of information while, in other cases, strengthening the com­
parative informational advantages and accountability of certain cen­
tral institutions. Although giving institutions or individuals the power 
to decide how information should be shaped can create serious dan­
gers, the way political institutions are organized can channel informa­
tion to the advantage of the society as a whole. 
Organizationally,  the discussion will proceed as follows. In Parts K 
and H, I shall summarize the law-and-economics and civic virtue per­
spectives on the value of political information and their proposals for 
reforms in the political process that \vould stimulate greater political 
information. These two literatures are often viewed as distinct in their 
objectives : one seeking to improve means/ends rationality; the other 
seeking to improve goal formation - a function that I loosely describe 
as normative, ethical, or value-based. Nevertheless, they share some 
common practical approaches where information is concerned. In 
Part III,  I shall discuss the instrumental advantages to limiting polit­
icai information, focusing particularly on the role of fJOlitical party 
identification and party organiza tion generall.y in promoting rational 
decisionmaking (section H I . A),  overcoming the perverse influence of 
special interest groups (section HI .B) ,  and surmounting political stale .. 
·n-1 'A r e ("'ertior• 'I I r\ �1-·t\ P·CP <;;Fr· ' ic.�, ... r>r)·,; :> r ·r.�c r'PC'l'· l' vol y -rr> na" p].o  O I' C> .1 .., t.,..;. �  _..:; __. _., _._ 11. il ......_ , "--'} •  l�.,  ...  v ,,... ....., -.., � ....... !... .. 1 ..:  .. '!> ·_.. -.._ . v l :;  ... ..... .... £-' "-' )_. .,. ' J. l J_ -J .... _,. J  .!.\....' 
, 1 · . ,  ' ' �· . ,  · '" , .. , T • 1 1  J ' t ·itvo, ana tnree ciescr1t·ed aoo..:/e.  1� 1na11yJ  111 l3art l!. \ 1 shaJ.1 exp ore tn_e 
normative value of mo:re l imited information, based partly on the ap­
proach of Rav ls' v.�il of ignorance (model four). This Part explores 
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confrontations, and pluralist versus constitutional decisionmaking, all 
in the context of the breakdown of polit ical parties. 
Clearly, each model focuses on a different type of information -
information about the often confusing range of diverse political op­
tions; about constituent or pork-barrel proj ects; about potentially divi­
sive and destructive political debates; and about the impact on 
different groups of alternative social policies.  In each case, however, 
strong political parties can be seen as performing a positive role in 
reducing such information. Moreover, ·while we probably cannot cre­
ate strong parties, and indeed would not want to in certain contexts, 
some current proposed changes in government structure, which I will 
explore in each section, may be helpful i n  furthering the beneficial as­
pects of the strong party tradition. 
I.  THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN PUBLIC DEC1S10NMAK.!NG 
UNDER THE LA W-AND -ECONOMICS lVIODEL 
A. General Problems with Limited Information 
Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of law and economics is the 
autonomy of individual choice. 20 Taking the individual's valuation of 
personal utilities as a given, law- and- economics scholars generally 
seek to fashion various social or legal decisions that 'Ni11 maximize so­
cial welfare, in either a Pareto-superior or a Kaldor-Hicks sense. 2 1  
While the precise mental processes through v.;hich individuals arrive at 
their market choices a re seldom the focus of law-and-economics analy­
sis, this literature does recognize that preferences, as well as the inch­
vidual's ability to locate avenues for pursuing them, are dependent 
upon the information available to the individual. 
Unfortunately, because perfectly functioning markets assume per­
fect information, the law-and-economics scholars face a significant 
20. The discussion that follows, l ike the descript ion in the succeeding seclion on civic vi rtue, 
seeks to sketch broad outlines of a l it::rature in which there are obviously many different strands, 
some of 'Nhich may be in tension -.v1t� t.ny general sun1iTI!lry. For this reason, I clain1 only to be 
establishing an "ideal type, ' '  which ScT'<"es to capture many of the central i nsights and directions 
of a l i terature and can be he!pfui in  understanding and comparing the perspectives of different 
approaches. SeE M .  'NEBER,  ECO!'•!O'Yl Y A i 'l D  SocJETY 9 (! 9 78 )  [hereinafter M. WEBER, EcoN­
O�AY AND SOC 1ETY]; Ivl. V/ EHER)  THE l\/IETHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SC I ENCES 9 1 - 1 1 2  (E. 
Sh i ls & H .  Finch eds. l 949) [hereir�after M .  WEBER, METHODOLOGY]. 
2 1 .  See B. AcKERMAN, ECOi'IOMlC FOU N DATIONS OF PlWPERTY LAW xi-xiv ( ! 9 7 5); A . M .  
POUNSKY, AN iNTRODUCTION T O  LAW A N C  ECONOMICS 7- 1 0  (2d e d .  1 989); R. POSN ER, Eco­
NOivilC ANALYSIS OF LAw 1 1 - 1 7  (3d ed. 1 936). Of course, th.�re is an ::xtensive l iterature ques­
tioning \Vhether or to  '>Vhai  extent this is an appropriate basis for decisionmaking. See, e.g. . 
Sytnposiurrz on !:..fficicncy as a Legal Concern, 8 �10FSTR:\ L. RE'I. �-8 5  ( 1 9 80); Kennedy, Cost­
Benefit Analysis of Enrir!em en! Programs: A Critique. 33 STAN. L REV. 3 87,  40 1 -2 1  ( 1 9 8 1 ) ; 
Tribe, Constitutional Calcu lus: Equal Justice or EcoNomic E;5'iciency?. 98 H.>.RY.  L REv. 592 
( 1 93 5).  
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problem m ensunng that markets produce information sufficient to 
justify deference to individual choice. Information is often a public 
good, that is to say, an item freely available to the public without pos­
sibility of exclusion. 22 Due to free-rider problems, such goods are 
likely to be produced suboptimally, absent government intervention. 
Since it is often difficult to exclude information in economic and polit­
ical markets from free use by others, there is a disincentive to produce 
it at appropriate 1evels .23  
The early law-and-economics literature sought to grapple 'Nith this 
problem primarily in the commercial law context, pointing out the 
large efficiency loss due to imperfect information, and the resulting 
creation of suboptimal markets in commercial transactions and corpo­
rate stock. As a remedy, several government interventions were pro­
posed for stimulating the production and dissemination of 
information, including having direct public production, requiring bar­
gaining parties to disclose material conditions, proxy statements, la­
bels, and warranties, and assigning property rights to the least cost 
22. There are two additional problems, one technical and one philosop h icaL which are not 
explored i n  depth in this article. First, as a technical matter, the individual knows whether the 
information is valuable only after she expends the effort to acquire it .  Logicall y ,  neither the 
society nor the individual can make a prior utility calculation that the information should have 
been secured, or, more broadly, make a judgment with respect to a class of decisions that a given 
amount of information should have been acquired, or a specific system used to acquire it,  without 
first acquiring the information. Any judgmen t about proper resource allocations for information 
must be imperfect, based on predictions on the value of the information for that or similarly 
situated persons. Thus, inductive judgments about information acquisition are i nherently imper­
fect.  Only after obtaining the information - making the decision - can one know whether it 
was justified. See generally H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON 
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY ( 1 968). 
Second, apart from these technic<:! problems, there is  a philosophical problem 'Vith infonna­
tion acquisition. To the extent that the acquisition of the information changes the nature of the 
individual, i t  may be philosophically impossible, even understanding the "value'"  of the informa­
tion, to know whether or not it  should be acquired under an economic model. The o.nswer 
depends upon which individual - the one with or without the information - is making the 
decision . If the individual's views on the value of the information change, i t  i s  logically impossi­
ble to determine whose autonomous preferences should be respected. See D. P ARFlT, REASONS 
A N D  PERSONS 2 1 9- 43 ( 1984); Ainslie, Beyond !Y!icroeconomics: Confiict Among Interests in a 
Multiple Self as a Determinant of Value, in THE rAuL TlPLE SELF 1 3 3 (J. Elster ed. 1 986); Kel­
man, Choice and Uriliry, 1 979 Wis. L.  REv. 769, 779.  For this reason ,  one's philosophy of 
inforrr:ation acquisition i s  dirtctiy re1evaut to \�/hc�tever structure is emp�oyed for gove;-n:nen t 
organization. 
These problems obviously may be more signi fican t with ;·espect to some is3ues tlE'.n to others. 
As one rnoves frorn microrna11agen1ent questions, such as consumer search �trategies� to iss ues 
concerning alternative stat�s of po1 i t ica1 organiz�ltion, both of these diffic u l ties nLiY bt: �;tacer­
bated . The 1nore fundarnental the question being researched, the more varied the potential stat��� 
of the worid and the mete hi(e!y the individ ual in  thai ne\v s ta t� is to De dif �reni f:4om the 
decision maker in the e.\isting ··Ncrld.. 
23. See Arrow, Economic Weijcre and ihe Allocation of Reso;:rces for i�l, .'e:uion, in THE 
RATE A N D  D I I-?.ECTJON or: lN'VEi�T! V E  A.CT1VITY: Ecor,Jorvnc A N D  SociAL F;;.c-ro�{S 609 ( i�Ja­
t ional Bureau of Econornic R.esearch 1 961); P ... rrov1, Li,rn i!ed l(nowledge and £'coNor:1ic A nalysis. 
64 t-\ :-d .  EC0i"1 . RE'.'. i ( ! 974). 
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avoider. 24 
This perspective was later extended to the public sphere in order 
better to understand the general problems of political organization and 
the perverse advantages enjoyed by certain groups in influencing pub·· 
lie policy.25 As to the organizational problems, since politics and the 
exercise of power are almost necessarily group activities, information 
usually becomes important only to the degree that the group with 
which one is associated is able to assimilate it and exercise influence. 
As a result, the public good/collective action problem inherent in the 
information market is compounded by the collective action problem of 
group political organization : " [I]gnorance is rational because the 
costs of obtaining a collective good are shared by many, and no one 
individual's contribution . . .  is thus likely to make a difference. "26 
According to this model, therefore, "one can expect individuals to be 
24. See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM ( 1985);  0. 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES ( 1975). An extensive literature has arisen regard­
ing how various insti tutional frameworks can economize and facilitate greater exchanges of in­
formation. As a general matter, this literature reflects a careful balancing of the need to create 
sufficient incentives for individuals to generate information against the problems created when 
information, once created, is  not available. Since the processes of bargaining to acquire informa­
tion and of knowing initially how much information to bargain for are inherently imperfect, a 
strict property l imitation on information would be counterproductive. 
25. As in the private sphere, information is advantageous in the public context because i t  
facilitates individuals' and groups' abi l i ty to  identify their interests and to use governmental in­
tervention to promote these interests. 
Of course, some legal scholars view the public sphere, in  contrast to the private market, as a 
fundamentally redistributive enterprise, rather than as an efficiency- enhancing process. Accord­
ing to this rent-seeking model, information in t h e  public sphere tends to be purely redistribu­
tional, with the benefits of action predicated merely on one's comparative ability to understand 
and press one's interest in competition with one's opponents for the same resources. For descrip­
tions, see Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEo. WASH. L REv. SG 
( 1 987). Macey claims: 
[T)he same invisible hand that leads to wealth creation in  private market transactions causes 
massive economic inefficiencies and social instability when it is set loose in the political 
sphere . . . .  As a consequence of the government's ability to coerce, rationally self-interested 
citizens have incentiv:::s to organize into special inte;est group coalitions in order to demand 
regulation that makes them better off. 
!d. at 57;  see also Mashaw, The Econom ics of Poliiics mtd the Undei'S!Cii!ding of Public Law, 6.:i 
CHL-KENT L REv. i 23 ,  i33 ( 1 989) ("For some, th£ Oi!l;t public purpose worthy ol res pee� 
seerns to be the elirnination of the public sector itself. "); H .. ose-ltckcrman, .Progressive Lah' and 
Economics - And the Ne�v '"lditJinistmtiw; Lcnv, 98 YALE LJ. 34 1 ,  3LI-2 ( 1 988) ("Schoiars in all  
three traditions [in la'.v and ccono:Dics] :.1re skeptical atout the legiti rrtacy of lcgi�lative and bu­
reaucratic processes and share 8. confidenc� i n  the \/alue of rnarket outcomes'') . For exarn�les, 
see TOWARD A THEORY O F  THE RENT-S EEKING SOCi ETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tul­
lock eds. 1980); Crain & Tollison, Constizutiona! Change in an Interest-Group Theory of Govern­
ment, 8 J .  LEGAL STU D. ! 65 ( 1 979); Crain & Toliison, The E>:ecutive Branch in the lnteresi 
Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555  ( 1979) .  In other words, because of the coercive power3 
of the state, informat ion is ;nore likely to  be a zero- sum game. a process of rent-seeking, wi c !-: 
negiigible social value. But cf Hirshleifer, The Prirate and Social Value of Information and the 
Rea·ard to Inven tive Activity, 61 AI\·!. EcoN. REV. 5 6 i  ( 1 97 1 )  (discussing the redistributive and 
efficiency consequences of information in private mu!,ets). 
26. Oppenheimer, Public Choice and Three Ethical Prcpenies of Politics. 45 P u a .  CHOICE 
24 1 ,  243 ( 1 985) .  
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relatively uninformed about and unmotivated b y  the collective conse­
quences of their political behavior. "27 
Beyond this general disincentive to service adequate levels of infor­
mation, the differential access to information among competing groups 
also presents problems in political organization. As a variety of schol­
ars have detailed, discrete groups with a h igh degree of interest in spe­
cific outcomes often enjoy organizational advantages because 
information is costly to obtain and because such groups enjoy lower 
transaction costs. More diffuse groups, on the other hand, often have 
free-rider problems in obtaining the information, even though as 
groups they may care more about the particular outcome. 2 8  
According to  the economic analysis, moreover, this differential ac­
cess often disadvantages large segments of society, even though most, 
if not all, citizens are part of at least one special interest group in one 
political context or another. In the first place, the organizing advan­
tages of special interest groups often outweigh the need to counteract 
any majori tarian bias in our political system. According to the eco­
nomic model, they serve to supply a greater advantage to narrmv 
groups than is justified by the weight of their interests . 29 l\'lore impor­
tantly, it is argued, because virtually all of us are part of both special 
interest groups and diffuse groups in different contexts, many groups 
27. Id. at 245; see also Macey, supra note 25,  at 7 7 :  
A s  a general matter, citizens will have l itt le incentive t o  inform themselves of t h e  nature of  
t h e  various statutes passed i n  t h e  ordinary course of a legislative session because t h e  cost of 
such legislation is lower than the cost of acquiring such information. And even i f  the costs 
of acquiring information about a proposed statute are low relative to the effects of the stat­
ute, the costs of organizing an effective political coalition to oppose such a statute is suffi­
ciently high that  expending resources to discover the economic effects of ordinary laws 
remains irrational for the ordinary citizen. 
2 8 .  This important observation about the effect of group size on group activity was made 
many years ago by l'v1ancur Olson. M. OLSON, supra note 1 4. This insigh t has since been ex­
panded into a richer typology of possible incentives to group action. See, e.g., R. HARD!N, supra 
note 1 4; M. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL lVL -\ R X ETS 64--
1 27 ( 1 98 1 ); ] _ W I LSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 327- �t5 ( 1 973); Wilson, The Politics of Reg­
ldation, in THE POLITICS OF REGU LATION 3 57, 3 5 7-72 (J .  Wilson ed. 1 9 80). For empirical 
evidence, see, for example, J.  FEREJOHN, PORK BA R R E L  POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEG­
ISLATION, i 947- 1 968 ( 1 974); C. LINDBLOil.-l,  POUT!CS AND lVlA RKETS ( 1 977);  G. McConNELL,  
PR IVATE PO\VER AND AM ERICAN DEMOCRACY ( 1 966). According to this analysis, the "ten­
dency of our factional pol i tics to redistribute wealth from large groups to small ones [may hiiV�) 
produced the opposite of the oppressive majori;ies that the Framers feared . "  Bruff, Legisia!! Ye 
Formality, Admin istrative ,,O,ationa!ily. 63 TEXAS L.  REv. 207, 2 1 6  ( 1 934); see also Ackern:;;.n, 
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.  REV. 7 1 3, 745 - c!-6 ( 1 985) ;  Posner, Econom ics, ?oiitics, 
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution. 49 U. Ci-il .  L. REv. 263 ,  266 ( 1 9 82) .  
29. In other words, the  power of special interest groups does not  further Kaldor-Hicks "effi­
ciency" in government, but may do the exact opposite: it  may bias the systr�m beyond wh«t ti";.= 
"preferences" of the narrow group warrant. See Stigler. The Theory of Economic R egu lation. 2 
BELL J. EcoN. & rv!Gi\H. SC I .  3 ( 1 97 1); ]\ilashaw, supra note 25,  at 1 27 ("analysts in the ' interest 
group' tradit ion predict that governmental programs will be too large , directed at  the •.vwng endo 
and p�rversely redistributional") .  See genera!iy l\11. OLSON, THE RISE AND D ECLINE O F  N."­
TlOi'!S ( 1 982). 
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in our society are disadvantaged by this process .  In effect, special in­
terest government can often create a type of social prisoners' dilemma, 
where most citizens are made worse off by pursuing their self-interest 
as part of many successful special interest groups. 30 In its extreme 
form, members of Congress or other political actors enter into explicit 
or implicit agreements to support a general system of legislation enact­
ing different group projects, a process described as "universalism." 3 1  
30. See generally M .  FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE O F  THE WASHINGTON ESTA BLISH­
M ENT ( 1 977) .  Technical l y ,  this is supposed to create a prisoners' dilemma deadweight loss, 
whereby the majority of citizens end up paying for more public services than their demand wou ld 
j ustify ,  since they pay for their  own interest groups' projects (and those of other groups) with 
higher tax dollars. This system is supposedly inefficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense because, at  least 
in a perfect world, most of us could be made better off by not initiating the distributive scheme 
and retaining some previously spent tax dollars. Macey explains it this way: 
Since most groups expect to be net losers from a pervasive system of special interest group 
activities, these groups have a strong incentive to enact constitutional rules that raise the 
cost of rent seekin g  generally - even if doing so means forgoing a certain measure of 
favorable legislation later on. The costs of giving u p  this favorable legislation are out­
weighed by the benefits of being protected from the expense of paying for the wealth trans­
fers that go to others. 
Macey, supra note 25, at 7 3-74; see also Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. I ( 1 982); B ruff, supra note 28, at 2 1 6  ("When groups compete 
for legislation, each has an incentive to demand its private benefits, even though the net result of 
the process is a welfare loss to ali .");  McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the 
Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J .  LEGAL STUD. 1 0 1 ,  1 1 8 ( 1 98 7) .  
3 i .  Of course, it is  possible to argue, contrary to the textual thesis, that  a system of pol i tica l  
universalism, where each interest group i s  more likely to  b e  assured i t s  piece of the poii tical pie, 
protects the lot of the worst off, and is  thus defensibie on redistributive grounds. Although 
intel lectually intriguing and undoubtedly true in particular cases, this argument appears factually 
problematic in the United States today, at least according to the public choice perspective. 
According to this analysis, universalism is supposed to promote equality by minim izing the 
possibility that any one group is left out of the ruling political coalition - in other words, by 
improving the position of what would be the worst-off group in a majority rule system. And 
while protecting the group that would have been worst off may reduce the size of the overall pie, 
in  universalism al l  participants may be willing to buy into the agreement became they do not 
know ex ante whether they will  be i n  that group. See Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 
AM. POL. Scr.  REv. 7 34, 737 ( 1 983)  ("In a p luralist society, crosscut by many cleavages and 
partitioned into a multiplicity of preference clusters, political satisfaction i s  distributed much 
more equally.");  cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10,  at 62 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. ! 898) (where there 
is "a greater variety of parties and interests," it is "less probable that a majority of the whole will  
have a common motive to invade the rights of other c i t izens"). 
In this sense, universalism could be rationalized using a type of Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance 
analysis, whereby everybody is will ing to accept fewer social resources in order to improve the 
position of the worst-off group (whi ch might be them), and to ensure the continuation of the 
polit ical distributive system . See Rawls, supra note 1 6; Barry, is Democracy Special?, in PHILOS­
OPHY, POLITICS AND SOC I ETY 1 5 5 ,  1 79 (P. Laslett & J.  Fishkins eds. 1 979); \Veingast, A Ra­
tional Choice Perspective in Congressional f./arms, 23 AM. J.  PoL. SC I .  245 ( 1 979). Since pursuit 
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is not necessari ly  consistent with Rawls' " d i fference principle," the 
resulting system may violate norms of efficiency under public choice models, but comport with 
some sense of political moral i ty . The reason the system is poli t ically acceptable i3  simply that no 
group knows ex ante who will be the worst off. 
Unfort unately, this argument 3ucceeds only i f  one vie'>'-'S u niversalism as protecting the worst 
off in society, as distinguished from those who happen to lose in a particular poEtical coali tion 
game. Accord i ng to many observers. ho wever , the losers in pol iti r.:al majoritarian politics tend 
not  to be disproportionately the worst off i n  society, but rather simply in terest groups vvho are 
not part of the majority coali t ion .  See R.  DAHL. A PREFACE TO DEMOC2t\T!C TI-l SOR '<' i .'.3 
( I  9 56); f-\ckeJn1a11. sup,va note 28 .  at 745 -�-6; Sandalov'<', Jl!diciu! Proteciiun of' J'Viinun·ries, 7 5  
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For this reason, despite the benefits o f  special interest group influence, 
such as facilitating greater pluralism and perhaps greater dialogue, the 
public choice analysis suggests that our current political system has 
probably tilted too far in their direction. 32 
B. The Influence of Special Interest Groups zn Public Law 
The greater ability of concentrated groups to secure information 
has consequences in two different political and legal contexts, which 
are related but sometimes have been treated separately in the litera-
MICH. L. REV. 1 1 62, 1 1 90-9 1 ( 1 977). See generally Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 1 1 , at 1 5 79-
84. To the degree that many different groups tend to be winners and losers i n  different 
m ajoritarian coalitions, there would likely be a social advantage by l i miting the universalistic 
cycle. 
32. To be sure, it  might be suggested that universalism (and interest group pluralism gener­
ally) is beneficial, despite its inefficiencies, because it  furthers resource redistribution within a 
progressive taxation system. Ultimately, however, this argument appears to falter on factual 
grounds, at least according to the economic perspective. 
To put the thesis in its clearest form: interest group pluralism supposedly creates an overpro­
duction of government resources by ensuring that the important actors on a particular issue are 
disproportionately those who benefit - the special interest groups - while the diffuse groups 
who pay the taxes are less organized. Assuming the tax system is both exempt from this interest 
group process and is progressive, universalism would thereby serve to create a bias in favor of 
redistribution. While a costless redistributive system would do more, within our current political 
environment where we must generate the political will  to redistribute, pluralism would facili tate 
redistribution. Thus, some might argue, it  is appropriate in certain instances to redistribute 
t h rough pluralism, recognizing there will be some deadweight loss, but a redistributive advan­
tage. Cf Markovits, Duncan 's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit A nalysis and the Determination of Legal 
Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 1 69, 1 1 74-77 ( 1 984) (positive distributive i m pacts may out­
weigh concerns for efficiency). 
This defense of pluralism, it  should be noted, differs from the traditional pluralist claim that 
most interests would be represented within a pluralist community, ensuring that the pluralist 
compromise would adequately reflect a legitimate accommodation among existing parties. See 
infra note 93 .  As noted above, the political economy l i terature has demonstrated persuasively 
the existence of pervasive collective action problems that undermine this analysis: some groups 
are not part of, or are at a market disadvantage in, pluralist politics. See supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. The above analysis suggests, rather, that, given a preexisting redistributive 
tax structure, some differential distribution may exist, but is "ethically" beneficial.  While the 
relevant constituencies are included - those who wish distribution - there is  a veil of ignorance 
with respect to those groups who are likely to pay, or at least their costs have a l ready been 
established. 
Unfortunately, -,vhile intrigui ng, the argument ultimately seems factually problematic.  As 
numerous scholars have observed, wealthier groups often have an organizational advantage in 
pluralist polit ics; the poor are often the diffuse group that is kept out of the pluralist d istributive 
deb�tc . See THE BIAS OF P L U RALISM (W. Connolly ed. 1 969); K. SCHLOZMAN & 1. TIERNEY,  
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND Ai\1ERICAN DH,JOCRACY 8 7 ,  395-403 ( 1 9 86). Moreover, t h e  dis­
persion of poli tical responsibility endemic to pl ural ist politics can confuse the public, especially 
the poor and less educated. See Burnham , The Tu rnout Problem, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN 
STYLE 97, 1 3 1 - 3 3  (A. Reichley ed. 1 987).  Finally, and most importantly, there is evidence that 
the tax system, especially d uring times of so-c�dled " normal " politics, when numerous tax loop­
holes are secured, is not exempt from this pluralist bias. See G.  Cox, l'vi. McCubbins & B.  Wein­
gast, Congress and the Distributive Tendency in Tax Policy (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author); McClu re and Zodrow, Treasury l and the Tax Reform Act of 1 986: The Economics and 
Politics of Tax Reform , 1 EcoN. PE:=<SP.  37, 37 -33  ( 1 98 7) .  A government which makes decisions 
through a pluralist process in both ta;; <lr:d expenditure contexts cannot claim this normative 
defense. 
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ture. The first is electoral. Special interest groups, because they tend 
to be more concentrated, are supposed to have disproportionate ad­
vantages in determining their interests on specific issues, securing the 
information with respect to those interests, and notifying political rep­
resentatives about their desires. 33  In effect, they enjoy reduced trans­
action costs in securing the information necessary to engage in 
electoral political action. More diffuse groups experience serious col­
lective action problems in organizing institutions for the purpose of 
securing and delivering information necessary to pursue their electoral 
positions. 34 
A second and related context in which special interest groups are 
said to exercise disproportionate influence over government behavior 
occurs in the formulation and implementation stages of government 
decisions. 35 In such cases, 36 government actors vested with suppos­
edly final decisionmaking authority (such as Congress or the Presi­
dent) find that their decisions or the implementation of their decisions 
in administrative agencies can be perverted by special interest groups 
that have a marked advantage in affecting the execution of broad di­
rectives or mandates within the bureaucracyY 
33. See K. SCHOLZMAN & J .  TIERNEY, supra note 32. 
34. Jd. 
3 5 .  See Bruff, supra note 28, at 244; B.  OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM , THE REGULATION 
GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 - 1 3  ( 1 978); CASE STUDIES I N  
REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFOR M 7 - 1 0  (L. Weiss & M .  Klass eds. 1 9 8 1 ) .  For the 
classic view on interest group government, see T. LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM ( 1 969) and 
Lowi, Two R oads to Serfdom, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 295 ( 1 9 87). 
36. As a theoretical matter, some political science l i terature analyzes these latter situations as 
agency-principal problems, i n  which the principal (the President or Congress) has difficulty en­
suri n g  t hat i ts subordinate - the administrative agency - is fulfilling its mandate. See McCub­
bins, Noll, & Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instrum ents of Political Control, 3 J .L .  
EcoN. & ORG. 243, 247 ( 1 987). According t o  this analysis, special i n terest groups often h a v e  a 
marked advantage in perverting the "principal's" intent, especially in light of the difficulty i n  
monitoring t h e  complex decisions emanating from the administrative bureaucracy, a n d  i ncreas­
ing the costs of monitoring by the principal. 
37. Indeed. a variety of scholars have also pointed out the independent influence of govern­
ment agencies in perverting implementation of government programs. Because of their d i fferen­
tial access to information regarding the facts of the substantive programs over which they have 
responsibility, they are thought to skew the policy agenda in favor of maximizing the agency 
budget or furthering its bureaucrats' career goals. See R. ARNOLD. CONGRESS AND THE Bu­
REAUCRACY ( 1 979); G. BENVENISTE, BU REAUCRACY 7 1 - 1 1 1  ( 1 977); D .  MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE 1 5 6-70 ( 1 979); W. N ISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
( 1 97 1 ) . 
Obviously, the two circumstances are related: the influence of special interest groups in the 
formulation and execution of policy is i n  part due to their powers in affecting the i n itial political 
judgment. Nevertheless. control over information and contacts can be important i n  legislation 
and administration for reasons un related to the electoral influence of special interest groups; 
administr3\iv-� and executive z..ctors may be dependent on con tacts and knowledge obtained by 
those most knowL:dgeabl-: in the area. 1n addition, those most li kely to p<�Y atten tion to what 
administrative and iegislG.tive officia ls are doing, and to alcct the public or special interest groups 
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To overcome the lack o f  informational parity among diffuse and 
concentrated groups in these various contexts, and to surmount the 
general lack of incentive to generate political information, several 
scholars, relying on law-and-economics theories, have defended a vari­
ety of political institutions and legal mechanisms that would expand 
political information. 38 The most important is disclosure of govern­
ment activities, on the ground that enforcement and d isclosure will 
improve diffuse groups' oversight of governmental activities. Because 
obtaining information is more costly for diffuse groups, and because 
monitoring government is more difficult for such entities, it becomes 
important for information to be available at no cost. "By supporting 
the freedoms of speech and press,"  it is suggested, "one can increase 
the likely caliber of [rationality] in political action by increasing the 
availability of free and relatively inexpensive information.  "39 While 
" [i]ndividuals may not seek information, [they] may process it if it is 
very easily acquired."40 
A similar analysis has also been used to support recent law-and­
economics proposals to transform the nature of statutory construction 
and judicial review.4 1 Like the first amendment scholarship, the as­
sumption of this approach is that "citizens have poor information 
about the actions of legislators" and "legislators have few incentives to 
when policies diverge from what was intended, can be important and powerful groups to these 
officials. 
38. To be sure, there are cases where the economics l iterature recognizes that less informa­
t ion can be advantageous even apart from the costs of generating it. See. e. g. . Hirshleifer, supra 
note 25 ,  at 568.  I n  addition, it should be recognized that market participants who possess less 
information can sometimes rely on the superior knowledge of others. See Schwartz & Wilde, 
/n rervening in Markers on rhe Basis of imperfect Information, 1 27 U.  PA. L. REv. 630, 638 
( 1 979); McKelvey & Ordeshook, Information, Eiec10ral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal, 48 
J .  PoL. 909 ( 1 986) (arguing that under certain conditions uninformed voters can rely on polls of 
public opinion i nstead of candidates' declared positions to decide for whom to vote). Indeed, 
some of the arguments set forth in  this  article and in the traditional party l i terature are consistent 
with these observations. 
39. Oppenheimer, supra note 26, at 253 .  
40. /d. Thus, the  first amendment and disclosure requirements regarding legislative and ad­
min istrative operations can all serve to increase the availabi l i ty of such information, and, in so 
doing, supposedly improve the relative abi l i ty of diffuse groups to participate etTecti vely in 
government. 
4- 1 .  The subject of statutory construction has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years, much of it 
with the goal of using varying techniques to i m prove judicial decision making. See, e. g. . Eskridge, 
Dynamic StaiUtory Interpretation. 1 3 5 U. PA. L. REV.  14 79 ( 1 987);  Eskridge, Public Values in 
Statu/Ory Constructin , 1 2 7  U. PA.  L. REV. 1 007 ( 1 989). Some interesting scholarship, hmvevcr, 
especially that of Jon Macey and Susan Rose-Ackerman, suggests that i n terpret ing legislation 
according to its p ublicly stated goals can overcome the informational disadvantages of diffuse 
groups in overseeing legislative del iberations. See M acey, Promoling Public-Regarding L egisla­
tion Through Statu tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 2:?.3 ( 1 986) ;  
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25.  
Apri l  1 990] Veils of Ignorance 9 3 3  
reveal deals that would not be  obvious to  superficial observers. "42 To 
overcome this deficiency, " [t]he aim ofjudicial review should . . .  be to 
make legislators more responsible to the electorate by assuring that 
information about legislative bargains is more likely avai lable, [im­
proving the public\] capacity to monitor the output of congressional 
bargains."43 Courts should thus construe statutes according to their 
"public" explanations, rather than according to their technical terms 
or deals that were supposedly formulated behind the scenes, thereby 
serving to equalize the ability of diffuse groups and more concentrated 
groups to oversee legislative deliberations. In this way, statutory con­
struction would improve the informational abilities of the diffuse pub­
lic to monitor government, helping to minimize the organizational 
advantages of special interest groups.44 
Finally, a related analysis has been applied by administrative law 
scholars to the monitoring of government bureaucracies. As noted 
above, although delegation is intrinsic to operations in the Post-New 
Deal state, execution will necessarily involve a deviation from the ini­
tial legislative judgment. This deviation, moreover, can be affected dif­
ferentially by special interest groups.45 'While the proposed solutions 
to this problem have been varied, many scholars express a common 
approach and purpose: to increase the oversight of administrative 
agencies so as to counteract the differential informational advantage of 
special interest groups. The most important such proposed technique 
is to make decisionmaking by administrative agencies more open to 
the public through "hard look" judicial review, enhanced procedures 
under the Administrative Procedures Act, and supplementation of in­
tervention rights.46 A variation on this theme is to improve the acces­
sibility of executive information to legislative review by expanding the 
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, and, perhaps, by 
expanding legislative oversightY Finally, some have argued that pres-
42. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2 5 ,  a t  349. Rose-Ackerman also u rges courts t o  "encourage 
del iberation' "  in Congress. t hereby making a d i rect link between the Jaw-and-economics and c iv ic  
v ir tue  approaches. 
43. ld. at  3 5 1 .  
44. A visible i n s t i t u tion such as t h e  presidency i s  also supposed t o  he lp  overcome t h e  relative 
organizat ional  disadvantages of d i ffuse groups by s urmounting their i n formational  and t ransac­
tional d isadvantages t hrough vis ibi l i t y  and ease of monitoring. See Fitts,  Vices of Virtue, supra 
note l l , at 1 606. 
45.  See supra notes 34- 3 7  and accompanying tex t .  
4 6 .  See S t ewart.  YJze R cjimnlllion o/ A meriwtl A dm inistmti>'E' Law. 8 8  I-L\ R Y .  L R F Y .  1 669.  
1 7 8 2  ( 1 97 5) ;  Bru ff·. supra note 2 8 ,  at  248 ( . .  modern legal reqll l rernents defming adminis trat ive 
rat ional i ty  share with legis lat ive form a l i t y  the effect uf ensuring t h,:t p u b l i c  pol icy w i l l  be sup­
ported by coal i t ions represenung a set uf val ues t h at i s  relat i ve ly  widely accepted" ' ) .  
47.  See. e.g., K ronman.  The Privacv Exemprion ro  !hi! Freedom of Information A cr. 9 J .  
LEG.\L S nm .  7 2 7 .  7 J c\ ( 1 980) .  
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idential oversight of administrative agencies, through such techniques 
as enhanced review of agency regulations, can provide the needed ex­
pansion of diffuse political oversight necessary to counteract the orga­
nizational advantages of special interest groups.48 
II .  THE VALUE OF INFORMATION UNDER THE 
CIVIC VIRTUE MODEL 
Although civic virtue scholars come to these issues from a mark­
edly different perspective from the approach discussed above, many 
also appear to be exploring different mechanisms for stimulating the 
production and dissemination of information among political institu­
tions.49 According to this viewpoint, a major purpose of government 
is to create a full and developed dialogue among political and social 
actors representing a rich diversity of social, economic, and ideological 
viewpoints. 50 
A. An Overview 
At its core, the philosophical concern of civic virtue is the influ­
ence of self-interest in political decisionmaking. In this sense, it is di-
48.  See Bruff, Presidential Power and A dministrative R ulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 45 1 ( 1 979);  
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J .L .  EcoN. & 
ORG. 8 1  ( 1 985); Pierce, The R ole of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 
TEXAS L. REV. 469, 5 20-24 ( 1 98 5); Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573,  663-64 ( 1 9 84). A l though a l l  of t h ese 
proposals may i n  their specific requirements lead to different policy outcomes, t h ei r  common 
underlying goal is to improve polit ical  oversight of administrative behavior by disseminat ing 
greater public i n formation about government activities, thereby overcoming the collective action 
problems of i n formation acquisition and counterbalancing the differen tial advan tage of t h e  spe­
cial interest groups in  influencing adminis t rative behavior. 
49. See generally Sunstein ,  Beyond rhe Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1 5 3 9  ( 1 9 8 8 )  (sum­
marizing civic republican approach to political institut ions).  In  the fol lowing d iscussion I wil l  
focus principal ly on Sunstein's scholarship, both because he appears to have become a " leader" 
of this approach, and because he consciousl y  and thoughtfu l l y  seeks to summarize and rational­
ize a broad spectrum of legal opinions and secondary l i teraturt focusing o n  t h e  structure of 
pol i t ical inst i tut ions.  Where applicable, I will note d i fferences between his approach and that of 
others writ ing i n  the tradit ion.  Fra n k  Miche!man,  for example, appears to focus m o re on the 
S upreme Court,  rather than politic!'.! i nstit utions genera l l y ,  as the center of the civic virtue dia­
logue. See M ichelman,  The Supreme Coun. 1 985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Governm en t, 
1 00 H A R V  L. REv.  4 ( 1 986) [herei nafter Michelman,  Traces of SelfGuvemmenr]. BUI cf 
f'vi ichelrnan,  La w 's  R epublic. 97 YALE L.J. 1 49 3 ,  1 5 3 1 ( !  9 8 8 )  (appearing to recogn ize a more 
inst i tut ionally p l u ralist  conception of di alogue). 
50.  See g<'nerully Sunstein, supra note 49; Sunstein,  Constiwriunu /ism Ajier rhe New Deal. 1 0 1  
H A R V .  L .  R E v .  42 1 ,  429. 5 10 ( 1 9 87) (s imultaneous pres i d e n t i a l .  !egis lat iv� ,  a n d  j udicia!  con trol 
can. "by pro l i ferating the points of acce:;s to govern meni , increase the opport unity for 
groups to seek and obtain reform" and " b ri n g  about  somet h i n g  c lose to t h e  safeg uards of the 
origi na l  const i t ut ional  framework ") .  Sunstcin has a lso argued for a dispersal of power in  a d m i n ­
istration because, a �  in  t h e  case of sepa r'-!.te branches, usually "at  least o n e  branch \Vi i i  be respon­
sive to the i n terests of politically weak group:; and thus w i i l  become an advocate for refo rm . "  !d. 
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rected toward one of  the same goals that: led Rawls to  develop his 
heuristic device, " the original position" 5  t - to make decisionmakers 
"think from the point of view of everybody. "52 Because of the social 
biases created by individuals' knowledge of their own social positions 
and the effect of agreements on their individual welfare, Rawls origi­
nally proposed the veil as a mental filter that would serve to excise 
decisionmakers' knowledge of their own place in society and their own 
belief systems. 53 
The value of this device in stimulating a "true" dialogue has been 
questioned, however, on the grounds that the original position appears 
to excise important information about decisionmakers as real people. 
How, i t  has been asked, can a normatively attractive social consensus 
be achieved by disembodied individuals lacking knowledge of real peo­
ple and their human motivation - "good" or "bad"?54 In short, 
" [f]or republicans, the problem with the original position as a guide to 
political institutions or as a political ideal is that it is too solitary and 
insufficiently d ialogic. "55 
In their design of political institutions, therefore, civic virtue schol­
ars seek to create a rational dialogue through the opposite technique: 
lead decisionmakers in the real world,  obviously possessing full  knowl­
edge of their own social positions and belief systems, to engage in the 
type of normative discussion that Rawls believed would occur behind 
the veil . In this case, however, the bias of political actors' social back­
grounds would be overcome by increasing the number of dialogic par-
5 1 .  J.  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 1 - 1 2  ( 1 97 1 ) . 
5 2 .  Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1 569 (quoting Okin ,  Reason and Feeling in Thinking about 
Justice. 99 ETHICS 229 ( 1 9 89)). Of course, the veil  can further other purposes as well .  
5 3 .  J.  RAWLS, supra note 5 i ,  a t  1 7-22.  
54. See generally L. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 59-66 ( 1 9 8 7); M. 
SANDEL,  LIBERA LISM AND T H E  LIMITS OF JUSTICE ( 1 984); Nage l ,  Rawls on Justice, i n  READ­
ING RAWLS 8 - 1 0  (N.  Daniels ed. 1 975) .  The ve i l  of i gnorance, it also has been argued, i ncor­
rectly portrays man as a narcissistic, nonvirt uous decisiomnak,�r, who can engage in publ ic 
responsibi l i t ies and decisionmaking only if  he is  unaware of i ts  impac t on h i s  own i nterests .  
55 .  Sunstein ,  supra note 49, a t  1 5 7 1  (footnote omitted); cf M inow, The Suprem e  Court, 1 986 
Term - ForeiVord: Juslice Engendered, ! 0 1  H:\RV.  L. R E V .  1 0, 60 n . 240 ( 1 987) (Rawls "as­
s umes a s i ng le and un iversa l perspec t i ve from 'Nh ich rdl expecLltions can be d iscern ed " and is 
" insufficien t ly sens i t i ve to the poss ib i l i ty  of com pet ing perspect ives " ) .  
This does nul  sugges t  t h a t  R awls'  overall  theory i s  inconsisten t wi t l1 t h e  c i v i c  v i r t ue perspec­
tive. For one, the veil  is a device u l t im a tely i n tended to i n form the s i t uated reader - as a 
t hought ex perimen t .  Se<', e.g., Baker, Sandel on Remis. 1 3 3 U .  P .. \. L. IC �v. 895. 893 ( i S•8S) :  
Okin,  R eason and Feeling in Thinking and Jusricc, 09 ETH i C:> 2 2 9 ,  246 ( 1 989). In addit ion,  
Rawls does not s uggest the vei l  of ignora nce should be recre�tr.ed in  e.\ i s t i n g  pol i t ical  i ns t i t u t ions,  
only used as a h eu r i s t ic  device for t h i n king about :1 j us t  :i t n.t•: t urc for soc ic.:ty .  See J .  Rx,·.; Ls, 
.wpra no te 5 1 ,  :.�t  1 9 5  (disc ussi ng appl ication of pr inc i ples uf j ust ice to s tructure of po l i t ical i ns t i ­
tu t ions) . F o r  t h i s  r�ason . i t  can reasonably b e  arg ued th <l t  c i v i c  v i rt u e  is a consistent e xto:? n s ion of 
the Rawlsian approach to the s t ructure of pol it ical inst i tu t icH1S .  Set' Sunstei n ,  supra n o t e  "!·9 ,  at  
1 567 n. l 60, 1 5 7 1  n . 1 83 .  
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ticipants and expanding the information base. Political actors would 
thus "generate institutions that will produce deliberation among 
the differently situated, not mimic decisions . . . made by the 
unsituated."56  
The difference in technique between the Rawlsian veil o f  ignorance 
and rational dialogue under the civic virtue model should be under­
scored. 57 The structure of the veil of ignorance presumes that deci­
sionmaking may be improved and dialogue promoted by excising 
information - that is, by disembodying individuals from knowledge 
of their society and values. The approach of civic virtue theory, how­
ever, views dialogue from a different perspective: the presumption is  
that a rational dialogue cannot take place absent knowledge of one's 
values and society.  To ensure that real-world decisionmaking will not 
be biased, or at least that the bias will be reduced, civic virtue relies on 
a social dialogue encompassing a wide variety of individuals from dif­
ferent perspectives and walks of life .  The resulting exchange and ex­
pansion of information, it is supposed, will lead participants to 
broaden their perspectives and "think from the point of view of every­
one" - largely what the veil is intended to achieve. 58 Quite simply, 
under the civic virtue view, "the purpose of politics is . . .  the transfor­
mation of private interests into public interests through discussion and 
persuasion. " 59 
B. Legal Application 
To achieve these goals, the civic virtue literature generally explores 
a variety of new or expanded doctrines and institutions that would 
ensure diverse informational inputs. As a general matter, these doc-
56.  Sunstein.  supra note 49, a t  1 5 7 1 ;  see also id. at 1 5 7 5 ,  1 5 86 (footnotes o m i t ted):  
I m part ia l i ty  w i t h in republican t h eories . . .  require public-regarding j u s ti ficat ions offered 
after m u l t i ple po i n ts  of  view have been consulted and (to the extent  possible) genuinely 
understood. 
[T]he basic const i t u t ional  in st i t u tions of federalism, bicameralism, and c h ecks and bal­
ances share some of the appeal of proportional representat ion,  . . .  prol iferat( ing) the points 
of access to governrnc:nt.  increasing the abi l i t y  of d iverse groups to infl uence policy,  mult i ­
plying perspect ives i n  govern ment,  and i m p roving del iberative capacit ies .  
S u nstein also remarks t ha t "pol i t ics should . . .  a l low for a measure of cr i t ical  d i s t ance from and 
scrutiny of [ci t i zen] desi res, bringing new i n formation and d i fferen t perspect ives t o  bear . "  !d. at 
1 544; see alsu fvl ichelmJn .. Truces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 7 6  ("The norm o f  j ustice 
co part ies i tse!f com m�tnds  t h a t  nn oth�r norm shou l d ever take a form that  preempts  questions or 
exem p t s  frurn r�asun-g i v i n g . ' ' ) .  
5 7 .  i ndeed. a s  w i l l  h<: ,;cc: n .  the  d i fference h a s  p ruc t ical  s i g n i fi cance bec�t u se real-world a: ­
remrts to further cliak>gue <Ht one di mension may be in tc:nsinn with  technique�; used t o  fur ther i t  
along anothc ;· .  S'!c inji-o n u tcs 2 1 2 - 1 7  and accomp<tny ing t t: x t .  
5 8 .  See S u n s t C l l l ,  .wpru t tUle �-9 ,  at 1 5 69 (quot ing Ok in , supm n o t e  5 5 .  at  2 2 9 ) .  
5 9 .  �;bshaw. supru n o te  2 5 .  at  1 .10. 
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trines and institutions would serve to proliferate the points of access to 
government and disperse power, thereby increasing the opportunity 
for different groups to find institutional representation within the fed­
eral government and to participate in public dialogue. Recent propos­
als for supplementing checks and balances; facilitating independent 
and "insulated" political representation; promoting "consistency" and 
"high visibility" in statutory construction; requiring proportional rep­
resentation; and ensuring presidential, judicial, and legislative partici­
pation in and oversight of administrative decisionmaking are all 
intended to expand and diversify expressed opinions.60 
These proposals are outgrowths of earlier doctrinal developments 
in administrative, first amendment, and race discrimination law. In 
administrative law, the so-called "hard-look" doctrine and earlier at­
tempts to expand procedures and supplement intervention by a wide 
variety of groups were originally advanced on the ground that they 
would force agency officials to engage in a dialogue with the courts 
and other social actors. 6 1  This exchange, overseen by the courts, was 
intended to force agency officials to come to understand the limitations 
of their own position as well as to reveal any blatantly improper or 
illicit motives . 62 Similarly, first amendment and race discrimination 
law has on occasion sought to force public decisionmakers to reveal 
and explain their reasons for acting to extend a benefit, thereby help-
60. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, Sllpra note ! I , at 1 5 86-92 (summarizing authors). See generally 
M ichelman, Traces of Self-Govern men/, supra note 49, at 3 3  ("The dialogic themes express the 
vision of social normative choice as participatory, exploratory, and persuasive, rather than spe­
cial ized, deductive or demonst rative. "): Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1 5 57 ("Republicans envision 
[the government] process as a forum in  which alternative perspectives and additional information 
are brought to bear . . .  increasing available opportunities [for input] and information.") .  Of 
course, this approach is not necessarily t rue of all writers who might be viewed as writing in the 
civic virtue tradition. See, e.g. , 8. ACKERMAN, SOC I A L  JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 
( 1 9 80) (developing a more objectively l imited and nonculturally dependent conception of dia­
logue); Michelman, Traces of Se/f-Govemmenl, supra note 49 (appearing to develop a more 
court-cen tered approach to dia logue) . 
6 1 .  Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 9 1  HARV. L. 
REV. 1 805 ,  1 8 1 1 - 1 3  ( 1 978) ;  Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private R igh1s, 95 H A R V .  
L. REV .  1 1 93 ,  1 2 67-7 1 ,  1 278-82 ( 1 9 82):  Sunstein, Deregula1ion a n d  t h e  Hard-Look Doctrine, 
1 98 3  SuP. Cr. REV.  1 77 ,  1 8 2-83 ;  see also Greater Boston Television Co. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 84 1 ,  
850-53  (D.C.  Cir. 1 9 70), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 ( 1 97 1 ) . But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resou rces Defense Cou nci l ,  435 U.S. 5 1 9  ( 1 978) .  See generally Tribe, 
Structural Due Process, 10 H A R V .  C . R . - C. L .  L.  REv. 269, 3 0 1  ( 1 975)  (Structural  due process 
"env i s ion(s] the Supreme Court as str uctu ring a d i alogue between the state a n d  those whose 
l iberty its laws confi ne, a d i a logue in which t h e:  cont i n u i n g  l egi t imacy of a law turns on the 
current  w i l l i n gness and abi l i t y  of t h e  state to come forth with rat ional  j ust ifica t i ons for t h e  law's  
cont in ued enforcement .") .  
62 .  See Sunst ein . supra n o t .:  50, ;.tt 4 7 !  (concluding that the hard--look doctrine is "an effort 
to 'flush out' i l legitimate or unart ic u latcd factors . . to ensure that those factors are available for 
d i scussion and comment d u ring and after r he rukmaking process"); id. at 478 ("A fi r m  judic ia l  
hand h as d iscipl i ned admi n i s t rat i ve outcome:; by correct ing parochial  or i l l - reasoned decisions 
and serv ing as a s igni ficant deterre n t . " ) .  
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ing to reveal "�.Vhether o r  not the true motive for the government action 
was a permissible one. 63 In general, the legal admonition that political 
actors "listen" and "respond" to the arguments of others is the norma­
tive linchpin of the civic virtue perspective. By seeking to understand 
and to converse with all relevant actors, deci sionmakers should better 
understand the limitations of their own viewpoint, both factually and 
normatively. 64 While recognizing the clear "participation" benefits to 
diverse informational inputs, 65 this approach focuses on the quality of 
political decisions made in a framework of public dialogue. 
Thus, while the standard law-and-economics and civic virtue anal­
yses of the public interest are often treated as antagonistic, they have a 
common perspective on the issue of information. Both generally favor 
increased levels of information - either through the government's 
production of information and the assignment of property rights (the 
law-and- economics view), or the proliferation of the points of access 
to government (the civic virtue view). The law-and- economics ap­
proach emphasizes the utilitarian value of information - its ability to 
reveal productive or exchange opportunities for furthering means/ end 
rationality. Civic virtue, on the other hand, views the elucidation of 
opinions primarily as serving a value-based function, leading people 
(by the exchange of information and ideologies) to recognize the bias 
of their own positions, and to change their preferences or values -
that is, to help identify ends. Taken together, however, these two tra­
ditions shovv that information can be of benefit normatively as well as 
instrumentally. 66 
63. See, e.g . . Fullilove v .  Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 ,  548-54 ( 1 980) (Stevens, J., dissent­
ing); Hampton v .  Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,  103, 1 14- 1 7  ( 1 976); Saia v .  New York, 3 34 U . S .  
5 5 8  ( 1 948); Cantwell v.  Connecticut, 3 ! 0  U.S .  296 ( 1 940); see also Monaghan, First A m endment 
' 'Due Process, " 83 HARV . L. REV. 5 1 8  ( 1 970). But see Board of Regents v .  Roth, 408 U . S .  564 
( 1 972) (procedura! due proGess does not require hearing of first amendment claim by fired state 
'"m ployee absent ent i tlement). S imilarly, the protec t ion of "public discourse" under the first 
amendment is quite compatible with the civic virtue approach.  See, e.g ,  Post, The Constitutional 
Concept of Pubiic Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Maga­
.<:tne v.  Fa lwel l .  103  HARV.  L. REv. 693 ( 1 990). 
64. See generc:l!y Fiss, The Supreme Coun. 1 978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
1-J:ARV.  L.  REV.  1 ,  4 ( 1 979 ) :  rvricheiman, Forma l  and Associational A ims in Procedural Due Pro­
cess. in Nm.!Os X V I I J :  D u E  P !tOC ESS 1 26, 1 27 ( 1 9 7 7) ;  Tribe, supra note 6 1 ;  Tribe, The Emerg­
ing Reco;In!'ction of individual R ig/us and Jnsritu riona/ Desij;n: Federalism . Bureaucracy and 
!Jue Process of L u wmuking. 10 CREJGHTO:" !.... REv.  433. �!-4'!- ( 1 977) ;  Weisberg, The Calabresian 
Judicial A rlisi: Srallltes and rhe 1'/ew Lcgal .Process. 3 5  S rx-: L REv. 2 1 3  ( 1 983)  (discussing the 
· 'new legal process" v i c\\ Gf  d ialogue): Ackerman. Wh_i: Dialogue?. 8 6  J .  PHJL. 5 ( 1 989) .  
65.  See. e. g. . r\1ashaw, Adminislrurive Due Proces:;: 'The Ques1 for a Dignitary Theory, 6 1  
B . U .  L REV 6 1\ 5  (! 98 1 )  
66. Of cour�,c:. t here 2 r� pc>ic:ntiai  d ifferences. For example. prolifera t ing points of access can 
in som.-; cas�s dinzinish t ::c  ��rnount of inforrnat ioJ�. or at least rncre!y change the type of informa­
i jon,  r�� tber  th ;J.n ir:crease i ts  �Jver�- d l  le; .. e l .  
1 I 
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Despite these important arguments in favor of more information, 
less information can be advantageous along several dimensions, even 
when viewed in light of the goals articulated by the civic virtue and 
law-and- economics traditions. A variety of legal and political institu­
tions that serve to create less information are useful in pursuing some 
of the long-term goals of one or both traditions. This Part focuses on 
the utilitarian benefits of party identification and limited information 
as devices for improving reasoning processes (section III.A), overcom­
ing perverse interest group incentives (section HI.B), and avoiding 
political stalemate (section H I . C).  These are models one, two, and 
three, as sketched earlier in this article. 67 I also consider the signifi­
cance of these effects to several possible governmental reforms (section 
HI.D), and the problems they can present to the civic virtue and law­
and-economics perspectives (section HI.E).  
A. Limited Information as a Value in Promoting Rational 
Decision making (lvlodel l) 
At first glance, it  is difficult to understand how less information 
can improve reasoning processes. As noted above, under a traditional 
economic or utilitarian model of decisionmaking; each new piece of 
information should be integrated according to its probative impact on 
events and marginal judgments; the information should enhance 
rather than undermine utilitarian decisionmaking. Since, under this 
analysis, "the costs of information acquisition and transmission and 
the costs of search are the only factors that limit the quest for more 
information,"68 expansion of information should be presumptively ad­
vantageous. Similarly, under a value-based view of rational dialogue, 
the greater the number of perspectives, the less likely should be the 
bias or irrationality of the ultimate judgment 69 Thus, generally speak­
ing, more information should improve ethical decisionmaking as well. 
Diverse l iteratures from social psychology, philosophy and organi­
zation theory, however, indicate that this process can be more compli­
cated than this general description suggests. In situations of high 
67.  See supra text accompanying notes 1 2 - i 6 . 
6 8 .  L. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 1 2  (ernphasis �ldd:-:d). 
69.  Sec supra n o t es 5 6 - 5 3  and accoirlpanying text .  ()f colJ rse, there ��re sante limits on public 
d iscourse, at least accord i n g  to �;c m e  ;j ·,·ic republi c�Hl� .  See f;;f ichelrnan, L a w 's i\epubhc. supra 
note 49,  at 1 527 (public d iscourse should net  be · ·consider��d or experienced 2.s coercive,  or inva-
3ive, or other\vise a violation of cn-.e's idertt i ty o •  fr:-:eclurn ' ' ) .  
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complexity o r  uncertainty, 70 decisionmakers are often aided b y  "heu­
ristic" devices, which affect the use of information in two different and 
subtle ways. 7 1 First,  a heuristic boils down a complex of i nformation 
into a shorthand ancJytic framework. 72 Economists would view this 
process as decreasing the marginal costs of transmitting the informa­
tion, though the number of actual verbal communications (that is, the 
amount of dialogue, in a colloquial sense) would ordinarily be reduced 
as well. 73 Second, and more importantly, in order to facilitate analysis 
of the information actually transmitted, the heuristic also serves to ex­
clude some information. This limitation, in fact, is a precondition to 
effective comprehensive analysis. As Christopher Schroeder has ob­
served, "comprehensive rationality . . .  reduces choice to an analysis of 
the efficacy of available alternatives to achieve predetermined goals . . .  
inevitably entail[ing] simplification, both in the specification of goals 
and in the modeling methods employed to predict the extent to which 
alternatives achieve them. "74 In the absence of such limitations, deci-
70. The problems of rational decisionmaking in such situations have been extensively i n vesti­
gated. See gen erally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. 
Kahneman, P. Slavic & A. Tversky eds. 1 9 82);  Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions, i n RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN EcONOMICS AND PSY­
CHOLOGY 67 (R. Hogarth & M. Reder eds. 1 9 8 7) .  As Daniel Farber observes, decisionmakers 
"systematically deviate from rational i ty i n  considering combinat ions of risks; they ignore back­
ground information in assessing new data; and they are easi ly swayed by tr ivial  changes in the 
presentation of i n formation." Farber, En virorzmemalism, Economics, and The Public In terest, 4 1  
STAN. L .  REV. 1 02 1 ,  1 03 5  ( 1 989) .  
7 1 .  For a discussion of the value of l i m ited information i n  organization theory, see D. 
BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 5 3  ( 1 963);  J. MARCH & H .  SIMON, 
ORGANIZATIONS 203 - 04 ( 1 9 5 8);  H .  SIMON, ADMIN ISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 80- 8 3  ( 1 9 7 6) ;  H. SI­
\WN, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALiTY ( 1 9 8 2 ) ;  A. W ILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO 
POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY AN,\ LYSJS 36 ( 1 979) .  
7 2 .  Sociologists might call  this an i deal-type. See supra note 20.  
73.  This process is the basis of decreased "costs" i n  an economic sense. I n  an i n formation­
ally perfect world, the heuristic would serve as a "sufficie n t  statistic. ' '  See B. LINDGEN, STATIS­
TICAL THEORY 1 9 1 -205 ( 1 962) .  
74 .  Schroeder, Rig/us Againsl Risk, 86 COL U M .  L. REV. 49 5 ,  502 n.29 ( 1 9 8 6) .  I n  other 
words, the p rocess of com preh ens ive rat ional  dec i si onmak ing itself, as the ph ilosophers of t h e  
social science a n d  organ i zat ion t heory poi n t out,  req u i :·es a dwarfing of marg i nal variables t o  
fac i l i tate a n a l y s i s .  F o r  a law-and- economics explanat i on of t his process , see A . M .  POLINSKY, 
supra n o t e 2 1 ,  at 4 ( "The art of economics is pi ck i ng ass um pt i ons that  s impl ify a problem enough 
to better understand cenair. fea t u res of i t ,  wi thout  in ev i tab ly caus i ng those features to be unim­
portan t ones " ) ;  R.  POS N E R ,  supra n o t e  2 1 ,  at 16  ( " ' [A]bstract ion - reduct ionism,  i f  you l i ke ­
is the essence of scien t i llc i n q u i ry .  A sci e n t i fic t heory must  select  from t h e  welter of experience 
that i t  is trying to  e xp la i n . . " ) (footnote o m i tted).  For an organizat ion-theory explanation,  see 
D. BR,\ YBROO K E  & C.  L l N D i lLO'.l. .wpra note 7 ! ,  a t  1 1 7  ("The synoptic c.rproach makes such 
comprehensive ckm a n d s  for i n format ion and analys is  tint t heor ies a re desperately needed merely 
t o  d isc ip l i ne t he g a t h e r i n g  or ! n form�J t i t.lll �• nd w orga n i ze the m u l t i p le i m pl icat ions of w h atever 
evidence i s  gath erc:d . " i :  .:\. . Vi ! i .DAVS t< Y  . . wpm 1 ; ,-, r ,: 7 1 .  <1t 36 ( " [:\] 1uly' i"  wckomes con s t ra i n ts. 
if every t h i n g  i s  seen as puo;s i b le .  not h 1 ng can be d o n e . " ) :  J. M .-\ RCH & H. S tMON,  supra note 7 1 ,  
a1 1 39 ("Choice i s  a l w a y s  exerc:o;c:d w i t h  respect to <! l i mited , <!ppro:o;imatc, s i m pl i fied ' model'  of 
the n::d s i tu a t io n " )  . .-\ snmc:what  s i m i l a r  t udeo!T is p resen ted i n  t h e  choice be tween rulc mak ing 
a n d  adj ud i c a t i o n  in a d rm n i ;, t l · :! t i v c  law.  Cf Diver·, Policymaking Paradigms in Adminislralive 
Law, 95 H.\ !(V .  L. R F\· .  3 'J 3 .  -UO ( 1 9r� l ). 
l 
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sionmakers often cannot engage in effective analysis, tending (in a type 
of information overload) to miss "the forest for the trees" and to use 
the greater information in a s tochastic manner. 75 
1 .  The Value of Party Identification and Related Party Structures 
Although the significance of heuristics and information overload in 
a variety of contexts is a subject of legitimate controversy/6 two of the 
most important tools of national political organization - strong par­
ties and party identification - appear to serve this function both in 
theory and in practice. As I have argued previously, political parties 
are rightfully praised for their ability to disseminate their message 
broadly to the public. 77 At the same time, however, their power and 
influence is also achieved - especially at the national level - by chan­
neling and implicitly reducing the number of public communications 
about political actors, programs, and policies. The reason this occurs 
is that political parties seek to focus the public's attention on a visible 
cue - party identification - which is intended both to simplify a vast 
amount of information about individual candidates, and, in order that 
it will be understood and followed, to overshadow and dwarf the static 
of individual political communications. 78 " [P]olitical parties 
75. See, e.g. , D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra 7 1 ,  at 5 1 ,  1 1 3 ,  1 1 7 ;  A. WILDAVSKY, 
supra note 7 1 ,  a t  32, 36;  D .  KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
507 (2d ed. 1 978) ;  J. STEINBRUNER, CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION 1 2  ( 1 974). Indeed, 
investigations i n  the natural sciences may involve something like the same process. See T. 
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS ( 1 962). 
76.  Compare Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An A nal­
ysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277 ( 1 986) (criticizing use of i n formation 
overload analysis i n  legal context) with Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their 
Implications for the Law. 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 225 ( 1 986) (suggesting application of psychological 
l iterature to the law). 
77. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 1 1 , at 1 606. What follows is not i ntended to deny 
the importance of this  fundamental advantage. Rath er , I •_)utline here the related positive benefits 
of the channeling (and implicit  l imit ing) of i n formation undertaken by some polit ical parties. 
78. See D. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 1 1 0 ( 1 984): Popkin ,  Gorman, P h illips & 
Smith,  Wha t  Have You Done For !He Lately? Toward An In vestmen t Theo,-y of Voting, 70 A M .  
PoL .  Sci. REv. 779 ,  780 ( 1 976); see also infra note 1 3 8 .  
O f  course, it  can be argued that part ies should n o t  b e  dependent on l imited i n formation once 
the party label has been established in the public consciousness. Under this reasoning, w hile 
party identification does depend on a heu r ist ic label that i nherently simplifies and l imits informa­
tion and communications, once that label is publicized and und erstood,  the public should then 
simply evaluate the complex world of diverse communications i n  light of the label, through a 
type of reflective equilibrium. As a factual matter, however. this b i fu rcated process is difficult  to 
achieve: the proliferation of informational inputs  appears to overwhelm the label i n  a type of 
information overload. Moreover, given the l imited amount of t ime the public has to spend l isten­
ing to poli tical communications, more t i me spent on i nd i vidual  communications necessari l y  
means less time spent on information abou t  the  pa rt y , a n d  a reduced signifi,2ance of t h e  party 
label. See M. WATTENBERG, Ti:iE DECU>d: O F  A�I ERJC\ N POU'l!C-\L PARTI ES ( 1 9 84); Rich­
ardson, Constituency Candidates Versus Ponies in Japanese Voting Beha vior, 82 A :v1 .  PoL. S c i .  
REV.  695,  700 ( 1 988) .  Whi le  the p u b l i c  m a y  b e  more capable of undertaking t h i s  effort n o w  than 
in  the past, see Fi tts , Vices of Viri !IC . .  wpm note l l . a t 1 6c!.Q (summarizing a u t h o rs),  there is 
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originated i n  large part from the need of voters for a guide, a set of 
symbolic shortcuts, to the confusing and often trackless political ter­
rain. "79 The simplification of the general wealth of political informa­
tion in a party label can facilitate the ability of a diffuse public -
which often cares very little individually about those political events, 
though very much in the aggregate - to follow political affairs. 80 In 
short, because people are uninformed on most issues, "democracy 
[may be] best served by reducing and simplifying those choices to a 
single electoral choice. "8 i 
Based on this benefit, the traditional party identificatiOJl, which 
was generally criticized during the 1 950s and 1 960s, 82 has now gar­
nered some academic respectability and praise, as have political parties 
as organizations structurally impelled to create this symbol .  83  Faced 
with the necessity of forging a program and platform attractive to a 
majority of the population and capable of rationalizing the running of 
government, party forces must draw connections between issues, pro­
grams, and interests that may not be apparent in the din of diverse, 
decentralized individual political conversation, but ·.,vould nevertheless 
be attractive to a winning coalition. By drawing these linkages, party 
forces serve to highlight the interrelationship between issues - that is, 
to create a heuristic device. Moreover, while the political party organ­
ization itself obviously creates some new information - the party la­
bel - it succeeds in getting the public to understand and use that label 
partly by simplifying (and, in so doing, necessarily limiting) the wealth 
of political information about candidates and government. In effect, 
party identification is maintained by the :fact that the party exercises 
greater control than individual politicians over political resources and 
communications. The result is that political events are more accessi-
continuing i:ldication that i t  has difficulty keeping abreast of political events and is  advant::ged 
by the party label , see £. SM iTH , THE UNCHANGING AM ERICAN VOTER ( 1 989) .  
79. F. SAUROF & P. BECK, PARTY POLITICS I N  AME!UCA 503 (6th ed. 1 9 88) .  Indeed, party 
identification has been aptly described as the "party i n  the ekctorate." I d. at  1 60. 
80. In contrast to more concentrated special i nterest groups. the diffuse public simply cannot 
take the time, and in some cases do·�s not have the ability regardless of time, to engage in rational 
poli tical dialogue or to understand marginal  uti l i t ies or benefits of altern:1tive policies. G iven the 
col lective action problem of political m obil ization, i t  is  not rational for the public to expend 
m uch effort .  The party label i s  ;1n important shorthand device enabl ing diffuse publics to deal 
with public issues in  a modern indus t rial society. 
8 1 .  J.  Wi LSON, THE AIVlATEUR DEMOCRAT 3LI·3 ( 1 962); see also M. McGERP., THE DE­
C LI N E  OF PoPULAR POLITiCS 206 ( 1 986) (noting tlnt deciine of partisanship "presented a com­
plex, less accessible political world"). 
82 .  See, e.g. , A. CAMPBELL.  P. CONVERSE, W. M i LLER & D. STOKES, THE A M ERiCAN 
VOTER ( 1 960). 
8 3 .  See. e.g ,  Popkin ,  GonT1an, Phil l i ps &: Sn:ith.  su.ura note 70 .  
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ble and more important to the public. 84 
Some critics correctly question the ability of the public to agree on 
the party linkages at various times, rightly observing that the question 
is one of balance between simplification and specification . 85  Certainly, 
American history includes examples of groups, especially blacks, that 
were excluded from political debate and pmver partly by the duopoly 
of a two-party system. Despite this, however, the simplification of 
party labels has also served at times to promote public understanding 
of political events, especially among less educated and poorer 
groups. 86 To the extent that the voting public focuses on this informa­
tion, and is less likely to dwell on the often confusing static of diverse 
individual political conversations, the instrumental rationality of its 
decisions can be improved. 87 
84. See M. McGERR, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 34 ("Traditional party journalism . . .  eased readers' 
participation in polit ics by creating an accessible polit ical world[;] [p]arty papers made politics 
seem important, simplified issues, [and] encouraged the public to judge men and measures with 
the  yardstick of partisanship . . . .  ") ; R. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS 1 37 ( 1 989) 
("The decline of participation in the  U.S. has h istorically paralleled the dwindling of the partisan 
press and the rise of objectivity."). 
85. See S.  SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 58 ( 1 9 8 8); A. WARE, CITIZENS, PARTIES 
AND THE STATE 238 ( 1 987); M iller, supra note 3 1 .  Indeed, Morris Fiorina, who has written 
extensively about the  importance of strengthening party organization, has recently noted that 
some of the breakdown of party influence may simply be a result i n  part of popular preference for 
divided government. See Fiorina, A n  Era of Divided Gm-ernment, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERI­
CAN POLITICS (B. Caine & G. Peele eds.)  (forthcoming 1 990). 
86. The binary choice offered in two- party rule may also be one means for overcoming the 
social costs of political Condorcet cycling, the endless voting cycle created when voting is mult i ­
peaked. See H. ROSEN , PUBLIC FINANCE 1 1 1 - 1 5  ( 1 9 84); P.  0RDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 56-59 ( 1 938). This is not only because political parties exercise agenda 
control, thereby eliminating such cycling, but also because a socialization process may occur that 
wi l l  make positions among political actors more "single peaked, "  and thus not subjec t  to cycling. 
As A lbert \Veale has observed, "The effect of a two-party system is to force voters to  think of 
issues in  the same way, namely in  terms of a choice between party A and party B." \Veale, Socia! 
Choice Versus Populism ? An Interpretation of R iker's Political Theory, 1 4  BR. J. PoL. Sci. 369, 
373 ( 1 984); cf Mashaw, supra note 48, at 99 (noting that dialogue can produce single peaked 
dis tribution in some contexts). From the perspective of some legal academicians exploring l i ter­
ary theory, politicai parties might also be a means of helping to forge a rough type of interpreta­
t ive community, which can be viewed as a prerequisite to meaningful group dialogue or 
understanding. See Fiss, Objectivity and In terpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 ,  745 ( 1 982) (ob­
serving that interpretation can be objective within a given legal interpretative community). Of 
course, there is a fundamental question whether an i n terpreta t i ve commun ity in the literary or 
philosophical sense can or should be established in the political or lega.l system. See Kahn, Com ­
m unity in Contemporary Constitutional Theory. 99 YALE L J .  I ( 1 989) ;  Mann, The Universe and 
the Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as Writer and R eader, u, j STAN. L. REv. 959 
( 1 9 89). See also Post, supra note  63 (discussing some of the tension between community and 
civic dialogue in the first amendment context). 
87. Indeed, this benei'it might be unders tood in  tcrrm r.:<-; i te  compatible with :'orne aspects of 
economic and civic vir tue theory � namely, the value of a princi pal/agency reiationship between 
the public and governrnent officials. For the eco�ornics theory, see ,DJchi�!n &. I)emsetz, JJroduc­
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. 62. A ;,J . Ecor·i. REv. 777 ( 1 972);  Jensen & 
Meckling, Theory of· the 1-r:inn.: JV!anagerial .Behavior .,�igenc-·y C�osts end C'wru.:r.c;h(o Structu re. 3 J .  
FIN. EcoN .  305 ( 1 976). For the civic virtue theory) sec Su nstc·in ,  In terest Gi''O'i�"fJS in A rnerican 
Public La h-'. 38 ST.·\ J",J . L .  R.EV. 29, 69-72 ( 1 9 8 5) ;  Fr.:.rber D,_ 7.'-?1c ;Dublic 
944 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88 :9 1 7  
2. Party Identification and Public Dialogue 
The simplification of political dialogue inherent in party identifica­
tion has historically provided another instrumental benefi t :  improved 
"communication" between government and the public, and, in this 
sense, enhanced government accountability to public judgments, espe­
cially those of the poor. 88  In a dispersed environment of diverse polit­
ical dialogue, the meaning of electoral events is more often unclear, as 
hundreds of individual candidate peculiarities determine particular 
electoral decisions with respect to congressional seats and state offices. 
This is especially true because voting is disproportionately retrospec­
tive, with voters responding best to clear government actions,· 89 in a 
government of dispersed powers, government actions are less likely to 
be the subject of popular affirmation or retribution, since no individual 
government official or party controls government sufficiently to be 
held responsible and subj ect to clear retrospective evaluation.90 Polit­
ical parties, to the extent they control government, can serve as a 
structure that frames issues and programs in clear and simple terms 
for the whole public . 9 1  While there may be a reduction in rational 
dialogue in a legal or philosophical sense, which cannot be ignored, 
there can be a quite different benefit in systemic political accountabil­
ity - in a sense, mass public communication and dialogue through the 
Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REv. 873,  9 1 2  n .224 ( 1 987) .  In  the eyes of many poli t ical  scientists, strong 
party identification effectively l imi ts popular oversight of day-to-day government  activities, re­
ducing polit ical  evaluations to general retrospective assessments about whether the party is act­
ing consistently with the voters' general views and interests. See M. FIORINA, R ETROSPECTIVE 
VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS ( 1 9 8 1 ); V.O. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTO­
RATE ( 1 964). In this sense, i t  establishes a principal/agency relationship  between the people and 
their government, necessarily giving the agent (that is, government leaders) some leeway. To the 
extent that the public is better at evaluating the general results of government actions, than at 
guiding specific future strategies, the general ity of party identification may offer an advantage in 
promoting long-term rational ity in  voting. 
88 .  See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 1 1 , at 1 639- 43. 
89. See V.O. KEY, supra note 84, at 63 (" [T]he major streams of shift ing voters graphically 
reflect the electorate in  i ts great, and perhaps principal role &s an appraiser of past events, past 
performance, and past actions. It  j udges retrospectively; it commands prospectively only insofar 
as i t  expresses either approval or disapproval of that which has happened before ." ) ;  M. FJOR I N A, 
supra note 87, at 5 - 6 ;  cf J. CLUBB, W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE,  PARTISAN R E A LI GNMENT:  
VOTERS, PARTI ES A N D  GOVERNM ENT IN AM ERICAN H ISTORY 30-32,  267 ( 1 9 8 0) (arguing that 
the major realignments in  American political history depend on rejection and affirmation by the 
electorate of the parties' actions in  power). 
90. As V.O.  Key wrote, " (t]he vocabulary of the voice of the people consists mainly of the 
words 'yes' and 'no. ' " V.O.  KEY,  POLITICS, P A R T I ES, AND P R ESSURE G RO U PS 544 (5th ed.  
1 964). 
9 1 .  Of course, d ialogue between courts and Congress has been a frequem subject of academic 
analysis. See A. B I C K EL, THE LEAST DANG E ROUS BRANCH 26 ( 1 962); Bickel & Wellington, 
Legis/alive Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 7 1  HA RV . L. REV. I ,  1 4 -35 
( 1 957); L.  FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES ( 1 98 8) .  The literature on party organizat ion 
suggests that, at least in a systemic sense, this conversation may be undermined for the public by 
the decline of parties. 
1 
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To be sure, no one suggests that party identification is a perfect 
heuristic. 93 As a practical matter, no such device can exist.  94 By defi-
92. Indeed, along t hese same l ines, there is some possibility that this s i mpl ifica t i on may have 
a s igni ficant effect on the ability of the political system to ente< into high poli t i cs , that is, to 
preci pitate what political scientists call a critical election, one of those rare const i t u t ional move­
ments which is the basis for Bruce Ackerman's proposed system of JUdic ial review. See Acker­
man, The S10rrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution. 93 YALE L.J. 1 0 1 3 , l 049-5 i ,  I 053-54 
( 1 9 84) (claiming that the role of the courts is to perfect the political understanding reached 
during prior periods of "high poli tics"); see also Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional 
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 ( I  989). Several scholars believe that a prerequisite to h igh pol i t ics is 
political control and accountabil i ty of government i n  one part y's hands, such that the party's 
actions can become the subject of a comprehensive public retrospective evaluat ion. With the 
breakdown of the parties, there is some doubt whether in the future our political system will  be 
able to preci pi tate as easily such high pol i t ical debate, at least in  a critical election sense. See D. 
BRADY, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY-MAKING 1 65- 66, 1 79 ( ! 9 88) ;  W. 
BURNHAM , CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POL ITICS 1 9 1  ( 1 970); 
J.  CLUBB, W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, supra note 89, at 1 6 1 -62 ( 1 9 80) (" [U) n ified and sus­
tained partisan control of government was a necessary and obvious condition for the policy inno­
vations we usually see as the products of partisan realignments.");  R. RUB!N, P R ESS, PARTY, 
AN D  THE PRESIDENCY 2 1 6 - 1 7  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  If true, this structural ch ange may also suggest that 
events like the failed Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork are a resulT of the tradi­
tional testing of the h igh political moment, as Ackerman argues, see Ac!<erman, Trcnsformative 
Appcin !ments, 1 0 1  HARY. L. REV. 1 1 64 ( 1 9 8 8), but are also influenced by the breakdown of 
political parties , which makes it struc t urally more difficu l t  for the "moment" to engulf all 
branch�s today. 
93. Scholars have explored other types of heuristics, although they have been considered far 
more controversial. During the 1 950s,  a variety of politicai scientists, react ing in part to the rise 
of Nazi Germany and to McCarthyism, criticized the ideological bent o[ American politics,  fear­
ing that  an ideological debate among t h e  "masses" would promote McCarthyi sm and perhaps 
lead to fascism. See M. ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND McCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPEC­
TER 1 6- 1 8  ( 1 967) (summarizing authors). W hile this l iterature clearly overstated its position, it 
i mplicit ly argued that the mass publ ic  needed a heuristic device by which i t  could rational ly 
j udge poli tical l i fe. Free-wheeling discussion and dissemination of information, especial l y in an 
abstract framework, supposedly obscured popular understandi ng of pol i tical events. 
Th':': solution traditionally offered to these difficulties w:Js pluralism. A self-interested and 
narrowl y  focussed debate, accordi ng to this th inking, would serve as an importam heurist ic to 
channel political thinking. By keeping debate narrowly self-interested, it could facil i tate the abil­
ity of the public, especially the poor and less educated, to participate effec t ivel y  in  politics. See 
C. LiNDBLOM, THE INTELL!GENCE OF DEMOCRACY 229-32 ( 1 965) ;  M. ROG!N, supra. This 
conciusion claimed some support from the l i terature favoring incremental decisionmaking in  a 
wide v;:riety of public policy conte;,ts as a means of improving rational ity.  See, e.g., D. 
BRA Yf!ROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 7 1 ,  at 243; Lindblom, The Science of "!¥fuddling 
Through, · •  i 9 PuB.  ADMIN.  REV. 79,  86 ( 1 9 59);  see also Diver , supra note 74 (advocating the us•o 
of incremental decisionmaking in ail  uncontroversial cases not threatt:!n ing  disc.strous misotcps or 
disenfranchisement); :Miller, supra note 3 1 ,  at 736  (" [O]rganizations in a pluralisl so,�it:ty have an 
iTicentive to con·fine their act ions to t he businessl i ke pursuit  of their nD.rro\�/ de"f1ning �Pte·�·ests end 
;:ot to pursue broad ideological goals .") .  Wh i le the cost of this  increase in con t rol over imtnecli­
o.te events \Vas an abandon1nent of political debate over more long- terrn� philosophic2l ;:;�·lues, this 
vice v;as s u pposed to have a potential  virtue in political understanding and control. 
Unfortunately, pluralism ignored or at least undervalued pervasive t ransac tion costs, wealth 
effects, znd the philosophical and normative vacuity of self-intcresttd thit1king.  S.r:c supta text  
c.ccompanying no tes 26-3 1 ancl note 3 1 .  For this reason, \Vhile the normative d,:fense of p o l i ticc.l 
pa.rties has sometimes accepted the value of self-interest as a rationalizing device, sec> Fitts, '/icc:., 
of Viriue, supra note 1 1 , at ! 6Ll, l ,  many poli t ical scientists have advocated overcoming these Olhe: 
criticisms of plura lism th rough a different heurist ic device � party identlfica.t ion. This s:/stern 
S1Jppo�;edly all c)\vs the publ ic to have a manageable unders tanding c1f the cornprch•.::rtsi\·e public 
issu�;s that ::orne plu ralists tho�1ght would over'-.'lhelm i t .  
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mtwn, a heuristic simplifies and abstracts from reality ,  based on the 
decisionmaker's judgment as to what is important, as well as her need 
to facilitate analysis of social problems. 95 As civic-virtue and other 
writers have pointed out repeatedly and correctly, existing social insti­
tutions and heuristic devices necessarily bias public j udgments. 96 In­
deed, the argument on behalf of a two-party system (as opposed to a 
one-party system) is based on the need for alternatives to and criticism 
of a particular party perspective. 97 Ultimately, the question is one of 
balance. The political party approach cautions, however, that a con­
stant increase in the diversity of political inputs, which check each 
perspective with other perspectives,98 will not eliminate the use of 
heuristic devices; they are inherent in human processing of informa­
tion. 99 In the absence of strong parties and party labels, members of 
the public may well generate their own types of anchoring devices 
which can be worse. 
94. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text .  
95.  This is perhaps one reason that some common law legal analysts and interdiscipl inary 
legal scholars criticize each other's analytic methodology as simplistic. On one level, they are 
both correct, since all models simplify reali ty  to facil i tate understanding. See M. WEBER, METH­
ODOLOGY, supra note 20, at  20; cf B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITU­
TION 1 0 - 1 5  ( 1 977) (distinguishing between "scientific policymakers" and "ordinary observers" as 
alternative paradigms of legitimate legal analysis); R. POSNER, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 6  
("[A]bstraction - reductionism, if you like - i s  of the essence of scient ific inquiry.  A scien tific 
theory m ust select from the welter of experience that i t  is trying to explain, and it is therefore 
necessarily unrealistic when compared direct ly  to actual conditions.") (footnote omitted). 
96. We all have come to understand the pervasive influence of anchori ng phenomena and 
social background in  conceptual thinking. See C. BAKER, supra note 1 0, at  1 4-22; J. ELSTER,  
SOUR GRAPES ( 1 98 3); Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHIL & PuB. 
AFF. 1 ( 1 975) ;  Sunstein ,  Legal In terference with Private Preferences, 5 3  U. CHI. L. REV. 1 1 29 
( 1 986) (arguing that legal intervention despite private preferences may be j ustified when those 
preferences depend on the legal and social orders). See generally K. MANNH EIM, IDEOLOGY 
AND UTOPIA ( 1 954); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Lim its of 
Jnstru:nental Rationality, 46 S. CAL L. REv. 6 1 7  ( J  973). 
97. See A .  DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 1 40 - 4 1  ( 1 9 57); E. 
SCHA TTSCHNEIDER, supra note 1 1 , at 60. 
98. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1 1 54 ("A polit ical process that subjects private choices to 
critical scrutiny wi l l  in this sense produce better laws than a process that takes them as exoge­
nous. "); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra n o te 49, at 76 ("The norm of justice to 
parties i tself commands that no other norm shou ld ever take a form t hat preemp t s  questions or 
exempts from reason-giving.") ;  cf Minow, supra note 55, at  74 ("Justice depends on the possibil­
ity of conflicts among the values and perspectives that  justice pursues .") .  
99. See sources cited supra note 7 I .  As Cass Sunstein recogn izes: "If  the ideas of endoge­
nous preferences and cognitive distortions are carried sufllcien tly far, i t  may be impossible to 
describe a tnliy autonomous preference. I t  is  difficult indeed to generate a baseline from 
which to describe genuine autonomy and an approach that tries to abst ract ent irely from social 
pressures is unl i kely to be fruitful ." Sunstein, supra note 96, at  1 1 70-7 1 .  Ultimately, polit ical 
understanding can benefit from organizing pr inc i ples , ideal types, which faci l itate understanding 
of pc·!itical action. Competing pol i t ical parties perform this role for a modern indust rial  society. 
Sel! supra note 86 (discussing the possible need for an i nterpretative community  to engage in 
group d ia logue). 
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B. Limited Information as a Benefit in Promoting Utilitarian 
Efficiency (Model II) 
947 
The political party literature thus indicates that less information 
and party identification can serve as a heuristic device to simplify and 
organize political information. This approach also suggests a second 
possible utilitarian benefit to more limited information : minimizing 
groups' narrow pursuit of self-interest that, from a societal perspec­
tive, would have led to a reduction in social welfare through the pro­
cess of universalism described above. Put another way, less 
information may help forge a sense of collective responsibility, without 
which the pursuit of self-interest may make many citizens worse off. 1 00 
This is the classic prisoners' dilemma, which was described earlier as 
Model H . 1 0 1 
1 .  The Influence of Special Interest Groups 
As discussed above, a major reason often offered for the heightened 
and potentially perverse influence of narrow constituencies in congres­
sional and administrative decisionmaking is the splintering of govern­
mental power among different government actors . The increasing 
independence of representatives within Congress is thought in many 
ca.ses to advantage narrow interest groups that can secure a legislative 
foothold and trade that position for influence within the legislative 
process. This independence is secured, to a large degree, by represent­
atives delivering discrete services to their districts in the form of con­
stituent services, pork-barrel legislation, or other concentrated 
benefits . The cost of these services, however, is other constituent serv­
ices and pork-barrel legislation obtained by other representatives -
so-calied universalism - resulting in reduced social welfare. Once a 
regime of universalism has been established, moreover, there is no ba­
sis for individual legislators or their constituents to opt out of the sys­
tem . 1 02 As in the prisoners' dilemma, many groups would be better 
off, under this analysis, if representatives could reach a binding agree­
ment to end the system . 1 o3 
1 00. Limited information is beneficial for the ii!diYidua/ in this  context,  it should be noted, 
only if  s imi larly si tuated political actors are also restrained by the i n formation l i m i tation,  so as to 
a';oid the prisoners· di lemma. As i n  the case of t he prisoner's d i lem ma there would be an individ­
ual i nstrumental advantage to this t y pe of i nformation. See supra note 1 5 . 
1 0 1 .  See supra notes 1 4 - 1 5  and �ccompanying texl. 
1 02.  I f  t he const i tuents should elect a civical l y  virtuous represen tative, she alone would not 
be able to change t he nature of the regime or pol i t ical bargai ns ,  bu1 could only  deprive her 
con s t i t uents of their piece of the pie.  
1 03 .  For a generai description of this process, see L. DODD & R.  Scr-IOTT, CON G H ESS :U'[ D 
T H E  ADI';I I N iSTRATl VE STr\TE ( 1 979) ;  M. FIORINA,  supra note JO; Shepsle & Weingast.  Legisia­
Iive Po!i!ics and /Judger Ourcomes, in FEDER.o\ L  BuDG ET Pouc,· 1 :-; THE l 980"s J!f3 ( 1 934). 
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2 .  Party Identification 
There is good reason to believe, however, that strong party identifi­
cation (as well as strong party control over political resources that 
help maintain that identification) may tend to reduce this problem, 
especially at the national level. Strong parties, which control political 
resources and create strong party identification, thereby diminish the 
ability of legislative representatives to communicate effectively infor­
mation to their constituents regarding any delivery by the representa­
tives of special services peculiar to their particular districts. 1 04 In a 
sense, strong party identification, which is created and reinforced by 
strong party influences over communications, creates a verbal or ps) 
chological centralization of authority by leading constituents not to 
focus on any special services - individual or legislative - that might 
be performed by their representatives, but rather to vote and debate on 
the success or failure of the party as a \vhole. In this environment, 
representatives obviously have less of an ability or incentiv.;; to spend 
' . . d "  . . . . ' 1 ... 1 1 1 d tne1r tnne 1stmgms11mg tn:::rnse ves :r:com tne party or eauers an per-
forming discrete legisl.ative, constituent, or symbolic activities, 1 0 5  and 
more reason to work with party leaders in favor of a general party 
program for which they would be held accountable. 1 06 Although dia­
logue and information ordinarily are vievved as forging a sense of com­
munity, here the opposite ca:n be true: the absence of information 
From the opposite perspective, a more centralized government structure often appears t o  avoid 
some of these problems. See Inman, lvlcrkets, Governments, and the '"Ne w ' "  Political Economy, in 
2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOivilCS 647, 692-739 (A. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds. 1 987)  
(reviewing publ ic choice l i terature on centralized rule); Inman,  Federal Assistance and Local 
Services in the United States: The Evoiution of a New Federal Fiscal Order, in FlSCAL FEDERAL­
IS iV! AND QUA.NTITATIVE STU DIES (I-I .  Rosen ed. 1 9 88)  (discussing t he benefits of a majority rule 
system, c_s opposed to a d i spersed systern, in f-=deral grant programs); J. {_:OGA!"'-T, THE EvoLu­
TION OF CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET DEC!SIONMAK!NG AND THE EMERGENCE OF FEDERAL 
DEFICITS (The Hoover Institu tion V/orking Paper No. E-88-3 3 .  1 988) (conclud i ng that legi sla­
tive decentralization has led to deficits). 
1 04. To be st:re, the traditional picture of the party machine is of an organization facilitating 
graft. As the text suggests, however, party identification can obviate the need for the party to 
undertake such distributions in order to rn3.intain  its strength. 
1 0 5 .  A ..s has been observed: ' ·So lo!1g as individual candidates have SOiTte frecdoill t o  tailor 
their positions to their particular districts� they \Vi l l  natura1 1y  be percei v ed n-to rt: favorably than 
a�_� institution, such as Congressj cr . . .  the chief executiv·: , that in effect is constrained t o  z.dopt a 
si ngle nationai posit ion. ' '  B. c_,;.n·n:, J. FEREJOH;�.J Cr_ fvL fiOR i l'·IA,  TBE P En.soJ·-iAL "'ifOTE 200 
( 1  ? 8 7 ) .  
1 06.  S:?e sources r.:i tecl note 1 J 8 .  The u�xtual c.rgurnent,  i t  should be noted) i �� the pol it-
ic::-J.l coun terpart of a negati:-.'C>·inforr:1c:Lion thesis  first  p u t  forv/ard by econornist  f?jchard f-Iirsh­
leit"'er in the case of certain iYP·-==�� c( i!·tsuntnce contracts. See ��irsh1ei fer, sup."'a note 25. As 
.Hirshieifer observed, market participants in insurance n1Jy be better off if prec l uded fron1 secur­
ing inforrnation about futurt e·.,(�nts that would iT:.ere1y have distributional  consequences. The 
reason i ::;  {hat the a t terr1pt to t;;.e purely distributional inform2.tion Yv' i l 1  lr:ad to a social 
dea.d\v:--::igl1t loss.  A.s a rssult,  l�lirshicif:r i·t:ccSoned, cont rar�y" to the c1ztss1c tx�onorn ic analysis of 
information, 1ega1 prohibitions on the of such i n forn1ation c a n  enhance social ut i l i ty .  
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about individual actors and their distinctions may create a greater 
sense of collective identity and responsibility. 1 07 
Strong political parties and party identification help overcome this 
problem, it is important to emphasize, by reducing the incentive of 
narrow individual constituencies to act on information about their 
self-interest . 108 To draw the crude analogy to public choice theory, 
they should help solve the prisoners' dilemma by "depriving" the pub­
lic within a particular congressional district of the information that its 
political representative can ofrer a "special deal . "  1 09 This lack of 
knowledge helps to decrease the probability that the district will pur­
sue its immediately apparent self-interest. The result is that individual 
members of Congress are more likely to be held accountable for their 
contribution to the general effectiveness of government performance 
than for their narrow, marginal efforts to obtain special advantages for 
their district or for individual constituents. All things being equal, 
therefore, there is less reason for raembers of Congress to spend time 
distinguishing themselves politicaliy and symboljcally from the rest of 
their party. Rather, they will thrm:v their support and assistance to 
the party as a whole, since it is its success, ultimately, that is more 
likely to ensure the individual's reelection. As a result, the political 
influence of diffuse groups should be enhanced. 
I ndeed, an analogous argument has been made about the ,-:ffect of 
political parties and party identification on the incentive for political 
actors to take actions with a longeT tirne horizon. i-\ politics.l party 
that exists as a stable institution extending across careers and political 
generations may tend to mask the temporal distin.ctions between 1•:-ad-
1 07 .  Of course, some believe t here are pot;:ntial benefits to the breakdown of party iden t ifica­
t ion .  The d ispersion of influence and rise of independent poiitical power accompany i n g  the de­
cl ine  of pa rt ies faci l i tate greater d ia logue between indiv idual  representati ves within Congress and 
be tween branches of governm e n t .  Moreover, to the extent  that  u n i versalism re ign s in  Con g ress , 
i t  m ay i m prove the abi l ity of narrower groups, such as traditionally exc l uded m inorit ies, to se­
c ure some in st i t u t i onal representation w i t h i n  the polity, a l tho ugh , absent pn;judice, n arrow 
groups are generally t hought to enjoy organizat iona .i ad ., c.m tages in today's pol i t ical process. See 
A ..ckerrn:.-1n�  .)·upra note 28 ,  at 745-46. 
Final ly ,  t'rorn the opposite perspective, the d t:'ct:n traEza tion of pov/er n1 ight be thought to 
raise concerns of tyranny or of narrO\V groups gaining extra influence through t heir  control  of  
cen t ra l izeJ i n s t i t u t ions .  T h e  poi i ticai party's greater emphasis on cen t ra l ization me!y not  fully 
resolve the i n t ��rna.l q uestion - what organizatlo:;1  t h eory \\'Ould c a ! i  a princi pal/agency prob!en1 
- of e n � u r i n g  that party leaders art' rr:sponsive to  t h c� ir  party cons t i t uents.  The t radit ion!:ll vie\v 
is t h a t  a t \\'0 party fra n1C\VOrk cn�ures i._l_ me�L;U!"C or Sec Fins,  Vice oj' Virtue, 
supru note l l ,  �l c 1 6 !  () - i 2 .  
1 08 .  , t h i �·. i :� d i fferent fro:n �he:  
th::n seek t i ther  t o  i rn plernent  ;1 t i t-for-tat �; l ra r •.:gy , . ! c. i n s t i l l  �l l t ruis in o:· \' i rt u-:: . See ::<. . . .:\. �\ E L ·· 
ROD. T H E  EVOL UT!ON OF COOPERATION ( 1 9 S -:· j �  R. l:·P . .  ·\ l"'..J ;-� , PASSIOi'iS \Vrn-J I I< ? .. E.-\So;·..; ( 1 968 ) :  
�A .  T .. \ Y L O R ,  P.�.. r-..: :\ R C H Y  A�ID COO P F E .\TlON ( l 9 7 6 ); I-Iansn1ann. The R ole of· 
prise. 89 '{,\ L E  L . J .  8 3 5 .  848-54 .  8 5 9-62 ( 1 9 ()0);  Sunst .� in ,  supn1 note 8 7 .  
1 09 .  �::ce supro n o t e  1 5  
Enter-
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ers of the same party. With this "ignorance" of personal differences 
between party members, there can be less of an incentive, all things 
being equal, to pass off budget deficits or other problems to future 
party decisionmakers, who are linked to present political leaders by 
party ties and popular party identification. In this type of environ­
ment, it is possible that the President and subordinates who will soon 
become party leaders know that the public is more likely to hold the 
party and future party leaders accountable for current policies . Par­
ties and party identification thus would serve to help promote longer 
temporal accountability by m asking individual distinctions between 
party successors. 1 10 To the extent that political parties decline as col­
lective institutions extending across administrations and polit ical per­
sonalities, this temporal accountability becomes more attenuated, if 
not broken . Politicians can be more confident that successors within 
the party will not be held responsible for earlier actions, thereby exac­
erbating any temporal collective action problems. 1 1 1 
C. Limited Information and Nonideological Political Parties as a 
Benefit in Overcoming Political Stalemate (JV!odel lLT) 
A third and related way that less information and stronger party 
identification can benefit utilitarian decisionmaking is by obscuring the 
existence of political divisions and issues, thereby facilitating agree­
ment and political action. This is an example of Model H I, as outlined 
earlier. 1 1 2  
1 1 0. As V .O . Key argued: 
Expression of electoral d isapprobat ion . . .  depends on the existence of pol i tica l  parties with 
some con t i n u i t y  and some sense of corporate accountab i l i t y .  \Vhen a Presiden t seeks re­
election, he cannot avoid that accountabi l i t y ;  his record i s  approved or it i s  not approved. 
When the President "s  party puts forward a n o m i nee as a successor to the i n c um bent,  the 
candidate must ,  i f  the electorate i s  t o  be effect i ve, be accountable for the record of h is party.  
When such a presidential candidate seeks t o  work out of such responsibi l i ty .  he attempts to 
subvert a basic tenet of the consti t ut ional customs. 
V . O. KEY, P l.. IHL I C  OPIN ION AND AMERJCAN D EMOCRACY 474 n . 3  ( 1 96 1 ) .  See generally 
Cremer, Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations. 1 0 1  Q.J. EcON .  33  ( 1 986). 
I I i . The resu l t  could be a greater l ikelihood of such temporal collec t i ve action problems as 
budget defic i ts .  See Cogan, supra note 1 03 ( l i n ki n g  the dec l i n e  of parties to budget deficits). See 
generally J. BUCH.-\N,\N & R. WAGNER,  DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT:  THE. POLITIC.\ L  LEGACY O F  
LOR D  KEYi, ES 1 7- 1 8  ( 1 977) (arguing t h a t  deficits a r e  a re:;u l t  o f  tem poral collec t i ve action 
problems).  
1 1 2 .  See supra text accompanyi n g  note 1 6 . To some exten t ,  the val ue of pol i t ical part ies in 
improving the  rationali!y of vot i ng, see supra section I l l .  A.  w h i le at the same t ime avoiding some 
issues (as o u t l i ned here in sect ion I I ! . C) might be seen as pursuing objecti ves that are poten t ia l ly  
i n  tens ion .  A s i m i lar charge can be made against t rad i t ional defenses of p l u r a l i s m .  I n  th is  case, 
how::ver .  ro l i t ical part ies arc thought  to i m prove the rat ional i ty of vot i n g  <!bout t hose issues on 
t h e  po l i t i ca l agenda and to be better able to avoid other pote n t i n l ly des t ruct ive  issues by keeping 
t hem utf the  po l i t ica l  '!gend;.:.  Pol i t ic a l party supr:orters would explain the dift(:rence as simply 
· ·want [ ing] to offer v o t e r s  sotne L·h o ice but :wt [ too m uch]  choice . · ·  Orren . !he Changing S1y/e.1· 
a/A merican Puny Politics. in T H E  FuT U R E  OF A�t E R ICAc.J POI .JTIC\L P,\ R T ! E S  ,;. , 1 5  (J .  Fleish­
man ed.  1 98 2) (em phasis in  origi nal ). As E. E.  Schattschneicler  observed. · · [d]:�mocracy is not to 
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O f  course, the need for agreement is relative and i s  ordinarily out­
weighed by the fundamental value in confronting and resolving social 
issues. It can be necessary, however, to overcome the status quo by 
prioritizing among the infinite number of controversies that can be 
placed on the political agenda. Rawls, for example, has argued that 
avoiding certain issues is a necessity in the modern liberal state. 1 1 3 
This avoidance is achieved not only by explicit constitutional prohibi­
tion, such as the separation of church and state, 1 1 4 but also by the way 
political institutions, such as strong parties and party identification, 
are structured so as to keep political actors focused on some issues and 
not on others - that is, to facilitate ignorance of some issues. This 
process is similar to the manner in which party identification over­
comes interest group universalism, except in this case party identifica­
tion and other related devices can serve to overcome ideological and 
other stalemates. 
1. The Literature on Nonideological Parties 
This controversial argument can be traced to the pluralists, who 
suggested that structures that keep debate focused on today's 
problems, such as incremental budgeting systems, facilitate agreement 
and government action. 1 1 5 Because any general rejection of compre-
be found in the parties but between the parties . "  E. SCHATfSC!-INEIDER,  supra note I I , at 60 
(emphasis in original). In this sense, parties can be seen on some dimensions as facilitating polit­
ical clarity - even ideology - and on other dimensions as removing issues from the political 
agenda. 
1 1 3 .  See Rawls, supra note 1 6; see also Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 
OxFO R D  J. LEGAL STUD. I ,  1 7  ( 1 987)  (calling for a "remov[al] from the political agenda [of] the 
most divisive issues, pervasive uncertainty and serious contention about which must undermine 
the bases of social cooperation") .  As Stephen Holmes has observed: "In a liberal social order, 
the basic normative framework must be able to command the loyalty of individuals and groups 
with widely differing self-understandings and conceptions of personal fulfillment. As a result, 
theorists of j ustice can achieve their principal aim only by steering clear of irresolvable metaphys­
ical disputes . "  Holmes, Gag Rules or the Polilics of Om ission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY 1 9, 20-2 1 (J . Elster & R .  Slags tad eds.  1 9 88) .  
1 1 4 .  See Holmes, supra note 1 1 3 ,  at 1 9- 5 8  (discussing this and a variety of other legal tech­
niques). Sunstein recognizes the benefits of omission in this special case . See Suns tein, supra 
note 49, at 1 5 5 5  n . 8 5  (" [R]emoval of rel ig ion from the pol i t ical agenda protects republ i can poli­
tics by ensuring against stalemate and fac tionalism " ) .  
1 1 5 .  See A. W I LD.-\VSKY,  T H E  POLIT ICS OF T H E  B U DG ETA RY PROCESS ( 3 d  ed. 1 979);  
Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS, 29 Pul:l. ADM I N .  R Ev .  1 89 ( 1 969); see also A. 
B ENTLY ,  T H E  PROCESS OF GOV E R N M ENT 447- 5 9  ( 1 90 8 ) ;  R.  D.A. H L. supra n o t e  3 1 ,  a t  1 4 1 - 4 5 ;  C .  
LINDBLOM, supra n o t e  9 3 ,  at 3-34,  /l7- 1 0 1 ;  0 .  T R U I'viAN,  T H E  G O V E R N �1 ENTAL PROCESS 50 1 -3 5  
( 1 9 5 1 ) . But cf A .  W I I . D.-\ VSKY,  THE " N r:w" POLITICS O F  TH E 8UDG ET:'d� Y PROCESS 423-26 
( 1 9 88)  (recogn i z i ng many of the t rade-offs i nvol ved i n  this approach ) .  W h i le ignorance of long­
term issues may minimize ceriain t y pes of analysis ,  ii can have advantages in reaching agree­
ments where there is  lil l ie to gain from increased scrutiny. A n alogous arguments about igno­
rance facilitating moral consensus have been made in the p rivate law l i terat ure. See, e. g. , G .  
C A L A B R ESI  & P .  80 I:l B ITT, T R A G I C  C H O ICES 3 8 - 3 9  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
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hensive analysis is highly questionable, 1 1 6 however, the political party 
approach has pursued the benefits of less absolute limitations on 
information. 
Coalitional, as distinguished from ideological, politics is the best 
example. According to this perspective, synoptic ideological analysis 
often stimulates informational inputs and conflict which can be profit­
ably avoided through a more focused political process .  In particular, 
nonideological politics, which deemphasizes any overarching ideologi­
cal framework, is thought to avoid raising some issues, thereby 
"serv[ing] as a method for aggregating popular choices, tying these 
conflicts over courses of action to a broader program, and . . .  making 
compromise rather than veto the general form of resolution. " 1 1 7 
For similar reasons, such devices as party identification, closed 
primaries, and centralized party conventions , 1 1 8  as well as some re­
strictions on access to decisionmaking and bargaining in Congress and 
executive agencies, 1 1 9 are thought to serve as a means of avoiding or 
delaying resolution of some issues by keeping them out of public de­
bate and the public "consciousness. " 1 20 Indeed, the increasing use in 
recent years of government commissions appointed by the President or 
Congress to decide major issues of policy, such as the deficit, social 
St:;curity, or the future of the lVIX missile, represents an attempt to :re-
• C1 h bl "  ' 
. ,.. 1 . . . 1 . create outs1ue t e pu 1c eye t ne mwrma bargammg mec 1amsrr1 
1 1 6 .  The narrowness of decisionmaking with in  a plural ist  framework has been frequently 
crit icized when used as a general model for government decisionmaking.  At best, avoidance is 
only an in terrrtediate, not a universal, goal. 
l 17. Orren, supra note 1 1 2 ,  a t  5. 
1 1 8 .  See N.  POLSSY, CONSEQU ENCES OF PA RTY REFOR:Vl ( 1 933) ;  D. PRICE, supra note 7 8 ;  
L SA BATO, supra note 1 1 . 
1 1 9 .  See S .  FRANTZICH, COMPUTERS I N  CONG R ESS 246 - 47 ( 1 982)  ( " 'With better informa­
t ion.  members of Congress [are) able to determine not only the aggregate impact of legislat ion,  
but  :.dso the sp:::cific impact on their  districts ,  heighten [ing) the 'zero sum game' view of 
poi i tics·· and · ·exacerbat( ing] the problem [of decision making] by laying bare the conflicts over 
valu-es or parochial i n t erests that were muted when such information was not  readi ly  available . " ' ) ;  
S t r<tuss, supra note 48, at  666 ((;rit izing formalization of Presidential d i rection over agencies 
because the visibi l i t Y  of this process might lead Congress to · ·encumber·· the system "in ways 
re•; tricting the effect iveness of the Presiden r " s  coordinative apparat us. ") .  Similar observations 
h ave been made in  game theo ry about  the b�nefits of a · · focal point ,"  which avoids bargaining 
over coordinat ion problems. See A.  ROn!, A:( ! O \i .ATIC MO DELS OF BARGAINING ( 1 979) ;  T. 
SC i l E ! l . lNG,  T H E  STRATEGY OF Cm.; P LICT 70 ( 1 963 ) .  For a disc ussion of the  related agenda 
":ont rGl benefits of pol i ( icai pB.rtics. ;2nd l heir -..·(_due in  cre� H ing s ingle-peaked preferen(:e�, see 
i!!pi{i 1HI { C  06 .  
1 20 .  (Io!· i s  t h i s  technique foreign t c  c o u rt s .  i n  consl i l u t i O ! i i.ll Lnv, for e;<.ample, c o u rt s  o n  
GC(:_�sion hJ.·;e left unck:ar the relat ive po\vers of tht: separate branches in  part to faci l i t ate such 
i n fcnnal con1pron1 is:;s bet\vcen rhe br�H1ches on (! cas...:-by -case b:!.sis.  See Shane, Legal Disug;--ee­
nn'n i and 1Vegotiation in a (Jovernn;ent uj· .l;cJ v.·:·;: The Cose o./ E.Yecurive Privilege C/aitns .�-igainst 
Congre.\·s. 7 1  i'v1 I N N .  L.  R E v .  46 1 .  50 1 ( 1 9 8 7 ) .  ft._ n � xt.1n1 p l e  of t h i s  i�  the doctrine of e;�ec u t i ve 
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among branches that existed with the parties. 1 2 1 While all of these are 
only half-way time-limited measures (complete preclusion would be 
quite dangerous) the limits on information in these cases can facilitate 
useful agreement and subsequent action. 1 22 
2. Civic Virtue and Law-and-Economics A ttempts 
To Further Precision 
From a civic virtue perspective, this approach may seem perverse 
and certainly it is if carried too far. The foundation of rational 
dialogue, indeed the normative defense often advanced for the legiti­
macy of the legal process itself, is the willingness of decisionmakers to 
respond to and deal with challenges. 1 2 3 A variety of reforms consis­
tent with the civic virtue perspective, such as the "hard look" doctrine 
and "proliferation of points of acr.ess," are supposed to confront issues 
and to "promote access to sources of public deliberation."  1 24 Simi­
larly, law-and-economics proposals to facilitate greater consistency, 
candor, and oversight through judicial review and statutory construe-
1 2  I .  See, e.g., 2 U.S. C. §§ 3 5 1 -6 1  ( 1 988)  (establishing the Commission on Execu t i ve,  Legisla­
t i ve, and Judicial Salaries); Executive Order No. 1 2400, 3 C.F.R. 1 47 ( 1 983) (executive order 
estab l ishing the presidential  Commission on Strategic Forces); 10 U . S.C.A.  § 2 6 8 7  (West Supp. 
1 989) (authorizing the defense secretary's Comm ission on Base Realignment and Closure); Om­
n ibus Budget Reconci liation Act of 1 9 87, Pub. L. No. 1 00-203, 1 0 1  Stat 1 330 ( 1 987) (codified at 
2 U . S. C.A. § 90 1 (West Supp. 1 9 89)) (establishing the National Economic Comm ission); E:;c:cu­
tive Order No. 1 2335 ,  3 C.F.R.  2 1 7  ( 1 9 8 1 )  (executive order establishing the National Commis­
sion on Social Security Reform). See generally Greenberg & Flick, The New Bipanisan 
Commissions, 1 983  J. COMP. STUD . 3, 1 9 .  Indeed, t h e  fai lure of the National Economic Commis­
sion to reach an agreement, in contrast to the success of the social security and base-c losi ng 
commissions, was attributed to the fact t hat it was subject to an open-meeting requiremen t .  See, 
e.g . . M acNeil/Lehrer Newshour (Mar. I ,  ! 989) (comments of Rep. Frenzel). 
The l i terature cri tic izing the ' 'plebiscitary" presidency is based i n  part on a similar anal ysis : a 
president whose every act is subject to media attention l acks the abil ity to fac i l itate com prom ise 
and pri ori t ize interests in the resolution of issues . See T. Low I, THE PE RSONAL PRESJDENT 1 34-
75 ( 1 98 5); J.  Tuus, THE RHETORICAL PRESlDEi'iCY 1 7 3-204 ( 1 9 87).  Of course, president ia l  or 
congressional commissions can offer another analogous advantage: by lowering the n um ber of 
actors who part i c i pate in decisionmaking, they centralize power and help overcome collective 
action problems. 
1 22 .  At the same time, of course, incremen talist decisionm aking can be viewed as aealii!g 
i nformation - that i s ,  information abou t  the results of marginal acts. which then can become the 
basis of subseque:1t  dec isions . See Diver, sup;a note 74. 
1 23 .  See supra i!Otes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
1 24 .  Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1 577 ; see also id. at 1 5 62 (discussing the "central rep u b l i can 
understanding that d i sagreement can be a crea t i ve force'') ; id. at  ! 5 8 1 ,  1 5 84 (stat ing t h at s tatu­
tory construction shou ld prom ote "cons i stency , "  "coordi nation , "  "pol i t ical accountabi l i ty ,"  and 
"high vis ibi l  [ i ty ]"); Bruff, supra note 28,  at 233 ("[H]ard look review couid play the same legiti­
mizing role in  a d m i ni s t rat ive law that the j urisprudent ial  school of ·reasoned elaborat ion·  once 
held out for the courts  themselves th rough norms of neutral ,  consistent, anci candid deci:; ional 
processes .") ;  J.  ELY, DEYIOCRACY AND D ISTRUST 1 34 ( 1 9 80) (c rit ic iz i ng legis l a tors ' "propensity 
not to ma!<e polit ically controversial decisions - to leave them instead to  others, most often 
others who are nm elec ted or effective ly control l ed by t h ose who are") ;  cf Stewart. supra note 46. 
at 1 69 5  ('Indiv idual  poli ticians often fi n d  far more to be lost  than gained in taking a read i ly  
iden t ifiable stand o n  a cont roversial i ssue of social or economic polic y . " ) .  
954 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 8 8 : 9 1 7  
tion (that is, t o  further a legal and political cost-benefit analysis) are 
intended to force the public and decisionmakers to deal openly with 
problems. 1 25 As a practical matter, political candidates and parties are 
routinely castigated in the popular press for not offering the details of 
their programs or downplaying internal divisions. The presumption is 
that such obfuscation undermines the electoral connection, namely, 
the responsiveness of political representatives to the instrumental 
needs and desires of their constituents, and prevents the development 
of an effective rational dialogue. 1 26 
In support of the view that greater information will not cause stale­
mate, civic virtue scholars suggest that an ideological normative dis­
cussion should promote a convergence of views on social principles. 
That is because justifications must be proffered in terms of general nor­
mative ideals and not narrow utilitarian benefit. Where deci­
sionmakers are less focused on their own personal utilitarian 
advantage, it is supposed, they will be more l ikely to converge on first 
principles, which are presumed to be consensual . If that is true, it 
would seem unnecessary to reduce dialogue and information in the 
way suggested above, since ideological confrontation on issues should 
ultimately lead to a rough consensus. 1 27 
Whatever the attraction of this perspective in an ideal world, 1 2 8  the 
party approach suggests that an ideological debate in a real-world 
political environment, where people are aware of their self-interests 
1 2 5 .  See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at  3 54 (urging the courts t o  review legislat ion for 
"consistency" between ends and means in order "to i n c rease t h e  acco u n t ab i l i t y  of t h e  legislature 
t o  the voting public and t o  i m p rove del iberation within Congress"); Macey, supra note 4 1 ,  at  2 5 1  
(calling for system o f  statutory construction t o  p romote candor and " p u b l i c  regarding goals") .  
1 26. Accordi n g  to t h e  textual analysis,  if  candidates and parties were forced to be open and 
c l earer, the responsiveness of our government,  as measured by i ts u t i li tar ian performance, would 
be enhanced. For discussion o f  the other reasons offered for ambiguity,  see general ly  Campbel l ,  
A mbiguity in the  Issue Positions of Presiden tial Candidates: A Causal Analysis. 2 7  A M .  J .  PoL. 
Sci.  284 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ;  Shepsle, The Strategy of A m biguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 
AM. PoL. Sci .  REv. 555 ( 1 97 2 ) .  
1 27 .  See Sunstein,  supra n o t e  4 9 ,  at  1 5 50 ("The requirement of del iberation embodies sub­
stantive l i m itat ions t hat i n  some sett ings lead to uniq uely correct outcomes . " ) ;  id. ("The requ i re­
ment of del iberation i s  designed to ensure that polit ical  outcomes w i l l  b e  s u p ported by reference 
t o  a consensus (or at least broad agreement)  among pol i t ical equals .") ;  id. at 1 5 54 ( " [ R] epublican 
approaches posi t  the existence of a common good , to be found at t h e  conclusion of a well-func­
t ioning del iberative process .") :  M ichelman, Traces of Sel/Govern m en t. mpra note 49, at 24 
(While  "[m]y reading of the h istory w i l l  not show the standard version m i staken in i ts  ascrip t ions 
to republicanism of e i ther  the objectivism of public good or the teleology of c iv ic  v i rtue[ , ]  I wish 
rather to suggest why t h e  civic ideal  retains  i t s  hold despite  i ts  insults  t o  modern sensib i l i t ies .") .  
1 2 8 .  Civic v irtue wri ters have recognized the tensions with in  an obj e c t i ve view of moral i t y .  
See, e .g  . .  MichelmarL Traces of Self-Government, supra n o t e  4 9 ,  at 24 ( " [T] h e  c iv ic  ideal retains 
i ts  hold despite its insults to modern l iberal sensib i l i t i es . " ) .  See generally C.  B A K E R ,  supra note 
i O, at 2 2  ("Our l imi ted rat ionality and the absence of objective t ruth undermine [ ] any basis for 
confidence t h a t  the marketplace w[ i l l ] lead to wisdom . " ) ;  F. Sc HAUER,  F R E E  SPEEC H :  A P H I LO­
SO P ! l l L'd  ENQ U I R Y  34 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .  
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and their ideologies differ, can often exacerbate divisions and under­
mine the ability to reach a consensus. There are two related reasons. 
First, as a general matter, ideological politics tends to raise the stakes 
of the debate because it requires a consistency in judgment that neces­
sarily precludes everybody from getting "some but never all of what 
[they] want. " 1 29 Compromise on the issue at hand can thus be more 
difficult. Second, this effect is important not only for the resolution of 
the question at issue, but also for other issues. By definition, when 
issues are resolved ideologically, a decision about one issue can effec­
tively decide a host of other issues because it is logically connected by 
the ideology. 1 30 As a result, the stakes of the discussion in an ideologi­
cal debate are higher because more potential interests are affected. 1 3 1 
For both of these reasons, the political party literature suggests that 
the value in confronting all issues must be balanced against the media­
tion and consensus-forming benefits of coalitional politics, which in 
effect keep us unfocused on the long-term or "logical" implications of 
our actions. Political parties and centralizing structures such as party 
identification "represent[ ]  the triumph of pragmatic compromise over 
ideological purity that is an essential feature of American politics . "  1 32 
! 29 .  A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEMOCRACY A N D  THE Arvi ER!CAN PARTY S YSTEM 508 
( 1 956) (emphasis om i tted) . Problems over budget n egotiations i l lustrate the tension. A fter pas­
sage of the 1 974 Budget Control Act, each budget i tem was to be reevaluated in a ciassic compre­
hensive approach. See A .  SCH ICK,  RECONC I LIATION AND THE CONGP.ESS!ONAL B U DG ET 
PROCESS 34 ( 198 1 ). It was no longer "possible to swap an increase here for a decrease there or 
for an increase elsewhere without always having to consider the ultimate desirab i l i ty o f  programs 
biat ant ly in competi tion . " A. W I LDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE B U DGETARY PROCESS, supra 
note 1 1 5 ,  at 1 36-37. 
1 30. See Mi ller, supra note 3 1 ,  at  740 (noting that  ideologica l pol itics ord inari l y  "entails a 
large set of universal losers l ikely to be deeply al ienated by the political system"). 
1 3 1 .  Curiously, th is  analysis is the exact opposite o f  t he fam iliar refrain that  ideological de­
bate is the worst and most virulent because there is noth ing a t  issue. Indeed, t here is someth i n g  
at issue, but  i t  is  something that  a l lows of n o  compromise - r i g h t  a n d  wrong, truth or j ust ice, 
the structure of the society - and, therefore, can be more significant .  
This  argument ,  i t  should be pointed out ,  is  consistent with the vei l - of-ignorance d iscussion 
explored in  the next section, which examines the poten t ial value of ideological discussions that 
occur behi nd a veil of ignorance or a t rue real-world substi tute .  I f  decisions are delegated to 
administrative agency personnel whose constant turnover compl icates any pred iction as to their 
future decisions, or are embodied in const i t utional amendments where fut ure application by 
courts are truly unclear, winners and losers may be less apparen t ,  even though t he d i scussion has 
major social signi ficance and is truly ideological . Consensus might be possible .  See infra notes 
1 72-77 and accompanying tex t . In a real-world pol i t ical debate that is not s u bject  to a "ve i l , " 
however, the i mpact of ideologies on other contexts and i n t e r·ests  is more obvious . If poli t i cal 
i nst i t u t ions requ i re t hat discussion be both com prehensive and rational, pol i t ical  agreement as a 
general matter may be less ach ievable. 
! 32 .  Orren, supra note I i 2, at 27. I ndeed, i t  may be the case that imprecisio n .  as advocated 
in t h e  l i teratures on p l uralist incremen talism and nonicleological part ies , should be recognized as 
a rea! -worid means of promo1ing a c ivic virtue d ialogue as well . On a fundamental l evel. the goal 
of dialogue. i ndeed its very justi fication, is to reach some degree of certai nty.  A system t hat  
con verges on such t ruths,  however, wi l l  extinguish <J n y  need or incen t ive for continued dialogue.  
For this reason, i n s t i t u t ions that promote uncertainty  and i;r.fH·ecision can be viewed as ensuring 
a cont in ued inst i t u t ional dia logue; common l aw deci:,ion m a k i n g  and i nterest group pl uralism, the 
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D .  The Decline of Party Identification: A Case Study in the 
Instrumental  and Utilitarian Problems with Increasing 
Information 
The utilitarian and instrumental benefits of limited information, 
discussed above in terms of the political party model, find some factual 
support in the problems associated with the decline of party identifica­
tion and party strength over the past thirty years. As numerous schol­
ars have detailed, party identification within the electorate and party 
strength more generally have diminished, especially since the 1 950s, 
with a majority of the voters now identifying themselves as either in­
dependents or only loosely affiliated with a party . 1 33 This decline is 
especially noteworthy given the fact that the United States, with its 
dispersed political structure, has never had particularly strong parties, 
two greatest "antagonists" of civic virtue, are perhaps the clearest exam ples. See E. LEVI,  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING ( 1 948); see a/so supra note 9 3 .  The incremental i nst itu­
tional decisionmaking in trinsic to pluralist processes, and to a lesser extent nonideological par­
t ies, focuses clearly on immediate problems and, at the same time, ensures a continued exchange 
of views and dialogue over t i me. 
I n  the end, this  paradox i l lustrates the fundamental tension within civic virtue writing i tself 
about dialogue and objective truth, that is, between objective and community truths.  The work 
of Michael Walzer i s  a good example. See M .  WALZER, S P HE R ES OF J USTICE ( 1 983) .  For a 
recent legal discussion of some aspects of this  tension, see Kahn, supra note 86;  Post, supra note 
63.  Put simply, if  there are i n  fact  correct answers, why need institutions for the dialogue be 
eternal? Pluralism and nonideological parties seek to resolve this conflict in  a particularly 
noncivic-republican manner. Limitat ions on information and dialogue, under this approach, 
serve as systems for institutionalizing a continuing discussion. 
1 3 3 .  See W. CROTTY, A M E RICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE ( 1 984); N.  NIE, S .  VERBA & J. 
PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER ( 1 979); M .  WATTENBERG, supra note 78. In­
deed, one political scientist has gone as far as to say: 
In a world in which political scientists disagree on almost everything, there is remarkable 
agreement among the politicai science profession . . that the strength of American political 
parties has dec l ined significantly over the past several decades. Regardless of how one meas­
ures partisanshi p  - by personal party identification within the electorate, by party disci­
pline in Congress, or by the vital i ty of party machinery - there is massive evidence attesting 
to the weakened condition of the parties i n  the United S tates. 
Orren, supra note 1 1 2 , at 3 1 .  
There is evidence in recent years, however, of an increase i n  party fundraising, as well  as 
party voting and strength in Congress, especially on procedural issues. lt is a subject of intense 
debate w hether or in  what sense this represents a resurgence of party i n fluence. See, e. g . . Schles­
i n ger, The New American Polilical Pariy. 79 AM. POL. SC I .  REV. 1 1 52 ( 1 9 85) .  Without doubt, 
however, the focus of parties has become more national, as state party organizations have de­
clined m o re prec ipitousl y . Id. In a forthcoming boo k ,  Gary Cox and Mathevv McCubbins argue 
that the decline-of-party thesis is especial iy  overstat•cd in the case of Congress. See G. Cox & M .  
McCU BBINS, PARTIES A N D  COMMITTEES i N  THE U . S .  H O U S E  OF R E P R ESENTATIVES (Nov. 
1 989 draft on file wi th the a u thor). Regardless of wh et her one accept s their ult imate concl usions, 
their thesis is predicated on the continuing viabi l i ty  of party identification in the electorate and 
the resulting in terest of individual congressmen i n  a small collective body such as Congress in 
supporting party centralization i n  Congress and pariy efforts .  While they appear to be more 
optimistic than some other p o l i t ical scientists on the con tinuing s t rength of party identi fication, 
thei r explanation of i ts  overall impact appears w be consistent with the thesis of this a rt ic le . For 
a historical and i n s t i t u t ional explanat ion fo r the recent rise i n  party vot i n g  i n  Congress at the 
s a m e  : ime as party i n fl uence b.s declined nat ional l y .  see B. G l ''SBURG & M. S r-J EFTER, PoL ITICS 
ilY OTHER i'!l E -'>.NS: THE DEC LI N ING I M PO !<TANCE OF ELECTlO:'iS I N  i>. :Vi E R ICA 9'!·- 1 00 ( 1 990).  
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especially at the national level, as compared to some foreign countries 
such as Great Britain.  
While exceedingly complicated, the reasons for the drop lie partly 
in the proliferation of political resources that has made possible the 
dissemination of information independent of the parties. In particular, 
individual members of Congress have an improved ability to commu­
nicate directly with the public because of increased opportunities for 
individual candidate financing and PAC support; 1 34 increases in dis­
tributive legislation i n  the post-New Deal state; 1 3 5  constituency serv­
icing; 1 36 greater popular education that has made examination of 
individual differences among candidates more appealing; 1 37 and, per­
haps most important, heightened media attention toward individual 
candidates . 1 38 In addition, on the state level, the disaggregation of 
political offices, whereby individual positions are elected at off-years, 
minimizes the dependence of individual candidates on party or group 
performance or assistance. 1 39 In this environment, individual politi­
cians - especially incumbents - are better able than in the p ast  to 
distinguish themselves from their party by emphasizing single issues, 
personality, and symbolic stands. In general, "the media have sup­
planted political parties as the main connecting rods between candi­
dates and voters, providing citizens with their only real info rm ation 
during the campaign . " 1 40 As Morris Fiorina puts it, "Candidates 
would have little incentive to operate campaigns independen t of the 
parties if there were no means to apprise the citizenry of their indepen­
dence. The media provide the means. " 1 4 1  In this situation we have a 
1 34. See L. SA BATO, PAC POWER ( ! 985).  
1 3 5 .  See M .  F!ORINA, supra note 30, at 3 7-47. 
1 3 6. See id. 
1 37 .  E. L.'\00 & C. HADLEY, TRANSFORMATIONS OF T H E  A /1.·1 ER ICA N PA RTY SYSTEM 1 5- 1 6  
( 1 975) .  
1 3 8 .  See A .  WARE, T H E  BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY O R GAN IZATION, \ 940 -
1 980, a t  24 1 ( 1 985)  (noting that  cr i t ical t o  the breakdown of part ies was "the development o f  new 
technologies which could be emp loyed in poi i t ical campaigning.  and the resources w h i c h  hel ped 
i nc um bents,  especi a l l y  legislators, to d i vc:-cc themselves from the? nomin�tt ing un d electoral  act i v­
i t ies of their  party';; orga n izat i ons"):  Rid ardson, supra note  7 8 .  at 700 (concluding that  greater 
party infl uence in  J apan as com par<:d to rhe United States i s  d u e  to rhc  fac t  that  in Japa n , u n l i ke 
the Uni ted State�;, t h e  electorat e  is exposed regularly to i n format ion about part ies b u t  only  i n t er­
m i t ten t l y  to information ��bout cand idates) .  See generally J. C L U B il .  W. FL\ i...: t G A N  & N. Z I N ­
G A L E ,  supm note  89,  at 278-86  (decl ine of party iden t i fication a n d  s t rength occ u rred w h e n  "[t]he 
nat ional i n formation flow increased, became more varied and p-:rva:; ive  , s t r�ci n [ ing] the 
parties as n1echanis rn�; nf ptJ i i t ical  nhi b i lization� [ ]  i ntegrat i o n .  :_tnd polic/ ttF:n1at ion") .  
1 39 .  \V. B U R N H .-\ �\ 1 ,  supra note: 92 ,  ai  94. 
1 40. Orren, supra note I 1 2 , ar 3 1 .  
] J,  I .  fior in : t .  !he Decline uf Colleclive R c.1pomi!Jili(v in .'i 111 erican Po lilies. I 09 DAED.\ I .  US, 
S u m m e r  1 9 80. at 25. 3 3 :  see Orren, Thinking uhou1 rhc Press awl G'ut•ernmenl. i n  l i\·I I'ACT: How 
r H E  P K ESS ;-\. [ : r: �- :c -cs F F D F :.{ ,-\ 1 .  1-lO L I C Y �.l A K E'-l G  10 ( �li. Linsky t.' d .  1 9 8 6 )  (quoting Jan1es Barber 
as S�t y i n g :  "The nl c d i a  i n  the 'U n i ted S ! atcs  ilfC t ht' il t' \V p�.) ! i t ic � i l  r�tn ics. ThC" old pol i t i ca l  part ies 
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more dispersed dialogue. 
To some extent, this phenomenon suggests that "the candidate, the 
issue, [and] the particular events of the immediate campaign" may 
count more now than in the past. Obviously, in certain respects this is 
a political benefit. As two authors put it: 
[I]n the contemporary environment of weak partisan loyalties and large 
numbers of independents, the potential of the campaign for shaping 
voter perceptions of the candidates may be higher than it has ever been. 
As long-term voter commitments to [a] party becomes less important, 
short-term impressions come to predominate. 1 42 
There is a trade-off, however, i n  terms of the three benefits of party 
identification and strength described above. Most importan tl y :  
[S]uch patterns [do not] represent a n  increase i n  voter rationality. "Can­
didate appeal" is often based on the most superficial, contrived kind of 
media image. "Major issues" are too often a few isolated, symbolically 
potent issues that happen to be "hot" at the moment - frequently as a 
result of skilled advertising. And incumbent voting has l oosened the 
link, not only between the issue positions of individual voters and their 
representatives, but also between national public opinion trends and 
Congress as a whole. 143 
The resulting behavior is often "less political in a broad, program­
matic sense than the reliance on party loyalties and identifications that 
it replaces ." 1 44 
are gone."); M. WATTENBURG, supra note 78, at 100 ("Through the media, congressional candi­
dates now have the capability of making themselves far more visible than in  the past, and to the 
degree that their campaigns are run independently of party one would expect a decline in the 
saliency and intensity of partisan att itudes in  the  electorate.") .  
1 42.  See F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 2 9 5 .  
1 4 3 .  D.  PRICE ,  supra note  78,  at 1 1 0.  As Saurof and Beck point out :  
Recent campaigns have witnessed t remendous swings in  public support for candidates right  
up to election day and an increase in  the effectiveness of personal attacks by opponents and 
single-issue groups through negative television advertising, both signs of an electorate that 
lacks deep-seated commitments to candidates or to parties. 
F. SAUROF & P .  BECK, supra note 79, a t  296 (footnote omitted). 
1 44. F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 488; see also Fiorina, supra note 1 4 1 ,  at  44 (this 
· •system articulates interests superbly but aggregates them poorly'') ; Martin Wattenberg 
suggests: 
The party symbol performs a crucial l inkage in  the representation process because the "con­
s t i tuency can infer  the candidates· pos i t ion with more than random accuracy even t hough 
what the constituency has learned directly about these stands is almost nothing . "  With 
parties becoming increasingly l ess l ikely to perform this l inkage and without voter knowl­
edge of congress iona l candidates' pos i t ions . the c hances for fai t h fu l  represen tat ion are 
c l early reduced. 
M .  W.\TTENBERG,  supra note 78, at 1 1 2 (foot n ote omitted) (quoting M i l ler  & Stokes,  Conslilli­
I?IICY Influence in Congress. in  E L ECTIONS A N D  T H E  POl . ITIC\ L  ORDER 3 7 1 (A. Campbe l l  ed. 
1 966)) 
This process may affect the presidency as welL ln the past.  when presidents were chosen by 
party leaders and relied on party support and p o l i t ical iden t i ficat ion tor the election, the vote for 
the  president was more often a dec is ion on part ies t h <.� n  on indiv idua l candidates. Today, in 
con tr<.�st, with i ndependent pr imaries  and independen t candidate campaign organizat ions , the 
selection of the  president is  based less on party eval uat ions and more on public assessments of the 
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This confusion can have an effect on political participation as well .  
Unable to rely on the simplicity of political parties, the public, espe­
cially the poor and less educated, often appears to care less about poli­
tics that it does not understand. 145 This has been accompanied by an 
unprecedented decline in voter turnouts, which can be attributed in 
part to the drop in party identification. 1 46 
Beyond these instrumental problems, moreover, some believe there 
is evidence of a utilitarian cost, both in the increased dominance of 
special interest groups, and the heightened ideological divisions and 
stalemate that have been associated with the absence of strong parties. 
With the drop in party identification and party influence generally, 
many members of Congress seem to have found it easier, all things 
being equal , to build an independent constituency through pork barrel 
projects and constituent servicing. The result, as political scientists 
character and personality of individual candidates. The resul t  may be what several polit ical 
scientists call a "personal president" or  a "rhetorical president," who is more subject to immedi­
ate public pressures and assessment. This may also mean a decline i n  the tradit ional principal/ 
agency relationship between populace and president, and, according  to some prominent scholars, 
in  the l ikel ihood of i nst i tutional effectiveness. See T. LOW! ,  supra note 1 2 1 ;  J.  Tuus, supra note 
1 2 1 ;  see also supra note 87 (discussing political advantages of a principal/agency relationship) .  A 
somewhat analogous concern regarding the dwarfing of "soft" or "complex" variables underlies 
the anxiety over too searching judical review of agency decision making. See, e.g. , Strauss, Con­
sidering Political Alternatives to Hard Look, 1 989 DUKE L.J. 538 ,  549-50. 
1 45 .  M ichael McGerr describes how old-style party identification helped overcome the col-
lective action problem: 
A man's decision to vote at  a particular election did not depend solely on the al lure of a 
candidate, the i nterest of an issue, or the closeness on election; instead, his vote became a 
testament, regularly given, to h is persisting identification with one of the parties. 
M.  McGERR, supra note 8 1 ,  at 4 1 ;  see also Burnham, supra note 32, at 1 3 2  (" [T)he relative 
disappearance of partisan terms in campaigns and their replacement by personal ist ic and imagis­
t ic appeals to voters create condit ions that make ut i l i ty calculations difficult, i f  not impossible, 
[with the result that) some people will remain far better posit ioned to make accurate ut i l i ty 
calculations than others .") ;  R. ENTMAN, supra note 84, at 1 3 7  ("The decline of participation in  
the U.S .  has  historically paralleled the dwindling of the partisan press and the rise of object iv­
ity. "); Abramson & Aldrich,  The Decline of Electoral Participaiion in America, 76 AM.  PoL. Sci .  
REV. 502 ( 1 982) .  This is  not to argue that a l l  h istorically excluded groups are necessar i ly disad­
vantaged by this decline. As noted above, some politicians (Jesse Jackson, for example), have 
certainly been quite successful in  opening up political structures in  particular cases. 
1 46. Walter Burnham summarized th is  connection: 
Inchoate politics, fragmented electoral choices, and personalist ic campaign images lead nat­
urally to growth in the number of cit izens who have a low sense of thei r external pol i t ical  
efricacy; more cit izens who find it  d ifficult or  impossible to rnake a uti l i ty calculation d i ffer­
ent from zero (or perhaps make one at al l) ;  and  general ero�;ion of the strength of party 
ident ification. As politicians' incentives at elections shift more and more to considerations 
of "every person for h imself," the notion of col l ec t ive will tends to disappear; and so. in  a 
highly selective way, does the active electorate. 
Burnham, supra note 32, a t  1 23-24 (footnote omitted). 
In earlier days, part y iden tificat ion served to filter out many of these individual is t ic  considera­
t ions, and highlighted the relat ionship of the candidate to gene ral  polit ical and social i n terests 
that are often obsc u red by expanded and d iverse pol i t ica l  debate.  As David Price observed: 
"The idea of ·vot ing for the  person and not the party' fits nicely with the individual ist ic and 
moralistic st ra in of Amer·ican pol i t ical  cu l ture, bu� nei ther the vi rtue nor t he rat ional i ty of such a 
stance will be�H careful scr u t iny ."  D. PR ICE, supra note 78 ,  at 1 1 0 .  
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have shown, is an environment more conducive to the political univer­
salism described above. 147 At the same time, greater ideological orien­
tation in Congress appears to have led at times to greater stalemate as 
well . i 4s 
E. Political Party and Other Reforms as an A ttempt 
To Channel Information 
Despite the benefits of strong parties, party identification, and 
more limited information, it  is probably neither possible nor advisable 
to create a strong party system in the form experienced at various 
times i n  our history, 1 49 or in some other countries. For one, resources 
that were valuable historically i n  the United States i n  sustaining 
stronger parties - notably, extensive graft and patronage - are no 
longer politically or constitutionally available . 1 50 In addition, the in­
creased dialogue and diverse participation accompanying the decline 
of parties have probably provided benefits, especially among previ­
ously dispossessed groups, such as blacks, in both substantive influ­
ence and participation. 1 5 1  Finally, while less information may have 
offered advantages in a pre-technological age when ignorance did not 
depend upon active government suppression of information, it would 
be dangerous to attempt to reconstruct that state today, given the po­
tential for tyrannical governmental overreaching. 
in light of the instrumental benefits of more limited information 
described above, however, there are reforms that may be useful  meth­
ods for channeling information away from narrow constituencies and 
toward centralized institutions. They would not ,  and given our polit­
ic:::d structure probably could not, create truly strong parties . Rather, 
these proposals would, as some have recommended, simply "restrict [ ] 
access to resources and opportunities that would allow legislat [ ors and 
other politicians] to build strong personal ties to their con­
st i tuen [ts] . " 1 52 In other words, they would seek to decrease the sali­
ence and recognition of narrow group activities - in effect erecting a 
1 47 .  S�:e Fi t ts ,  Vices of Vinue, supra note 1 1 , at 1 628-3 1 (summarizing t he history of this 
phenomenon).  
1 48 .  !d. 
\ 49.  for an ex•:cl lent description of pol i t ics  during t h .: 1ak ! 800�, and early 1 900s. s-oe f'II . 
1 50. See. e.g.. Bra:1 t i  v. Finkel .  -'-45 U.S .  507 ( 1 980) ( proh ibiting dism issal of certain govern­
ii1•:11l employee:> based on rarty a l legiance);  Elrod v. Burns,  427 U . S  . .).p ( ! 976)  (hold ing that  th •c 
p !.<t c t i ce o! '  pat rcm8ge d i s m i ssa l ,, 1· io la tcs t h e  fi rst  and fo urtecmh amen d m e n t s ) .  
1 5 1 .  See Ackernwn.  wpra note  2 8 .  at 744-46: sec also supra notes 6 1 -65 and accompanying 
I 5 2 .  B .  C .. \ : :··F. , J F F :< :O j()H c: & i'v1 . FlOl< l "' ·' · supra n o t e  1 05 .  a t  l -l .  
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veil of i gnorance around them - while, in some cases, also accentuat­
ing the activities of more centralized political units. In a sense, they 
represent modern-day attempts to reintroduce some modest reduc­
tions in information. ·when they are justified depends to a large extent 
on how factually significant the effects outlined above turn out to be in 
individual cases. 
1 .  Coattail Effects 
One example is the proposal to move the election of members of 
Congress to several weeks after the presidential election. 1 5 3  The pur­
pose of this change is to increase the salience of that election, that is, 
its "coattail effects,"  in much the same way that party identification in 
the earlier days overwhelmed the peculiarities of local candidates. By 
linking the presidential and congressional candidates of the same party 
in a web of interconnecting interest, the party label would be empha­
sized and the party strengthened. The result would be a decreased 
focus on individual candidate behavior and an increased focus on 
group responsibility. Proposals to move state elections from off-years 
to coincide with federal elections have similar purposes in terms of 
strengthening national parties. 1 54 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, other proposals seek to 
minimize the independent voice of individual candidates. These in­
clude attempts to decrease the financial resources and influence of in­
dividual candidates by, for example, reducing their franking privileges; 
placing limits on PAC contributions and ending open primaries; im­
proving the financial and other resources of parties, including their 
patronage; and ending the limits on outside contributions to parties. 1 55  
1 5 3 .  See J.  S U N DQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REfORM AND EfFECTIVE GOV ERNMENT 93-98 
( 1 9 86); Cutl er, Pony Governmenr Under rhe A merican Consriturion, 1 34 U. P A .  L .  REV. 25,  3 8  
( 1 9 8 5 )  
1 54. See J .  S U N DQ U IST, supra no te 1 5 3 .  a t  9 5 - 9 8 ;  Sundquist ,  Needed: A Poli£ica! Theory for 
the New Era of Coalirion Govern men£ in £he United Stales, ! 03 PoL Set .  Q. 6 1 3, 63 1 ( 1 988) ;  
Cutler . . wpm n ot e 1 5 3 ,  a t  3 � ;  F. S A U ROF & P.  BECK,  supra note 79, at  2 7 8  n . 8 .  Of course. to  t h e  
extent  t h <.� I  o n e  \ · iews di v ided gove rnment  as a result  of a n  intenriona/ decision of the  v o t i n g  
rubl ic.  c/ Fiorin�i . .  wpm note 8 5 ,  t h i s  c h a n g e  would h a v e  less i m pact .  
1 55 .  Morris Finrina has considered a prohibiiion on con tr ibut ions  t o  i nd iv i d ual  candida tes. 
See Fiorina, supra note i c> l .  a t  '\5 n . 30 (" pccrty cohesion would n o  doubt be s t rengt hened by 
rev i s i n g  c:-: i s t i !1g �.;ta tu tes t o  pr�vent t icket spl i t t i n g  vot ing and to  perr11 i t cJnlpaign con t r i b u t ions 
Gil l y  to nanit:s " ' )  Ot.her pmposals rb ; 1ot  g o  s o  far, t h o ug h  t h e i r  object ive i s  t h e  same.  See 
Sab.ct!O, P.l'al and fnwg.in<'ri Corruprlon in Campargn hnancing. in Et .EC:TIONS A '.I E R ICA"l 
STY LE ,  supra note 3 2 .  at 1 68 ( " 'Th <� l Gng-terrn object ive is clear:  beef up t h e  part ies  so that  PACs 
[and i nd i v id u a l  canc! id;.: tc:;] w i l l  b-: l i r n i t ed i n d i rect ly . ' ") .  P u rs u i n g  s i m i l a r  objec t i ves, othas have 
cal led fo;· d i rect pub l ic subs i d i zat ion  of a party media. See R .  ENT\·L\ "1 .  supra note 84. at  \ 36-37 
(defend i ng pmposai on grou nd.s that  " '[ t)he decl ine of parr i c i pat ion i n  the U.S.  has h istorica l l y  
paral kled t h e  d1x i n d ! i n g  o l '  ! h e  part isan press and t he r i s e  of object iv i ty :  perhaps a n  i njec t ion o f  
party tnedia \\' n u ! d  rcv,_· rs� t h �.: r r c r : d  . .  ) . 
()f �thl!·se. L· iv ic •: i n u e  r• r ( 1 !X)lh� ! ! t �� h�n'e cal led for l i rn i tat io ns on Pi\Cs,  but  ord i na r i l y  on 
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In order for these proposals to have a significant impact, constitutional 
impediments to some of these iimitations might need to be re1axed. 1 56 
2. Government Secrecy 
Several other changes might serve to reduce the informational ad­
vantages of special interest groups, as well as to facilitate compromise, 
by creating occasional exceptions to the general trend toward greater 
sunshine legislation. Decisionmakers might consider, for example, 
making the floor votes of individual members of Congress secret in 
some cases (though not the aggregate tally); closing more congres­
sional meetings to the public; and closing more administrative agency 
operations to public view, including ending ex parte contacts . 1 57 Any 
restriction on initial public access, though, would need to be accompa­
nied by increased presidential and party involvement; the change 
would be acceptable only if there were greater central political partici­
pation and therefore political accountability for the resulting 
decisions . 
. Although this is not the p lace to attempt to delineate any particu­
lar cases, some contexts, such as the establishment of overall budget 
levels in the legislative branch, transmission of agency budgets to Con­
gress by executive agencies, and generation of the executive branch 
regulatory agenda, seem to be fruitful cases for study. Indeed, some 
recent budgetary and regulatory reforms have moved in this direction, 
sometimes with the approval of civic virtue adherents. 1 5 8 If successful ,  
the public would focus less on the marginal advantage of specific deci­
sions or actions taken by their individual representatives, and would 
concern itself instead with the overall party product. At the same 
time, more central political actors, such as high executive officials and 
party leaders, would need to be forced by law to participate more visi­
bly, making them more responsible to the public for the outcome. 
Certainly, there are important trade- offs and dangers implicit in 
any attempts to limit information, especially if they are applied to the 
redistributive grounds. W h i l e  I am sympathetic to t hose reasons. that  is not  the rationale I a m  
advan c i ng h ere . 
1 5 6. See, e. g . .  Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U . S .  l ( 1 976) (per c u riam) (F.E.C. Ac t p rovisions l i m i t ­
i n g  ce r ta in  c a m paign  contr ibut ions i n val idated u n d e r  fi rst amendment) .  
1 5 7 .  See S.  FR -\NTZ!CH .  supra note 1 !  9 .  a t  2 3 8-39 ( ' " [W ] i t h  more recorded votes, members of 
Co ngress are 011 display and can i l l  afford to be known as people who forsake const i t ue n t  con­
cerns i n  the pursu i t  of party loy a l t y . ' "  result i n g  i n  · ·reduced . . .  power of the leaders hi p . ' " ) ;  
G reenberg & Fl ick .  supm note 1 2 1 .  c t  ! 9-20 (argui ng that stalemate and t h e  e n ha nced i n fluence 
of narrow cons t i t uencies in  Congress i s  d u e  t o  breakdown of t h e  part ies and to en hanced publ ic  
scru t i n y ) .  
I S S .  Sc�' S u nste in ,  supra n u t c  5 0 ,  a t  "�5 2 - 6 3 .  
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adjudicative context. 1 59 No one is calling for a return to secrecy in 
government, only greater sensitivity to the political costs of total and 
immediate disclosure. While any change would need to be carefully 
identified so as to not undermine other dialogic and participation val­
ues, there appear to be specific cases where limiting political informa­
tion may achieve public benefits. 1 60 
3. Government Commissions 
In light of this analysis, the value and problems of presidential 
commissions with less clear institutional accountability can also be 
better understood. Over the past few years, there have been numerous 
attempts to erect blue ribbon, high-visibility boards to resolve divisive 
budgetary and political issues such as the deficit, social security, or the 
closing of military bases . 1 6 1  In these instances, Congress and the Pres­
ident have delegated decisionmaking on specific issues to independent 
commissions with broad mandates to come up with "solutions" for 
particular problems. While in some cases boards are given final deci­
sionmaking authority, plans are usually submitted to Congress for ap­
proval . Obviously, since the original plans could have been considered 
by Congress without commission review, the rationale for the estab­
l ishment of commissions, apart from some special expertise of their 
members, appears to be to bind Congress and the general public mor­
ally and politically to the resulting solution. 
A large part of the appeal of this device is its informational insula­
tion. Ideally, the commission may serve, much like traditional party 
identification, to help insulate representatives from constituent and 
special interest group pressures, erecting a veil over the process of 
decisionmaking and giving the commission's resulting proposal a pub­
lic interest veneer once it is introduced back into Congress. 1 62 In addi-
1 59 .  I n  some cases, special in terest groups may have better know l edge of what is  occurring 
behind closed doors, so this veil would have the effect of increasing their informational advantage 
over the public. Moreover, there is a constant concern about the potent i al for tyranny. As I 
have suggested previously, however, it is not clear whether s tronger centralized power in a two­
party sense may not reduce the possibi l i ty of tyranny. See Fitts .  Vices of Virtue. supra note 1 1 , at  
1 6 10- 1 2 . 
1 60. This argument is discussed again below. See infra notes 2 1 7-26 and accompanying text .  
1 6 1 .  See supra note  12 1 .  
1 62 .  See Greenberg & Flick, supra not� 1 2 1 ,  at 1 9  ( " 'Open ing up" of congressional process so 
that representati ves are no klnger i nsulated from interest group pressure by party st rength has 
" 'so com plicated and bl!rdened the legislative bargain ing process thai recourse to commissions 
. [becomes] almost i nevitable .") .  U n l i k e  the t radit ional  New Deal agency . moreover, which 
over t ime has establ ished s t rong l inks to congressional oversight com m i t t ees and to spec ia l inter­
est group' concerned with i ts  act iv i t ies.  the h igh-level commissions can be more insulated from 
such i n p u t .  Th us. t h e y  can be less l ikely to suffer from t h e  t radi t ional  problem of special interest 
groups being advantaged by a partial veil. See infra notes 1 63 and 207- 1 1  and accompanying 
text. 
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tion, and equally important, the commission permits bargaining 
outside the formal spotlight of existing legal institutions, hopefully fa­
cilitating consensus. \Vhile t here are obvious problems with this tech­
n.iaue, esoecia11y if the commission takes the form of the traditional > > 
l"lev/ Deal agency where no single central figure ultimately assumes 
responsibility for its decisions, 1 63 i t  has served as a modem-day substi­
tute for the parties on some issues where it  is limited in time and sub­
j ect matter and has overall high public visibility for its finished 
product. 
4. Increasing Voting Turnout 
Finally, recent attempts t o  deal with declining voter turnout by 
withholding information abou t  election returns and polls can be valua­
ble for somewhat similar reasons. Voting creates the same type of 
prisoners' dilemma as do special interest groups. If the public votes 
only for narrow instrumental reasons, individual citizens should not 
make an effort to vote, since their vote has almost no likelihood of 
affecting the outcome. 1 64 Unfortunately, to the extent that everybody 
fails to vote, this understanding undermines all of our interests by end­
ing or perverting the electoral connection. 
Yet the vote has not always been perceived in as cynical a way. 
Party identification originally helped to fill this void. Part of the rea­
son individuals voted was that they ignored the distinction between 
individual and group (collective) action, believing in the party as al­
most a mythical symbol. Voting was a group, not an individual, activ­
ity .  Thus, j ust as party identification is a symbol that leads individuals 
to pursue group interests and may minimize the prisoners' dilemma of 
special interest government, so the general myths of party identifica­
tion can lead individuals to ignore their narrow self-interest on the 
decision of v;hether to vote at all . 1 65 Quite simply, our ignorance of 
1 63 .  Sec e.g ,  M .  B E R NSTEIN ,  REGU LATING E Vi l N ESS BY ! !': D E PEN DENT Co:vi M ISSiON 1 72 
( 1 9 5 5 )  Thus .  i n  t h e  ca�;e of permanent l ow - level comm issions the insulat ion may serve to exacer­
bate t h e  i n fl uence o f  spec i;.J i i zed cons t i t uencies .  See M c Ltchern, Federal A dviso1y Com m issions 
in un Econon;ic :1-fodel of Represeti!Otire Democracy. 5':- P u B .  CHOICE 4 1  ( 1 987) ;  Pet racca , Fed­
eral A dvisorv Comm ittees. lnteresr Groups and r!u.' Adm inisrrazi�·e Swrc. 1 3  CoNG.  & PRES.  83 
( 1 9 76 ) .  Jn add i t ion .  i t  al:io should be recognized t h a t  s o m e  aspects  of t h e  ve i l  oft e n  appear to be 
more a pparcn i t han real .  When the proposa l s on kgisi ;J t ive c!n d  j u d ic ial S;.tiar ies  were u l t i mately 
s u b m i lted back 10 Congress, for example, indiv idu;.JI  members of Congress were clearly held 
dccountab!e fo r lheir decisions. and the i n c rea�;e W<lS defea t e d .  For a discussion of the separa­
t i Lm -of-powers aspec t s  of such commiss ions ,  and t h e i r  p u t c'n l i a l  > a l ue in  fu r t h e r i n g  a v e i l  of igno­
cance and pol i t i ca l  consensus, sec inj.;·a note 2 1 1  
1 6-� . Se<' N .  F:WH U C H  & J .  OPI'E:" H E I !\ l E R .  M O D E R !'' l'Ol . I T I C M. Ecot--: O M Y  97- 107  ( ! 978) ;  
R .  H .-:.. R D J :-; ,  mpra note  1 4 , at  1 1 : Meeh l , The Seljisli Vorer Poradox and rh(' Thrown-A way Vore 
. ·1 rgumcnr. 7 1  Ai\ 1 .  P O I .  SC I .  R E v .  I !  ( 1 977) .  
1 65 .  St!e J"-< L iv!cG I : R R .  supra note  8 l .  a l  39-'""� 1 .  
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and failure to focus on th"= "logic of collective action " can help to save 
us from the perverse consequences of collective action. 1 66 
I n  l ight of this historical benefit of ignorance, and of the continuing 
decline in voting in recent years, 1 67 there are various changes that can 
best be understood as seekin g  to reinforce the ignorance of the collec­
tive implications of the voting decision. For example, the periodic ef­
fort to prohibit public opinion polls from being taken during the last 
few weeks before elections, or to stop the networks from announcing 
the election results in some states before the polls  have closed in 
others, are attempts to reinforce the ignorance of the collective impli­
cations of the voting decision. 1 68 These changes seek to divert the fo­
cus away from the individual's impact on group activity.  Th e  failure 
to release this information is supposed to help maintain the belief that 
your vote is important, even though it is virtually impossible in a p res­
i dential election that an individual vote will matter in any case, regard­
less of what the last polls or television returns show. ·while 
i ncremental, these changes i l lustrate another possible value of limited 
information. 
F. Implications for Civic Virtue and La w-and-Econom ics Theory 
The proposals discussed above are admittedly modest and preca­
tory. My purpose is to sketch the outlines of some doctrinal and struc­
tural changes that appear to further the party approach, give a sense of 
their d irection, and underscore their potentia} tension "With the civic 
virtue and law-and-economics approaches. 
As noted above, the civic virtue tradition seeks to structure gov­
ernment so as to " proliferate points of access" to legislative and ad­
ministrative decisionmaking and to expand the dissemination of 
information opportunities. 1 69 Law-and-economics proposals to facili­
tate disclosure of information can have simiiar effects . 1 70 Taken indi­
vidually and on an elite level, there are benefits to many of these 
changes; they serve, for example, to illurninate the implicit biases of 
1 66. See D. MUELLER,  supra noie 3 7 ,  at 1 22-26, (finding t hat voter part icipation i ncreases 
with c1.8sencss of electiom). There are also important part ic ipat ional and non instrumental bene­
fits to vot ing.  See. e.g. . Gil letre,  Plebisciu:s. Participmion. and Co!!cclive A Clion in Local Govern­
ment Law, 36 Mrc!-i .  L REV. 930, 950-53  ( 1 988 ) .  P ub l ic behavior reflects this  conclusion : much 
of the publ ic  st i l l  votes, despite awareness of the col lect ive action prob lem, partl y  because t hey 
view the decision to vok noni nstrumen tal ly .  See Farber & Frickey, supra note 37, at 893-9�·, 
907. 
1 67.  See supm notes 1 45-46 and accompanying t ex t .  
1 68 .  See, e. g .  Blum.  Polling an A llomey for Advice, f'l a t l .  L J . .  I\lov. 2 1 ,  1 9 8 8 .  at ! 0. 
1 69 .  See supm notes ,L9-66 :ll d  accompunyir:g  text .  
1 70. See supra notes 4 1  A4 and accomp<mying t e x t .  
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particular proposals and marginal costs. On a systemic political level, 
however, there can be trade-off's, especially on the political and electo­
ral system. A general public that finds it difficult to make sense of 
complex dialogue and 'splintered government institutions may, at the 
same time, find it increasingly difficult to understand, care about, or 
participate in such a general political environment. Compromise and 
agreement may also be more difficult. Political and legal institutions 
should be designed to take account of both effects, which can be in 
tension with one another. 
The proposals outlined above are offered as exceptions to common 
civic virtue or law-and-economics approaches, and serve to channel 
information and public attention to more centralized institutions. In 
particular, the bulk of the proposals to strengthen political parties seek 
to decrease the independent financial or structural ability of en­
trepreneurial actors to engage in some forms of public dialogue and, in 
some cases, to increase the influence of centralized institutions such as 
the parties. In a sense, they change the matrix payoff of information, 
moving it to support more centralized institutions. No one suggests 
that any institution should be given the power to determine what infor­
mation should be disclosed, that is, to limit it  by prohibition; concerns 
about tyranny and lack of diverse participation preclude that. 1 7 1 The 
way political institutions are organized and the way financial resources 
are deployed in these cases, however, can serve an intermediate role by 
shaping the manner in which issues and programs are presented to the 
public. 
IV. LIMITED INFORMATION AS A NORMATIVE BENEFIT IN 
DECISIONMAK I N G :  VEILS OF IGNORA?>JCE (MODEL XV) 
Up to now I have focused on the thr"'e instrumental advantages to 
more limited information - improved rationality, utilitarian effi­
ciency, and political agreement. In this section, I turn to examine a 
fourth model, a type of veil of ignorance which offers a normative ad­
vantage in decisionmaking. This benefit can be achieved in theory by 
excising information about the effect of a decision on different groups, 
thereby erecting something like a real-world veil of ignorance around 
the consequences of social policy for individual groups' interests. H 
successful, this may help promote a rational dialogue and forge 3. polit.· 
ical consensus. 1 n 
1 7 1 .  The firs t  amendment g.:ne:al!y and appropriately serves as a l i m i tat ion on such 
intervention. 
1 72 .  In theory ,  t h e  consequences for pol itical decis ionmaking of such l i m i tations can be 
t h ree-fold. Fi rst. by el iminating self- interest ,  the veil  can serve to st imulate a <ationa! dialogl!e 
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While the use of the often-mentioned but seldom- examined device 
of a veil of ignorance is subject to some theoretical and practical 
problems that will be developed below, I argue that it has been suc­
cessful in one important structural public law case related directly to 
the thesis of this article: party turnover within a government of sepa­
rated powers. In other words, the veil has been promoted by a well­
functioning two-party system. Conversely, it appears to have been un­
dermined by changes advanced at different times in the law-and-eco­
nomics and civic virtue literatures. 
A. A Theory of the Veil of Ignorance 
Establishing a true veil of ignorance in the real world is obviously a 
difficult if not impossible task. In general, partial veils of ignorance 
can be created in public decisionmaking through any technique that 
serves to introduce a structural impediment to a clear identification of 
the ultimate winners and losers in a public decision. While it is unnec­
essary to catalogue all of the specific cases, the most prominent is a 
constitutional amendment. 1 73 In addition, statutes that are expected 
which, to the extent that our society enjoys a dominant consensual ideology with respect to a 
particular issue, helps to forge a consensus. Second,  to the extent that the ideology is Rawlsian 
or ut i l itarian, the l i mitations could create ince n t i ves for income redistri but ion.  Finally,  a l im i ta­
tion on i nformation which is complete, t hat is, which serves effectively t o  avoid a particular issue, 
may avoid destructive philosophical divisions on occasions where there are potential ly un­
resolved philosophical as well as i nterest group differences. This last case was explored sepa­
rately supra in section III .C, though t here clearly are aspects of a real-world ve i l  of ignorance 
that promote consensus through this type of effect as wel l .  
1 73 .  T h e  tradit ional case where the  legal systern c a n  impose a modified veil of ignorance i s  
t h rough constitutional amendment under article V. When t h e  populace at  l arge is  engaged i n  
constitutional decisionmaking, pol i t ical  actors are necessarily proceeding under some ignorance 
o r  imprecision - clue both to the implicit agreement that constitutional provisions must be 
framed in very general terms and to their  iong-term prospect i ve appl ication. The combination 
may make it less certain exact ly how the provision wil l  be applied as well as what  posit ion the 
framers wi l l  be in  when i t  is applied.  I ndeed, in some cases i t  may be the fram ers' descendants 
who are most affected by the provision, rather than the framers t hemselves. As a res u l t  of this  
combination of factors, i t  can be argued that const i tut ional  decisionmaking, while i t  does have 
other l iabil i t ies noted below, may make individuals more wi l l ing to consider such issues from a 
public-regarding perspective. See, e.g. , L. Sager, The I ncorrigible Const i tution 26 ( u npubl ished 
manuscript presented at Legal Studies Seminar,  Universi ty  of Pennsylvania (Ja n .  26, 1 9 89),  and 
on file with author) ("Decisionmaki n g  about a long- d istance Constitution is a special k ind of 
vent u re, one which reinforces the kndency to genera l ize away from one's O'.vn present t i me and 
c ircumstance to other times and circumstances; a ven t u re , in other words, which encouwges the 
general ity of the moral perspective .") ;  J .  BUCHANAN & J.  T U L LOCK, THE CALC U L U S  OF CON­
SENT 78 ( 1 962) (" uncertainty that  is  required in order for the individual to be led by his own 
i n terest to support const i tutional prov is ions t hat are general l y  advantageous to all indi viduals 
and ro al l  groups seems l ikely to be present at any const i tut ional  stage of d iscussion ");  M ueller, 
Constitu tional Democracy and Social Welfare. 87 Q.J. Ecor-:. 60, 61 ( 1 9 7 3 )  (the d rafters of a 
constitutional amendment shou ld consider the  im pact on al l  c i t izens and future generations);  cf 
Ackerman, supra note 92,  at 1 1 7 1 -7 3  (popu lation engages i n  h i gh pol i t ics when considering the 
Consti t ution); Ell iot,  Constitu tional Conventions and the D,;ficit, 1 9 8 5  DUK E  L.J.  1 07 7 ,  1 1 06-07 
(a const i tutional convention would t ranscend pol i t ics as usual and frame the issues o n  a general 
and abst ract level). 
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to remain i n  force for extended periods 1 74 and delegation o f  decision­
making to administrative agencies 1 75 can create sufficient ambiguity 
that the initial decisionmakers have difficulty in calculating the inci­
dence of costs and benefits. In these cases, the veil can be furthered 
largely by the generality of the rule that is initially adopted, making it 
unclear exactly how it will be applied . 1 76 The vagueness can also be 
created by ambiguity about who will enforce the rule or how they will 
enforce it (turnover in control of administrative agencies in particular 
affects both these factors), 1 77 and by the length of time it ·.vill be en­
forced (due to the length of time constitutional amendments and cer­
tain long-term statutes are in effect, the position of the proponents and 
other groups may change dramatically) . 
1 74. The same analysis can be applied to authorizing legislation, or so-cal led back door 
spending. To the extent that legislation is general and reasonably can be expected to remain on 
the books for years to come, its longevity can have a s imi lar  type of effect on political motivation 
as a consti t utional amendment. The longer the legislation is l ikely to stay in effect, the more i t  
may impede the framers' calculation of self-interest. Of course, this  argument is predicated on 
there being greater difficulty in repealing legislation. See, e. g. ,  McCubbins, Noll ,  & Weingast, 
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: A dmin istrative A rrangements and the Control of Agen­
cies, 75 VA. L. REV. 43 1 ,  4 3 5-40 ( 1 9 89).  
1 7 5 .  Delegation of decisionmaking to administrative agencies can, at least i n  theory, offer a 
similar normative advantage. When legislation is framed in general terms, or substantive au thor­
ity is specifically delegated to administrative agencies, the precise application of the provision by 
the administrative agency is unclear largely because the personnel of the ag�ncy are constantly  in 
flux.  Thus, t here is ambiguity both as to the identity of the executive officials who are subject to 
the provision and to the nature of the decisions they wil l  make. 
Needless to say, this is relevant to both those who might become executive officials and those 
who will be subject to its structu res. While law-and-econom ics scholars have explored delegation 
as an efficiency-enhancing (or efficiency-reducing) device in the effective i m plementation of pro­
grams, delegation can also shape and transform the t hinking of the initial decisionmakers in 
Congress in  much the same way as the requirement in  administrative law that certain types of 
decisions be made t h rough rulemaking. See Diver, supra note 74. 
1 76. See J. BuCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 1 7 3 ,  at 1 20; Bruff, supra note 2 8 ,  <:t 22 1 
( " A  check on the fai rness of selecting decision rules is the difficulty in determining who wil l  
profit from their later  use in specific cases. [A]t the operational stage it is much easier to 
predict the winners and losers from a change in the decision rules . ' ' ) .  To some extent,  one might 
argue tl:at this technique creates consensus by avoidance, obscuring t h e  existence or significance 
of problems in order to forge agreement.  In t h is sense, it is sin: i!ar to the tec hnique of avoiding 
intractable debates th rough ignorance and avoidance, a �  described in  section III .C. On the 0ther 
hand, at least as an ideal, the technique should only obscure the incidence of costs and benei'1ts of 
different policies, not the problems t hemselve:;. 
1 77 .  See U.S . CONST. art. I , § 6, d. 2 (the incompatibi i i t y  clz,use) ;  1 LOC K E ,  THE SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 1 43 (J.W. Grough ed. 1 966) (6th ed. 1 76,i) ("[B]ecause it may be 
too great a temptation to h uman frai lty,  apl to grasp at pow:::r, for the samr� persons , who have 
the power of making l aws, to have also in their hands the p�J'.ver to execute t hem, vvhereby they 
may exempt themselves from the obedience to the l::iws they make, and su i t the !z,w, both in its 
making and exec ution,  to their own private advantage, and t hereby come to have a distinct inte!·­
est from the rest of the comm unity . . ") ; cf United S ta tes v. Brown, 3 8 1  U.S.  437,  4�-9-50 
( 1 965)  (When establishing criminal l iabil ity,  Congress must  "set forth a generally applicable rule 
and leave to the courts and j uries the job of deciding 1·;hat  persons have commi tted the 
specified acts or possess the specified charncterist ics.  ") .  
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B.  Criticisms of J 'his Approach 
As ·with all approaches to policymaking, however, the veil is sub­
ject to both philosophical and practical problems. These difficulties 
are important in appreciating •.vhen and why it may not be a useful 
technique . 
1 .  Philosophical Critioues - � 
As the philosophical criticisms of Rawls' veil of ignorance outlined 
above suggest, 1 78 an informationally restrictive veil may undermine 
the richness of public dialogue by obscuring interests and issues . In 
order to promote a rational dialogue, civic theory generally seeks to 
expand the points of access to decisionmaking, thereby forcing govern­
ment actors to talk to and understand others' viewpoints. Knowledge 
of one's own position is critical to the clear presentation of one's 
views. 1 79 In contrast, the theory behind a veil of ignorance appears to 
reflect a more skeptical view of human motivation and of the ability to 
encourage a true dialogue when knowledge of one's self-interest still 
exists. Hs value lies in cases where (and to the extent that) the 
proliferation of information is likely to sharpen people's knowledge of 
and willingness to pursue their self."interests. 1 80 
Law-and-economics scholars, on the other hand, may also be trou­
bled by the loss of information, though on different grounds. Law­
and-economics scholars explore the acquisition of information instru­
mentally; the question for them is ordinarily whether more expendi­
ture on information would lead to utilitarian advantages for the 
individual, or, considering externalities, for society in general. 1 8 1  
Under this approach, efficiency concerns are ordinarily treated sepa­
rately from redistributive concerns. 1 82 In this sense, for example, dele-
1 7 8 .  See M .  SANDEL, supra note 54, a t 1 22-32 (arg u ing one cannot know one's views or 
interests un less one is  sit uated in a part icu lar context); supra not es 54-55 and accompanying text .  
1 79. Ultimately. tht: value of th is  :::x change depends on the participants' abilities t o  evince 
empathy for other positions - a necess<J.ry p red icate to the norma t i ve free d ialogue that leads to  
a consensus or agreement o n  the norm ative system . Obviously, o n e  o f  the m a i n  d i ffic u l t ies with 
this  system i s  that  i t  is subjec t to serious problems of decept ion and lack of empathy. 
I SO. Usually ,  a veil  of ignorance is  no t  jus t i fied on the grounds t hat i t  may serve as a welfa re 
lot tery . It does not improve decisionrnak ing or social  welfare merely because peop le migh t enjoy 
the ir  ignor:Jnc•c of fut ur e  sucial posit i llns.  Rather. it changes the ir  decisionmaking process i n  
ways that  should enh<!nce (fmm an e t h i r;al  rcrspec t i '>e) t h e  group social product .  t ak i n g  away the 
d.-=c is ionn1(.l..kr:rs' sense < �f t h e i r  ()I,Vn i n t e �·e�:t in fJart icu lJ.t o u tcon1es of the decis ion.  Th us , the 
::hotce \vhet hcr  ur ; :ot t o  retain su�·h ptoc·:.-:d u rts i::;  n o t  nrd i n a r i ! y  p t·ed ic:Hcd on the risk aversion 
of the gtnerr·d poruLl t ion or their d ,;-c�s iorEnilke:-s. Sec l\iLts:la\v) supra note 48,  at 88 (discussi ng 
delega t iOn in terms of risk :tver�: ion) .  Ncvenheks•.:. l ike  l'viudel l l l .  i t  can serve that role. 
I 8 I .  See supra note 22 (dis•:ussi n g  technic:1l and philosophical problems with the veil-of­
ignorance approach) .  
1 82 .  This observ�1t iGn is  i n t ended ;"' descript ion ,  not cr i t ic ism.  Law-and-economics theory 
c·rd in o.r i ly  vi r.:\v�-; t-'":d istribut iv�  i s��ue:, ;...:.s ;.:. �:;c:parate an�J. !y t i c  ccnct� r n .  See supra note 20 (d iscuss-
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gation i s  evaluated according t o  whether the division o f  labor 
improves efficiency. 1 83 The purpose of the veil of ignorance, on the 
other hand, is to create a social and political incentive for individuals 
to be willing to redistribute resources or reach agreements. This is a 
question of preference formation, which law-and- economics scholars 
generally do not address. 1 84 It may well be that the veil will create 
inefficiencies or deadweight losses . 1 8 5  
2 .  Practical Problems 
Apart from these philosophical differences, attempts to create a 
real-world veil can raise serious practical problems. Because the tech­
niques for creating a real-world veil lack the precision of Rawls'  heu­
ristic device, which by definition perfectly eliminated knowledge of the 
decisionmakers' place in society, the veil can be either overinclusive or 
underinclusive. 
If it is overinclusive, and too much information is eliminated, am­
biguity can create a misidentification of goals, obscure l egitimate inter­
ests, and dwarf relevant problems. For example, the generality of 
constitutional decisionmaking and legislative delegation has meant 
that courts and independent agencies have often been accused of pur­
suing goals viewed as adverse to the Congress that originally passed 
the measure. 1 86 The frequent criticism that New Deal agencies were 
"captured" by special interest groups clearly falls into this category. 1 87 
ing ideal types). See generally A . M .  PoLINSKY, supra note 2 1 ,  at 7 ("Economists traditionally 
concentrate on how to maximize the size of the pie, leaving to others - such as legislators - the 
decision how to d ivide it."); id. at  1 0  ("For purposes of discussing the legal system, a reasonable 
s impl ifying assumption i s  that income can be costlessly redistributed."); Rose-Ackerman, supra 
note 25, at 342 (law and economics " takes wealth maximization as a first principle"). 
1 83 .  See A ranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 30, at 6, 27-30. 
1 84 .  To be sure, the reaching  of agreements can be viewed as an issue of efficiency in  the 
sense of avoiding the col lect i ve action costs of achieving consensus. 
1 85 .  See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, a t  344 (stating that welfare economics "generally 
lacks a realistic view of rhe working of rhe pol i tical process[,) . . .  ignoring pol i tical feasibili ty") .  
I ndeed, one of the most importan t  aspects of the veil - the difference principle - is inconsistent 
with the approach of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The point is simply that in some cases inefficien­
cies may be just i fied as the cost of c reat ing  the political incentive for redistribut ion or polit ical 
consensus. 
1 86. Of course, on one level ,  the underlying purpose of the veil i s  to pursue goals adverse to 
the i n terests of some part ic ipants i n  the legislat ive arena.  See supra notes 1 72-77 and accompany­
ing text .  The problem is  th :J t  an im perfect vei l  of const i tut ional decisionmaking can go beyond 
this, obscuring  resolut ion of certain problems and leaving i t  to the courts and agency bureaucrats 
to li l l  in this vagueness by pursuing the ir  own independent object i ves. That certainly appears to 
be one of the current "conservative" critiques of jud icial and agency usurpation. See. e.g. , J. 
R A B K IN ,  J U DI C I A L  COI\-I P U LS IONS ( 1 989) ;  M. SH.·\ P I RO,  WHO G U . \ R DS TH E G U A R DI A N S :  J U D I ­
C I A L  COi"TROL OF AD\f i � J S T R J\Tio:..; ( 1 988) .  A n  earlier ' ' l iberal" generation had similar 
problems w i th  the hold-over i'l e'.v De•> l Court. Sf'e A .  B ICKEL ,  supra note 9 1 ,  at 90. 
1 8 7 .  Su' :d . B E R N S T E I N ,  supra note 1 63 ,  a t  86-i37 .  
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On the other hand, if the veil is underinclusive, too little informa­
tion may be excised, allowing some but not all political actors to pierce 
the veil. For example, to the extent there is not turnover in the groups 
to which a statutory or constitutional requirement applies and to the 
extent its impact is clear, the extended length of time it is expected to 
be in effect can exacerbate divisions and increase attempts at rent-seek­
ing. This would occur, for example , as groups such as pro- or anti­
abortion advocates fight "to the death. "  Due to the clarity of the issue 
and its long-term impact, they continue to battle rather than compro­
mise. 1 88  Similarly, to the extent that only a subgroup can foresee the 
impact of a rule, as in the case of some delegations to administrative 
agencies, the veil may increase social differences, as some advantaged 
groups use it  as a mechanism to appropriate social resources to 
themselves. 1 89 
These trade-offs can be seen in a variety of different public law 
debates. For example, a great deal of academic paper has been con­
sumed criticizing backdoor budget authority. In an attempt to pro­
mote instrumental rationality, many have criticized such budgeting on 
the ground that it avoids yearly analysis of the costs of programs. In 
addition, the use of different funding devices (backdoor versus ordi­
nary appropriation statutes) can further fiscal illusion, according to 
this line of reasoning, by hiding the true costs of programs. 1 90 
Nevertheless, backdoor budget authority, as opposed to yearly ap­
propriation statutes or other time-limited legislation, can provide a 
normative advantage in some respects. An appropriation statute is 
limited to one year only, and thus will generally have an impact only 
for that limited time. Those voting for the particular item are more 
likely to know precisely who will or will not benefit from the legisla­
tion. In contrast, an authorization bill, or a bill granting backdoor 
budget authority, lasts in perpetuity, unless Congress can overcome 
inertia and repeal it. In areas where Congress can expect to see a large 
turnover in the groups or institutions that will be subject to the partie-
1 88 .  See. e.g. , 1 .  MANS B R I DG E. WHY W E  LOST THE ERA 1 94 ( 1 9 86) (defeat of ERA was a 
res u l t  of " [t]rying to legislate a broad prinl:iple t h rough t he consti t u t ional  amendment process"; 
"basic iss ues were at stake" and "the fin al resul t  h ad to be victory for one side and defeat for t h e  
o t he r' " ) ;  Landes & Posner, The lndependen/ Judiciary i n  an !nleresi-Group Perspeclive. 1 8  J . L .  & 
EcoN. 8 7 5 .  879 ( 1 9 7 5 ) :  Macey, supra note 2 5 ,  at 52 (stat ing t h a t  according to law-and-economics 
theorists "srccial  in t e rest gro u ps place an especial ly h i g h  value on cons t i t u t ional  r ules, because 
such ru les are harder to repeal and t herefore more d u rable t h a n  ordinary legis lat ion") .  
1 89 .  See infra notes  208-09 and accompanyi n g  t e:d . For 2. 11  effort to  explain adm i n i s t rat ive 
procedures i n  terms of assis t i ng d i fferent g roups i n  moni toring bureaucracies, see McCubbins,  
Nol l ,  & Weingast. supra note 3 6 .  
1 90. C/ Goetz, Fiscal Iffusion in Sra1e a n d  Local Finance. i n  BUDG ETS ,\�ID BLJRL\UCR.>.TS: 
THE SOURCES OF GOY E K N \1 FNT G R O WTH i 7 6 ,  i 77 (T. Borcherding ed. 1 977) .  
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ular restriction o r  statutory limitation, these bills may create some 
greater incentive for Congress to reach a greater level of consensus and 
equality. Such areas include limitations on the executive branch, rules 
about the procedures of Congress, and overall levels of taxation. 1 9 1  
The reason for this incentive i s that more groups will  potentially be 
subj ect to the limitation. 1 92 
Indeed, this is the type of technique that Congress used to reach 
agreement on budget cuts in the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Control Act of 1 98 5 ,  popularly known as Gram m-Rudman-Hol­
lings. 1 93 By setting budget targets years ahead, the precise incidence 
of budget reductions was less predictable to the Congress that origi­
nall y  passed the measure. In effect, ignorance about specific outcomes 
can help forge a consensus and create a disincentive against the singu­
lar pursuit of narrow group advantage, at l east ex ante. 1 94 
A similar debate has occurred regarding the early l aw-and- eco­
nomics argument, advanced originally by Landes and Posner, that the 
long-term enforceability of statutes by independent courts facilitated 
rent-seeking by ensuring that deals would continue to p ush benefits in 
perpetuity to the narrow group vvhich originally secured passage of the 
legislation. 1 9 5  Under the early la·w-and-economics view, the longer the 
statute's existence, the more likely it was to facilitate rent-seeking by 
narrow groups, and to heighten political divisions. This is due to the 
greater discounted benefit to their present political activity .  To the 
1 9 1 .  See infra section IV.C. l .  As noted above, this argument is pred icated on the greater 
d i fficul ty in  repeal ing legislation. See supra note 1 N. 
1 92 .  Another example can be found in the events s u rrounding the origin a l  passage of the 
income tax during the Civi l  War .  After Congress was unable to increase traditional property 
taxes, the effects of which would  have been perfectly clear, agreement was u l t imately reached on 
an income t a x ,  l argely because the effect of the then-novel tax on different const i tuencies was 
unknown. See J. Alt, The Evolution of Tax S t ructu res 36-50 ( 1 982) (unpubl ished manuscript on 
file wi th  author). 
1 93 .  Pub. L. No. 99- 1 77 ,  99 Stat .  1 037  (codified at 2 U.S .C. §§ 90 l -22 ( 1 98 8)) .  
1 94. Whi le such programs may be !ess  "effic ien t " than ! ump-sum d istribut ions, they can 
create the pol i t ical wii l  to redis tribute or reach agreements .  For s imi lar reasons, a variety of 
i n t ernal legis l a t i ve rules can be viewed as a t t e m p t s  to  erect veils of ignorance over legislative 
activity, he lp ing to promote consensus.  For example, the rules of proced u re for each Congress 
arc set by the prior Congress and can be anwnded o n l y  t h rough i nterven t ion , sometimes requ i r­
i ng  s u per-maJori t ies ,  at t h e  beg inning or that Congress. The system ha:; been the subject of some 
academic  cr i t ic i :;m on the grounds t h<:�t ea,;h new Congrc:;s should generate independent ly ,  or at 
least be able t o  rc:pcal • h rough majori t y  vote,  a l l  of  i ts ru les each tenn See E u le , Temporal 
L im irs on !he Lcgislu!i l'i! !'>!andc11e: Enlrenchmenl  am! Rerroaclil'ii_v. 1 9 87 A'.L B.  FOU N D .  REs. 
j, 3 7 9. J,07- l 2. 425 ' L 2 i 5 . B.:cause kgisbtive proct:d ure is  ord inari ly agreed upon at a t ime when 
part ic ipants are lc:ss clear about the etfect of the rules on t heir  i n terests, however, they may be 
less l ike ly to consider margi na l i nstrumental  advan tages and. therefore. more l ikely to reach a 
consensus. 
1 9 5 .  Sue Landes & Posner, supra note 1 8 8 .  
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extent that the future application of the provision is clear, and the 
position of the proponents static , this analysis seems persuasive. 
In cases where the groups subject to the limitation might change 
over time, however, such statutes may be less l ikely to promote nar­
row, interest group rent-seeking, and more likely to further general 
agreement and redistribution, since the group can no longer be assured 
that it will be in a position to benefit from the statute. 1 96 The clearest 
examples, as outlined below, are statutes limiting executive powers 
where party control of the executive branch is expected to change over 
time, or broad, all-encompassing tax statutes. In such cases, in periods 
of rapid turnover and long-term application, there may be some 
greater l ikelihood of reaching a consensus and less likelihood that ac­
tors will pursue their narrow marginal advantage at the cost of a 
broader societal benefit. 1 97 
C. Separation-of-Powers Problems: A Case Study in the Value of 
the Veil and Political Parties 
While a veil can be generaily useful in these various ways, it 1s 
important to appreciate that a properly functioning two-party system 
can also be quite successful in establishing its own type of macro-polit­
i cal veil of ignorance. As noted above, delegation to administrative 
agencies may create a veil through different techniques of constitu­
tional and statutory decisionmaking, helping sometimes to forge a 
political consensus and overcoming the advantages of special interest 
groups. A brief review of the history of separation- of-powers confron­
tations suggests that political parties have been important in this pro­
cess. Conversely, their breakdown has had a negative impact on those 
relations. The consensus and breakdown can be seen in two different 
contexts - (1 )  control of the presidency and Congress, and (2) control 
of executive agencies . 
1 .  Control of the Presidency and Congress 
For much of the past one hundred years, the l-\merican politicai 
system has been heavily infiuenced by two political parties that each 
had the potential over time to capture any or all of the political 
branches. 1 9 8  ·when one party was dominant for a brief period, more­
over, it 'Nas ustlally able to control all branches of governr11erAt. I1  
1 96 .  See supra note 1 73 (discussion of cons t i t u tiona.\ change in self-inter<::st) . 
! 97 .  See infra section I V . C . l .  
1 9 8 .  The fol lowing discussion draws heavily upon B. Ginsburg & M .  Shefter. Pol i t ical Par­
ties, Electoral Conflict, and Institu tional Combat (unpubl ished man uscri pt  on file with the au­
thor). See also B.  Gt"iSBURG & M .  SHEFTER.  supm note 1 3 3 .  
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such an environment, individual politicians and political parties did 
not ordinarily envision their interests as necessarily connected or 
linked to the power of any one institution . While there clearly were 
constitutional crises between branches during this period, it was not 
demonstrably in the interest of a particular party or politician to con­
centrate power in any one institution - especially in a constitutional 
sense - since the party might later be excluded from this power 
center. In effect, a veil of ignorance existed in both statutory and con­
stitutional debates regarding the likely beneficiary of institutional pow­
ers. As compared to today, there also was generally more agreement 
over the extent of constitutional authority vested in executive and leg­
islative officials. 
In recent years, especially since 1 968, however, this fluidity has 
changed. Because of the decline of political parties and a variety of 
other historical reasons, no party has recently been able to dominate 
both branches simultaneously . To the extent there has been influence, 
moreover, the Democratic party has had greater control of the legisla­
tive branch during this period, and the Republican party has more 
often controlled the presidency. 1 99 Indeed, given the incumbency ad­
vantage in Congress, and the Republicans' recent advantage in presi­
dential elections, most current political actors seem to expect that the 
pattern will continue. One result of this situation is that the parties 
and individual politicians now tend to envision their political interests 
as tied to the particular institution that they inhabit and to the en­
hancement of the statutory and constitutional powers of that institu­
tion.200 No longer need Democrats fear that reduced presidential 
powers will block a modern Franklin Roosevelt; or Republicans fear 
that enhanced executive po·wers will serve as the engine for a new Ne'W 
Deal revolution. This has been accompanied, not surprisingly,  by a 
resurgence in separation-of-powers confrontations between the presi­
dent and the legislativ.e branch. These include battles over legislative 
1 99 .  See Ferejohn & Fiorina, Incumbency and R.ealignmenl in Congressional Elections, in 
THE NEW DIR ECTiON IN AMERICAN POUTlCS 1 1 5  (J. Chubb & P.  Peterson ed. ! 985)  (noting 
the decreased association between presidential and congressional voting and the electorate's 
seeming preference for a Repub l ican in the White House); Fiorina, supra note 85 (documen t in g  
the history of divided government a n d  i t s  possible explanations); Clymer, Political Terrain Seen 
as Changing. N.Y. Times, Sept .  3, 1 9 89,  at 27, col .  1 (d isc ussing reasons for i ncreasi n g Republ i ­
can control  of the presidency and Democrat ic  control of the Congress). While many have specu­
lated on the reasons for our prese n t  divided government,  t here is probabiy no generally accepted 
explanation. 
200. This appears to be a result  of the inst i tutionally specific con trol of p:uties as well as the 
general breakdown of parties. For, with the general breakdown of part ies and t ih� rising indepen­
dence of pol i t icians,  e';en if  forn1al poli t ical con t rol of the branches did change. i t  is  uncertain 
whether i ndividual polit icians would see their interests as :ied to other branches that they indi­
viduu!!y would be unl ikely to control .  
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vetoes,2° 1  legislative oversight, executive privilege, 202 executive foreign 
policy independence, 2°3 and judicial and executive nominations. 204 In 
the aggregate, these seem unusual in our political history. 205 
While there probably are a variety of social and economic reasons 
for this resurgence, one additional explanation is that the veil of igno­
rance over the institutional position of political interests and actors 
has been lowered. Constitutional and statutory debates over institu­
tional powers no longer occur behind a veil that protects the identity 
of the political participants. For the foreseeable future, it seems likely 
that strong legislative influence will be tied to the interests of the Dem­
ocratic Party and strong presidential power to the Republican Party. 
The loss in fluidity - the lowering of the veil - has undermined 
political agreements over the constitutional and statutory powers of 
the separate branches. 206 
201 .  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U .S .  9 1 9,  969-74 ( 1 983)  (White, J . ,  dissenting) (outl ining the 
consensus that used to exist between Congress and the executive over the necessity and propriety 
of the legislative veto); B .  CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUG­
GLE 36, 1 06-07, 1 60 ( 1 988) (discussing acquiescence of the executive branch to the legislative 
veto prior to the explosion of its use in the 1 970s, and the Justice Department's opposition to the 
legislative veto under the Carter and Reagan administrations); Breyer, The Legislative Veto After 
Chadha, 72 GEo. L.J .  785,  787 ( 1984) (suggesting that the legislative veto acted as a compromise 
on many separation-of-powers issues). For a detailed account of the history of the legislative 
veto, including the consensus on its use in  the 1 930s, see generally B .  CRAIG,  T H E  LEGISLATIVE 
VETO: CONGR ESSIONAL CONTROL OF REGULATION 1 5- 43 ( 1 983) .  
202. See Morrison v .  Olson, 487 U.S.  654, 699-701  ( 1 988) (Scalia, J . ,  dissenting) (detailing 
recent confrontation over executive privilege); Olson, The ImpelUous Vortex: Congressional Ero­
sion of Presidential A u thority, in T H E  FETT E R E D  PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
EXECUTIVE B RANCH 23 1 -42 (L. Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1 989) [hereinafter T H E  FETT E R E D  
P R ESI DENCY] (cataloguing congressional "encroachments" on supposedly traditional executive 
powers). 
203 . See generally Koh, Why The President (A !most) A lways Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons 
of the Iran-Con tra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1 25 5 ,  1 2 59-73 ( 1 988) (faulting the special congressional 
committee established to investigate the Iran-Contra scandal for not trying to understand the 
incident as part of the post-Vietnam breakdown of the consensus between the executive and 
Congress on foreign affairs). 
204. See Totenberg, The Conjirmarion Process And The Fubiic: To Know or Not to Know. 
1 0 1  H A RV. L. REv. 1 2 1 3  ( 1 988) (contrasting the con fron tat ion over the Bork nomination with 
the previous confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices); Chopping Down the Presidenr. 
Wall St. J . ,  Feb. 27, 1 9 89,  at A 1 0, col. i (suggest ing c; brea!<down of bipart i sansh ip  on executive 
appointments concerning foreign affairs). 
205. See generally B. Ginsburg & M. Shefter, supm note 1 98 ;  Monaghar., The Confirmation 
Process: Law or Politics, 1 0 1  HARV.  L. REv. 1 202 ( 1 98 8 ) ;  Totenbcrg, supra note 204; Chopping 
Down the President, supra note 204, at A l O, col .  1 (disc ussing Tower nomination).  For th is  
reason, claims that inst i tut ional arguments need not  be i n fl uenced by predictions of pol i tical 
effect can be hazardous. See Sunstein,  supra note 50, at 462-63 (" [T]here is no necessary connec­
tion between antiregulatory pol it ics and executive contwl.  In a d ifferent administration, execu ­
tive centralization m i g h t  have the opposite res u l t . ").  Obviously, this  can be a common problem 
in debates over inst i tu t ional choice. See H i rshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem 
of Administrative Discrerion. 82 Nw. U. L. REV.  646, 665-66 n . l 34 ( 1 988) (discussing charges of 
pol it ical bias in other i nst i tut ional competence debates). 
206. To public choice theorists, this breakdown of cooperation is fam iliar:  i t  i s  analogous to 
the public choice problem of main t a i n i ng coopt:re\t i ve behavior once th: poin t  .::Jf the end of che 
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The second way in which the veil has been pierced can be seen in 
the oversight by congressional committees of agency implementation 
of statutes. As several political scientists have detailed, delegation 
often imposes a veil of ignorance about congressional actions upon the 
diffuse public, but less so upon specially interested groups. 207 In par­
ticular, according to this view, when the costs of programs are diffuse 
and the benefits concentrated, delegation of authority to administra­
tive agencies can serve as a mechanism through which committees in 
Congress, and their associated constituencies and special interest 
groups, can hide many of the costs from the diffuse public, while pur­
suing their interests in the program at the agency implementation 
stage.208 
To support this observation, some scholars have shown the infor­
mal control individual committees of Congress often have over execu­
tive administration . Because these committees frequently favor the 
interests of narrow interest groups, delegation has sometimes been 
thought to erect a veil around the general public that nevertheless al­
lows congressional committees and special interest groups greater abil­
ity to affect the ultimate outcome through informal oversight of the: 
agencies. 209 The veil of ignorance implicit in delegation can thus be 
asymmetric, potentially exacerbating the informational advantages of 
special interest groups. 
To the extent that this process has occurred, our ability to reach 
agreements on the appropriate internal structures of the executive 
game is known, and is not distant. T i t-for-tat strategies are not successful once the end of the 
game is imminen t .  See R. HARDIN, supra note 1 <�, at  1 45-50. Similarly, her�, knowledge that  the 
institutional posit ion of political parties and members is relatively certain creates i ncentives for 
poli ticians to defect from cooperative strategies, since the opportunity for retaliation i s  
minimized. 
· 
207. See, e.g., Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regula lOry Forms: Legal Process or Administra­
tive Process, 39 PuB. CHOICE 3 3 ,  5 3-54 ( 1 9 8 2); Fiorina, Legis! a tor Uncertainty, Legislative Con­
Ira/ and the De!egatio,n of Legislative Power. 2 J .L .  & EcoN. 3 3 ,  49 ( 1 9 86) [herein:�fter Fiorina, 
Legislator Uncertain ty]; Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agenr 
Perspective, 44 Pub. Choice 1 47, 1 8 1 ·82 ( 1 984); Weingast & Moran, The jl/fyth of R unaway Bu­
reaucracy - The Case of the FTC. REGULATIGi'i, May-J une 1 982,  at 33, 3 7- 3 3 .  But see Moe, ..  !n 
Assessmenl of the Positive Theory of Congressional Domfnc:nce, 1 2  LEGIS.  STU D.  Q. cf75 ( 1 987) 
(quest ionin g  the Congress ioncl domi nance theory). 
208. See sources c i ted in note 207. See also Bruff, supm note 2 8 ,  at 230; B.  GINSBURG & M .  
SHEFTER, supra note 1 3 3 ,  a t  1 76-77.  For a n  explanation of the establishment o f  agency prc,ce­
dures and i nformation st ructures primari l y  in terms of furthering the i n t e rests of the different 
groups lobbyi ng for the original legislation, see McCubbins, Noll, & Wei ngast,  supra note 36. Of 
course, congressional oversight was originally seen as, and in some r·�spccts still is,  a ch::ck on 
agency capture. See note 2 1 5 . The evidence nov,· is that it  may faci l itate sorne forms of capt ure. 
though the extent of congressional ir1fi uence is  stil l  the subject of intensive debate. See. e.g. , Moe, 
supra note 207. 
209. See !\ranson, Gellhorn ;:!z. Robinsvn� supra note 30, at 7 ;  Pierce. supra �-!ot� �t8 ,  at L�- 8 3 .  
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branch may also have been affected. As time has elapsed, and the in­
formal control has become apparent to political actors, debates over 
the statutory and constitutional powers of independent agencies and 
the bureaucracy of executive departments may have been exacerbated 
for the same reasons that led to the separation- of-powers confronta­
tions described above. 2 1 0  \Vith political control over both the presi­
dency and Congress fairly clear, presidential authority over these 
agencies means, as a practical matter, greater Republican control .  
Agency autonomy, on the other hand, with congressional oversight, 
often means greater Democratic control .  Like constitutional and s tat­
utory debates on the separation of powers, divisions over the control 
and structure of the executive b ranch are now clearer and more 
politicized. 2 1 1  
In light of this history, i t  is apparent that ignorance has advantages 
and that important political costs are created by the greater certainty 
of political position. In the past, passage of long-term statutes or ac­
ceptance of informal agreements on executive and legislative powers 
often created fewer divisions because there was the distinct possibility 
of both executive and legislative turnover. With the decline of a com­
petitive two-party system, this greater ability to reach political agree­
ment over legitimate institutional powers has diminished. A veil that 
would ideally help equalize political influence and facilitate political 
agreements does not exist. 
3. Future Reforms 
V/hile there is no obvious solution to this complicated situation, it 
is important to recognize that many past and proposed reforms in the 
civic virtue tradition, whatever their other values, may exacerbate this 
2 1 0. For a discussion of the constitutionality of i ndependent agencies, see generally Synar v. 
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1 3 74, 1 3 9 8  (D.D.C.  1 9 86) (asserti n g  the difficulty of reconci l ing the 
holding in Humphrey's Executor v .  U ni ted S tates, 295 U.S .  602 ( 1 93 5) ,  with separation of pow­
ers); M i l ler, Independent Agencies, 1 9 86 SUP. Cr. REV. 4 1 ,  96-97; Scalia, Historical A n omalies in 
Administrative Law. 1 9 8 5  SuP. Cr. HIST. SocY.  1 03,  1 06 - 1 0. The debate over executive d epart­
ment au tonomy has occurred with respect to  the regulatory orders i n  the Reagan administration. 
See Exec. Ord. 1 229 1 ,  3 C . F . R .  1 27 ( 1 9 8 1 ), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 60 1 ( 1 982) ;  and Executive 
Order 1 2498,  3 C.F.R.  323 ( 1 9 8 5 ), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 60 1 ( 1 982 & Supp. I I I  1 985) .  
F o r  commentary on t h e  degree to w h i c h  the W h i te House exercises or s h o u l d  e;\e:rcise power 
over rulemaking by the Office of M anagement and Budget,  see, for example, DeMuth & Gins­
burg, White House Review of Agency R. u !emaking, 99 HARV.  L.  REV. 1 07 5  ( 1 9 86) ; Ivlorrison, 
Ol"fB In terference with Agency R u lemak!ng: The Pr"rong Way to Write a Regulation. 99 HARY. 
L. REV. i 059 ( 1 9 86). 
2 1 1 .  I n  l ight of this analysis, the value of high level government commissions as a decision­
making device can be appreciated. See supra notes 1 6 1 - 63 and accompanying text.  While dele­
gation of decisionmaking to the president  or  an administrative agency can be suspec t for the 
reasons out l ined above, a commission can be made balanced in i ts  membership.  In effect, by 
cornbining the rnembership of the separate branches) it can recreate the veil of instit utional 
posit ion.  
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effect.2 1 2 A s  discussed above, civic virtue theory favors stimulating a 
rich and diverse dialogue about administrative issues through "prolif­
erating points of access" to administrative decisionmaking. Courts, 
the president, Congress, and perhaps the public generally are all sup­
posed to become more involved in administrative decisions . 2 1 3 Pro­
moting mechanisms that facilitate legislative, presidential, and judicial 
participation should not only stimulate dialogue, but should also re­
duce the comparative advantage of special interest groups through a 
type of competitive oversight.2 1 4 
While there is much to be said on behalf of these changes, 2 1 5  espe­
cially given the necessity for broad delegations of authority today, as a 
totality they can further exacerbate the breakdown of the veil , as issues 
are increasingly fought out within the executive branch on a case-by­
case basis, ex post. Instead of debates on institutional powers being 
made behind a "veil ," real decisionmaking for the most part is delayed 
and transformed into a bargaining process within the executive branch 
on an issue-by-issue basis. Moreover, in recent years, these debates 
have probably become increasingly protracted due to the greater polit­
ical independence and security of political actors, especially members 
of Congress2 1 6 - an independance that civic virtue theory would seem 
to applaud as the structural precondition to a diverse and rich public 
2 1 2. One solution, put  forward by some scholars, is to abandon the veil al together. See 
Aranson, Gel lhorn & Robinson, supra note JO; see also T. Lowr, supra note 3 5 .  According to 
th is  analysis, courts should reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine and produce greater specific­
ity in statutes. Obviously this would avoid some of the perverse effects of legislation oversight,  
but might t h row the baby out with the bath water. See Mashaw, supra note 48. 
2 1 3 .  See supra notes 56 -59 and accompanying text.  In  order to ensure this d ialogue, over­
sight from all  of these institutions is supposed to be enhanced, with information about executive 
agencies disclosed through the Freedom of Information Act, the government i n  the Sunshine 
Act, legislative oversight, and enhanced judicial review under the hard-look doctrine. 
2 1 4. These proposals are based in  part on the old New Deal model of special interest group 
influence, where power was supposed to have been exercised behind closed doors between bu­
reaucrats and i nterest group representatives. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 450 ("Agency au­
tonomy, in short, has often served not as a guarantor of neutral administration, but  as a source of 
vulnerabil i ty to the pressure of wel l -organized groups. ") .  
2 1 5 . See Bruff, supra note 2 8 ,  at 2 1 0, 2 4 8  (concluding that the approach "acknowledge[s] 
pol i t ical influence and concentrate(s] on ensuring that i t  [is] openly and fair ly  exercised"; "(t]he 
widespread access to policymaking processes that the agencies are required to provide fosters 
compromise, . . .  ensuring that public policy wi l l  be supported by coal it ions representing a set of 
values that is relatively widely accepted"); Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty. supra note 207, at 49 
(increasing proceduralization of administrative agencies after late 1 960s consistent with "legisla­
tors t rying to counter increasingly evident biases in the administrative processes"); cf McCub­
bins & Schwartz, Congressional Oversigh t Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire A larms, 2 AM. 
J .  P O L  SCI .  1 65 ( !  984) (discussing information proliferat ion as  helping to solve principal/agency 
problems of Congress); McCubbins, Nol l , & Weingast, supra note 36 (same). 
2 1 6. There is  a now volumi nous l i terature on the congressional incumbency effect - espe­
cial ly in the House of Represen t at ives . See, e.g ,  Fercjohn & Fiorina, supra note 1 99.  at 9 1 - 1 1 7 ; 
f iorina , supra note 1 4 1 ,  at 37-39 .  
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dialogue. 2 1 7 In this environment, however, independence and the cer­
tainty of position may undermine the ability to reach agreements on 
institutional powers. In short, efforts to stimulate dialogue and "vi­
ture" under a civic virtue philosophy may be in tension with a "veil of 
ignorance" approach. 
At the same time, there is also some question about the extent to 
which the civic virtue proposals will actually minimize the influence of 
special interest groups. The theory behind this view is that the in­
creased spotlight of competitive checking and participation after dele­
gation will minimize the back-door, behind-the-scenes "deals" that 
inspired the common criticisms of the traditional New Deal agency. 2 1 8 
In many cases this is undoubtedly true, as administrative deci­
sionmakers respond over the short run to potential exposure . 2 1 9  Over­
all, however, the increased complexity of the process can, for the 
reasons discussed above in Part III ,  have another effect on the public 
at large, especially on an electoral level : advantaging specialized con­
stituencies that have a greater ability to untangle the complexity of 
administrative dialogue and inputs, while disadvantaging the diffuse 
public, which does not know whom to hold accountable, especially in 
its electoral judgments . 220 The ultimate effect on systemic political ac­
countability can be quite complicated. 
The traditional political party model, on the other hand, would 
offer a quite different perspective on these problems. It would likely 
seek to deemphasize informational access to the initial formulation 
and implementation of executive programs in particular cases by erect­
ing more informational barriers to executive agencies. As one scholar 
discussing this policy has observed, increases in congressional over­
sight can "inhibit[ ] democratic control of policy and administration of 
an idealized sort - coherent, coordinated programmatic in the re­
sponsible parties sense. "22 1 The "very system feature (disciplined, 
2 1 7 .  See Sunstein, supra note 87,  a t  3 1 -38 ;  Farber & Frickey, supra note 87, a t  9 1 2  n . 224; 
Tushnet, Schneider & Kovner, Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An  Observation. 66 
TEXAS L.  REV. 967 ( I  988). 
2 1 8 . See supra note 1 87 and accompanying text. 
2 1 9 . See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
220. See W. BURNHAM, Shifting Patterns of Congressional Voling Participation 1 981, in THE 
CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1 96 ( 1 982)  (observing that the mass electorate is "baf­
fled by the complexity of our const i tut ional arrangements, has extremely low levels of informa­
tion, and has not been educated by any social instrumentality . to an understanding of 
politics") (emphasis omitted); cf Bruff, supra note 28 ,  at 24 7 (noting that with the increase in  
inputs to the  administrative process, "[t ]he very mult ip l icity of competing actors suggests tha t  no 
one of them wil i  attain effective control . Consequently, an administrator usual l y  has discre­
tion in shaping policy .") .  
22 1 .  J .  AHERDACH,  KEEPING A W ,\TC HFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIOf':/\L 
OVERS iGHT 2 1 2  ( 1 990). 
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centralized decisionmaking) that seems to enhance the accountability 
of decisionmakers to the public may (be consistent with a] restrict[ed] 
role of legislative bodies in oversight. "222 Thus, this approach might 
'Nell be more sympathetic toward increased presidential power over 
certain nationwide agency operations, while legislative oversight 
would be more limited at the initial stages . A variety of reforms such 
as some limitations on legislative oversight, 223 s imultaneous transmis­
sion of agency budgets and other information to Congress, 224 and 
greater review by the Office of Management and Budget of major 
agency action and l egislation, falls into this category.2 25 While there 
are constitutional impediments to a full implementation of any party 
approach, which in its extreme form runs contrary to checks and bal­
ances, the goal would be to make the president more responsible for 
and accou ntable to the public for agency decisions .  
Unfortunately,  this approach can succeed, even on a modest basis, 
only if we h ave an accountable president and truly strong, competitive 
parties to recreate the veil .226 To the extent that we continue to h ave 
weak parties, each controlling a separate branch of government, cen­
tralized executive authority creates legitimate concerns of tyranny, 
one-party control of executive decisions, and substantially reduced 
public dialogue and public participation.  
Given this  potential tension between legal participation and polit­
ical accountability, we need to recognize that there are costs to a sin-
222.  Id. at 2 1 1 .  In short. "the more centralized and coordinated that  authority i n  govern­
ment becomes, the less l i kely it is that the legislative body will be an active overseer of policy and 
administration . "  I d. at 209; see also Bruff, supra note 28, at  233 ("the President lacks strong 
incentives to intervene in regulation because he bears only attenuated pol i tical  responsibil i t y  for 
decisions made i n  the agencies"). As Donald Horowitz has observed of the presidency: 
Cau t ioning against a plura l  executive, Hamilton, i n  The Federalist. warned that a prolifera­
tion of personnel would make personal accountabil i ty for executive m isdeeds difficult  to 
establish .  It would depri v e  the public of the "opportunity of discoverin g  with faci l i ty  and 
clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, i n  order either to [achieve] their  removal 
from office, or  [ ]  their  actual p u nishment in  cases which admit of i t . "  I n  public psychology 
and i n  legal conception, we have the u n i tary executive of the Framers; in the d ifficulty of 
t racing responsibil ity and i n  the accompanying immobil ism.  we have something closer to the 
pl ural executive they rejected. 
Horowitz, Is the Presidency Failing?. 88 PuB. INT.  3 ,  2 0  ( 1 9 8 7). 
223. See generally THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 202. 
224. See, e.g., 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 632 ( 1 9 82).  
225.  See supra note 2 1 0. As Aberbach has noted, " t he very discipline a n d  electoral account­
abi l i ty  of a democratic system with effectively centralized and coordinated authority over policy 
and administration is more than compatible with a restricted legislative role in oversight ."  J. 
A BERBACH, supra note 22 1 ,  at  2 1  0; see also Brufr, supra note 28,  at 2 3 3  ("central ized review of 
regulations can help the President check Dolicy that may result  from agency al l iances with con­
gressional commi ttees or i nterest groups, enhancing his  power against those forces"); 'Neingast,  
Regulation. Reregulation. and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agency Clien tele Rela­
tionships, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS . ,  Winter 1 9 8 1 .  at 1 4  7, 1 59 .  
226. As discussed above, we do no' at Ihe m o me;l t .  See supra section I I I . D .  
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gular pursuit of the civic virtue approach. Many past and future 
reforms in administrative law, whatever their other benefits, may also 
undermine our ability to reach agreements on government powers and 
may have a mixed value for diffuse constituencies. In this situation, 
attempts to limit disclosure in some narrow areas, such as the formula­
tion of the executive branch regulatory agenda, coupled with enhanced 
presidential oversight, may serve to further political accountability. 227 
At the same time, these changes would need to be accompanied by 
stronger, more competitive political parties, as outlined in Part HI, to 
ensure that the veil implicit in legislative delegation would be main­
tained and that centralized control would not lead to an institutional 
advantage for one political ideology. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article, which some might view as an exercise 
in intellectual arbitrage between law and political science, has been to 
explore the paradox implicit in some traditional writings on political 
parties : that political institutions have in some areas performed better 
with less information. This anomaly should be especially significant to 
legal scholars, since two prominent legal intellectual models - civic 
virtue and law and economics - often view greater information and 
political communications as the solution to current problems. These 
benefits include stimulating greater normative evaluation of public 
decisionmaking as well as promoting more responsible and efficient 
government. 
As this article has suggested, however, less information and re­
duced communications have been beneficial in some contexts, both 
normatively and instrumentally. In the past, the shaping and narrmv­
ing of political information through the organization of political par­
ties and party identification has in some respects improved the ability 
of the public to understand , make sense of, and control political 
events.  The accountability of indi vidual political representatives to 
group activities t h rough party identification has also l imited the i nflu­
ence of interest groups . \-Vith the breakdown of parties and party iden­
tificat ion, on the other hand, the entrepreneurial ability of independ�nt 
political actors to gain support in their districts has been one of the 
causes of political universalism, affecting the allocation of social 
:resources. 
In addition, as a normative matter, vagueness i n  legislative delega­
tion has sometimes improv·ed deliberative processes and furthered 
2 2 7 .  See St rauss� supra notr� '�· X ,  'H 666. 
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political consensus by limiting the ability o f  political actors t o  calcu­
late the specific costs and benefits of government policy on their own 
interest . Indeed, in some cases, delaying the discussion of problems, in 
the spirit of nonideological parties, has facilitated agreement, espe­
cially in the budget and party context, thereby improving govern­
ment's ability to act. In short, contrary to the usual presumption, less 
information can improve normative as well as instrumental objectives 
in some arenas, and thus should be considered as part of general policy 
analysis. 
Despite this benefit, the rewlution of current policy issues is surely 
not to adopt general or even major restrictions on information. As 
law-and-economics and civic virtue scholars have persuasively demon­
strated, information is an important resource for social progress.228 
Rather, I have speculated on how some institutions might be restruc­
tured to shape the dissemination of information, consistent with the 
insights of the political party perspective. These changes, which high­
l ight the trade-offs raised by many current public law strategies, would 
seek to improve the informational capacities of centralized institutions 
such as parties, while implicitly diminishing those of individual polit­
ical actors. The purpose is to further governmental and social consen­
sus, innovation, and responsibility, broadly conceived. 
2 2 8 .  Moreover, the fact that less information may have been beneficial does not suggest we 
should risk affirmatively empowering  government officials to impose restrict ions.  
